

# BÖLGE ÇALIŞMALARI DERGİSİ

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# **BÖLGE ÇALIŞMALARI DERGİSİ**



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# Reconceptualizing Interregionalism through Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): A Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis

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## Abstract

Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was formed three decades ago to intensify European and Asian relations. Today, it constitutes the widest interregional dialogue mechanism covering 53 countries from Europe to Asia, and it is a special case for regionalism studies. The literature on ASEM discusses its scope, structure, means of cooperation, and possible future scenarios. Yet, the current studies lack an empirical data-based analysis of which themes shape cooperation processes, how regional and international issues reflect upon ASEM, and the extent of change in cooperation themes. In that regard, this study aims to examine ASEM to answer these questions. By using Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis (CACDA), this research analyzes the chair's statements from ASEM Summits between 1996 and 2021 to identify discursive themes, their chronological shifts, and their alignment with ASEM's three pillars: political, economic, and socio-cultural. The research findings reveal that ASEM functions as an intergovernmental forum facilitating interregional dialogue on shared regional and global issues despite criticisms of lacking enforceable outcomes. The study underlines ASEM's role in fostering dialogue between Asia and Europe and proposes reconceptualizing interregionalism as an integral component of multilateral governance.

**Keywords:** ASEM, Asia-Europe Relations, Interregionalism, Corpus Linguistic, Critical Discourse Analysis.

## Introduction

The relationship between Europe and Asia has a long history, but it entered a new phase in the 1990s by prioritizing interregional dialogue. Although the first official interregional dialogue was established between the European Community (EC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 1970s, this initial relationship was ineffective in promoting interregional dialogue. In the early 1990s, a pivotal chapter was opened for relations between the two regions, with the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. ASEM is an interregional dialogue mechanism established to foster cooperation, partnership, and dialogue between Asia and Europe. Initially, it covered only 25 countries, 15 from the European Union (EU) and the other 10 from Asia. In time, it has spread to a wide regional space covering 30 European and 21 Asian countries, together with the European Union and the ASEAN Secretariat as regional organizations. Under ASEM, biannual summits, ministerial-level meetings, and various initiatives have been organized to foster closer interregional dialogue. It has built upon three pillars: political, economic, and socio-cultural. These pillars guide the biannual summits, ministerial meetings, and various initiatives under ASEM. Since its inception, ASEM has become a key reference point for studies examining relations between Asia and Europe and conceptualizing it with the term interregionalism. This study aims to evaluate ASEM by considering its objectives and policy areas since its establishment.

The literature on ASEM primarily focuses on its historical development, structure, and expectations regarding its role in facilitating relations between Asia and Europe. Since its establishment, many prolific studies have been done on ASEM, and they can be classified under two main themes. First, some studies evaluate conditions leading to its establishment and future expectations for facilitating interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe (See e.g. Abe and Plummer, 1996; Dent, 1997; Dent, 2001; Reiterer, 2001; Yeo, 2003; Park, 2004). Second, there are studies discussing and sometimes questioning its effectiveness (See e.g. Lim, 2001; Reiterer, 2004; Pereira, 2007). Moreover, ASEM plays a significant role in regionalism studies, serving as a crucial case for conceptualizing interregional interactions since the mid-1990s under the concept of interregionalism (See e.g. Cammack, 1999; Reiterer, 2006; Tsardanidis, 2010).

The contribution of these studies cannot be underestimated. However, studies on ASEM are relatively few in number, and the number of studies produced recently is also relatively low. In addition, due to the qualitative methods used in these studies, it is not possible to discuss and evaluate ASEM in all its aspects. Therefore, the literature on ASEM is



centered around the idea that ASEM's role in influencing relations between Europe and Asia is somewhat limited. Consequently, both the assessments of ASEM and the conceptualization of interregionalism in relation to it remain narrow in scope within the literature.

This study is built upon the idea that these mentioned weaknesses of the literature stem from the fact that the purpose of ASEM, its evolution over time, and its policy areas have yet to be revealed in detail. As a result, while these studies contribute to the discussions surrounding ASEM and the concept of interregionalism, they lack empirical evidence highlighting key themes shaping ASEM, how they may have evolved over time, and how Asia-Europe relations are represented within ASEM. Hence, it is still hard to identify the role attributed to ASEM in Asia-Europe relations in relation to interregionalism. This study aims to provide a glimpse of ASEM by focusing on these unexplored aspects.

To achieve this aim, this study focuses on ASEM Summits, which are ASEM's key events. It critically analyses the chair's statements of ASEM Summits, which have not been examined extensively. It seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the most frequent discursive themes in the ASEM Summits?
- Is there a change in these themes over time?
- With which themes do ASEM's pillars collocate?
- How is the word “interregional” defined and constructed in these documents?

In order to answer these questions, this study relies on two methodological strands: Corpus Linguistic (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). While Corpus Linguistic (CL) allows the researcher to see dominant themes in texts, their change over time, and concordance among them, the CDA helps the researcher examine the context in which these themes are uttered. These two methods have been combined under Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis (CACDA). Specifically, it examines 13 Chair's statements from the ASEM Summits between 1996 and 2021. These documents are the key texts that reflect participating countries' expectations from ASEM and how they associate interregional relations between Asia and Europe under ASEM.

This paper is organized as follows. A brief history of ASEM and its current structure is summarized at the outset. This would help to bring the contribution of the research into the picture. Next, the study's methodological framework and the structure of the examined documents will be presented. Afterward, the empirical findings of the research are summarized through frequency, concordance, and collocation analysis. Later, the place of

ASEM in Asia-Europe relations in reference to the notion of interregionalism will be discussed based on the empirical findings. Finally, the paper concludes with summaries of findings and comments on suggested agendas for future research.

### **1. Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): A Brief History and Literature Review**

Despite having a long history lasting for centuries, the diplomatic relations between European and Asian states took new forms in the second half of the 20th century. At first, there were bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations between the states of the two regions. These relations, which can be defined as a continuum of long-lasting economic and political ties, were mainly in the form of state-to-state relations. Furthermore, in this period, the first steps towards region-to-region relations had been taken as a new dimension to Asia-Europe relations. The official region-to-region ties between the European Community and the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) were established in the 1970s. It is one of the oldest forms of regional group-to-regional group dialogue between two regional entities (Doidge, 2004: 39).

However, until the 1990s, relations were primarily shaped by the Cold War dynamics. While some Asian countries were positioned under the influence of the Soviets and China, those allied with the US had closer relations with European countries. In addition, some Asian countries had a different positioning due to the Non-alignment Movement. As a result, during the Cold War period, interregional relations remained limited due to ideological and military competition. However, when the Cold War was over, new opportunities and motives to deepen, renew, and change the form of region-to-region relations emerged. As a result, in the mid-1990s, already existing ties between Europe and Asia were solidified with the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). This part of the paper summarizes the historical conditions paving the way for the inception of ASEM in 1996, its development, and its structure.

Two broad reasons trigger the intensification of interregional relations in the aftermath of the Cold War. First, as a political cause, with the end of the bipolar system of the Cold War, a new power vacuum in international order emerged. It prepared the ground for the arrival of multipolarity, which was an opportunity for new actors to engage in more active policies in different parts of the world. The second reason is associated with Asia's growing economic presence in the international economic order. As a result of the transformation of most of the Asian economies, the region turned into a huge production center. Consequently, establishing a dialogue with Asia and Asian states that would strengthen economic relations became an essential motive in pushing non-regional states' foreign policy agendas.

These two reasons should be considered interlocking motives paving the way for developing interregional relations under the concept of Triadic Notion, emphasizing a triangular relationship between Asia, Europe, and North America. The transatlantic dialogue had already secured the triangle's European and North American sides (Dent, 2004; Gilson, 2005: 313). On the Asia-North America side of the triangle, the region-to-region dialogue was institutionalized under the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Asia-Europe side of the triangle, on the other hand, was missing. As a result, while the so-called Pacific Century came with the rise of Asia and there had already been institutionalized ties between the United States of America and Asian countries under the APEC, the European side aimed to keep the relations with Asia as the Euro-Asia leg of the broader new Triadic World Order (Segal, 1998: 563). Consequently, for both European and Asian states, intensifying structured interregional ties had both economic and political meanings within this triangular structure.

The first steps to form a regular and structured dialogue between East Asia and Europe were taken in the early 1990s. On the European side, the idea was solidified with the “Towards a New Asia Strategy” of the European Union. In this document, the European Commission declared that considering the dramatic change in the economic weight of Asia in the world economy, the EU needs to increase its presence in Asia by strengthening relations with Asia (European Commission, 1994). According to Doidge, this document clearly showed that the European side aimed to mitigate its potential economic marginalization by creating interregional dialogue (Doidge, 2019: 9).

On the Asian side, the idea was first put forward by Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. In his speech, Goh underlined that in the absence of dominant power in a tripolar world shaped among North America, Europe, and East Asia, communication channels among politicians and business networks of East Asia and Europe, which was the missing link of the triangle, is one of the essential priorities (Goh, 1995). Goh’s argument was also established on the notion of a tripolar world order. Doidge (2019: 7) claims that “Goh Chok Tong’s proposal was designed to plug this gap, with the call for “Pacific-style” ties between the two positing the new forum as something of a mirror to APEC.”

De Dios, Robles, and Santiago (1996: 57) point out that “ASEM is more than just another European tactic in an economic offensive. Rather, it reflects a broader political strategy of strengthening relations with regions, not simply with nations.” The Asian partner shared these motives. As a result, ASEM emerged as a byproduct of both sides' desire to facilitate interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe. Consequently, the first official meeting of ASEM was held in 1996 among the heads of participating states. During its

inception, it covered 15 EU Member States, 7 ASEAN Member States, China, Japan, Korea (Republic of), and the European Commission. In the following years, together with European eastward expansion and the inclusion of new partner states from the Asian side, it expanded to a vast regional sphere ranging from the Pacific to Eurasia. Today, it has 53 partners, including 51 independent states, including the European Union and the ASEAN Secretariat, as regional entities.

ASEM does not have a permanent secretariat with a form of organizational structure. Instead, ASEM is structured as a dialogue mechanism consisting of regularly held Summits of heads of state, other ministerial-level meetings, and sub-working groups on selected areas. In its current setting, as declared on its official website, ASEM (n.d.) is an “intergovernmental process [...] to foster dialogue and cooperation between Asia and Europe”. Since it does not have a permanent secretariat, its events, including summits and ministerial and senior officials’ meetings, were organized under the management of four coordinators, two from Asia and two from Europe.

Yet, ASEM has only one permanent institution, the Asia Europe Foundation (ASEF), which aims to foster socio-cultural dialogue between peoples of Asia and Europe. It functions like “an intergovernmental not-for-profit organization,” which provides a ground for people-to-people networks between two regions (ASEF, n.d.). In addition to ASEF, the ASEM process hosts other types of dialogues like the parliamentary level dialogue under the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP), a network for civil society under The Asia-Europe People's Forum (AEPF), business dialogue under The Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) and dialogue of trade union centers under The Asia-Europe Labour Forum (AELF) (European Union, n.d.). Most of these are held as side events of formal biannual ASEM Summits and meetings.

In terms of cooperation areas, ASEM relies on a three-pillar structure composed of political, economic & financial, social, cultural & educational pillars (ASEM, n.d.). ASEM Summits bringing partner countries' leaders and ASEM foreign ministerial meetings represent ASEM's political pillar. Ministerial-level meeting series range in different topics such as economy, finance, transportation, employment, culture, education, and energy, marking the other pillars. In addition to the ministerial-level meeting series, senior officials' level meeting series have been carried out under different topics to supplement the ministerial-level meeting series. In that regard, through regularly held summits, ASEM offers a venue for leaders to directly address common policy areas on the summit diplomacy structure.

Despite addressing different cooperation areas, ASEM is not an institutionalized international organization. Instead, dialogue among partners under ASEM is carried out through these abovementioned meetings in the form of intergovernmental dialogue. Due to prioritizing dialogue, ASEM's decision-making process is not based on a formal voting system (Haksess, 2022). Instead, decisions are made through consultation and consensus among members. This flexibility allows decisions to be made based on consensus or broad acceptance by addressing different regional sensitivities.

For the last three decades, ASEM has constituted a special place in terms of its potential contribution to Asia-Europe relations and its significance in international relations with respect to interregional ties. Therefore, what ASEM is, how it can be conceptualized, and how it has affected and been affected by interregional relations and international politics since its establishment are three important questions defining the research agenda on ASEM. This study, in that regard, aims to contribute to the literature on ASEM by addressing these questions with its empirical findings.

## 2. Research Design

### 2.1. Corpus Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis

This research is based on two methodological strands: corpus linguistic (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). While CL is used to disclose linguistic patterns and trends in large data sets, CDA focuses on understanding the social and ideological aspects of these linguistic patterns. These two methods have been combined under Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis (CACDA).

Critical Discourse Analysis is one of the most frequently used methods that look at language as part of social phenomena and is concerned with unearthing overt and covert messages in texts. It investigates how discourses in texts are shaped by social structures and power relations. This study analyzed text, discourse practice, and socio-cultural practices based on Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional analytical model. The model allows not only the comprehension of the linguistic structure within the texts but also an understanding of the social conditions in which those structures emerge. Despite being one of the most frequently used analysis approaches in social sciences in various fields, including politics, media, psychology, and sociology, CDA is still the subject of severe criticism. Studies utilizing the CDA are generally accused of problems related to research bias in choosing texts for analysis, highlighting certain discourses, and overlooking selected language forms to reveal discourses addressed in texts (See e.g. Stubbs, 1997; Widdowson, 2004).

On the other hand, Corpus Linguistics (CL) is a method used for examining corpus, focusing on the features of texts, the linguistic patterns dominating them, and the way language is used (Baker, 2006: 1). A corpus is a collection of linguistic data in which all written or spoken materials are gathered based on a specified set of criteria. A corpus can be produced by a specific person or institution or compiled based on one subject. As an analysis method, CL examines a selected corpus of a particular topic. Originally, CL was a method used by linguists to examine linguistic data. Since the 1990s, it has also inspired other fields and related methods, producing corpus-assisted research by utilizing a multi-method perspective. For example, it has been used in communication studies, which focus on media discourses (See e.g. Kim, 2014; Li and Zhang, 2021; Baker, 2012), political science studies, which analyze political discourses (See e.g. Garcia, 2018) and various other fields, such as law (See e.g. Vogel et al., 2018) and information science (See e.g. Papageorgiou and Vieira, 2021). CDA is one of the methods that CL assists with. Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis (CACDA) is an analysis method that benefits from CL and CDA simultaneously.

As Sinclair (2004: 10) states, both CDA and CL are “the twin pillars of language research.” In the former, the text is examined with a qualitative approach. The latter analyzes the textual data with a more quantitative approach. Yet, both methods have their own missing aspects. As mentioned before, one of the major limitations of CDA is its subjective positioning based on the researcher's perception. On the other hand, despite providing statistically measurable quantitative data, CL does not interpret this data through a contextual analysis in which specific language patterns emerge. CACDA, on the other hand, not only helps to overcome individual limitations of two methods but also provides a better understanding of a subject under examination.

Hence, this study prefers to use CACDA as a research method to examine the corpus of ASEM Summits. As mentioned before, in the literature on ASEM, there is a discernible lack of systematic revealing of the themes reflected on ASEM documents and discursive patterns in association with the notion of interregionalism. Also, there is no study tackling and examining ASEM's agenda and changes in the agenda every year. Lastly, to the researchers' best knowledge, no study has been conducted using CACDA to examine ASEM. Hence, this study utilizes CACDA to examine the ASEM Summit Corpus.

## 2.2. Data Collection

The essential aim of this study is to provide a glimpse of ASEM. In order to reach this aim, it is designed to examine selected documents related to ASEM comparatively and chronologically through CACDA. Since its inception, ASEM has organized ASEM Summits

for two-year periods and declares a chair's statement after each meeting. This study focuses on ASEM Summits, and the chair's statements produced after these meetings. These documents were chosen because, unlike sectoral and ministerial level meetings, which have a specific focus, chairs' statements of ASEM Summits contain all the cooperation pillars of ASEM and are declarations of the highest-level participants. They summarize the issues discussed during the meetings and highlight the themes characterizing interregional dialogue, thus offering a more comprehensive insight into ASEM. In that regard, this study covers 13 chairs' statements of ASEM Summits from 1996 to 2021.<sup>1</sup> They constitute the "ASEM Summit Corpus." It has 3,832 types and 57,682 tokens. The number of tokens for each year's document can be seen in Table 1.

	Number of Tokens
1996	2462
1998	3202
2000	4486
2002	1786
2004	3357
2006	5536
2008	4190
2010	7505
2012	7044
2014	4736
2016	5560
2018	3597
2021	4221
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>57682</b>

**Table 1.** Number of Tokens in the ASEM Summit Corpus<sup>2</sup>

### 2.3. Data Analysis Tool: AntConc

This study uses AntConc Tools Version 3.5.8 (Anthony, n.d.) to conduct CACDA on ASEM Summit Corpus. It is a concordance analysis program created by Laurence Anthony. Like many other concordance analysis programs, it contains numerous functions, such as wordlist, concordance, concordance, collocation, and keyword list. To answer the research questions, the "wordlist," "keyword list," "collocation," and "concordance" tools of AntConc are employed extensively in this study.

<sup>1</sup> The summit, which is usually held every two years, was postponed to 2021 due to Covid-19. Afterward, the summit, which was normally supposed to be held in 2023, was not held. The reason for this delay/cancellation has not been officially revealed. For this reason, the study covers the documents from 1996, when the first event was held, to 2021, when the event was last held.

<sup>2</sup> The number of tokens refers to the total number of words (including repetitions and variations) in each document analyzed. The token count provides an overview of the corpus size and variation across documents.



### 3. Findings

#### 3.1. Frequency Analysis

In CL, the primary function of frequency analysis is to determine the focus of the examined corpus (Baker, 2006: 70). In AntConc, the frequency analysis can be done through Word List and Keyword List Tools. The Word List Tool lists all the words in the corpus by sorting them by frequency. After listing all words in the corpus by their frequencies, a researcher can examine the reasons for the domination of certain words in the corpus. At that point, CDA assists in revealing a better understanding regarding the domination of these words. Table 2 below lists 20 high-frequency words in the ASEM Summit Corpus that had been attained after using the “stop list” function of AntConc.<sup>3</sup>

Ranking	Percentage	Frequency	Word
1	2,60	901	leaders
2	2,14	743	they
3	2,13	741	asem
4	1,20	418	cooperation
5	1,09	378	development
6	0,97	336	asia
7	0,88	306	international
8	0,84	293	europe
9	0,75	259	welcome
10	0,74	256	economic
11	0,73	253	meeting
12	0,65	225	importance
13	0,64	223	promote
14	0,62	215	un
15	0,59	206	sustainable
16	0,57	198	support
17	0,53	185	global
18	0,53	183	security
19	0,52	182	dialogue
20	0,50	173	strengthen

**Table 2:** Top 20 High-frequency Words in the ASEM Summits Corpus<sup>4,5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The Stop List function in AntConc allows researchers to exclude certain words or items from the analysis, making it easier to focus on more meaningful or relevant data. Stop List words are typically high-frequency, low-information words that occur commonly across texts, such as "the," "and," "is," and "of."

<sup>4</sup> Table 4 lists only the 20 most frequently occurring words. Since the cumulative weight of these words within the total corpus exceeds 0.5%, this threshold has been chosen. The purpose of this table is to give an initial impression of the data, so the listed words have been kept limited. Different analyses will be used in the subsequent sections to provide a more detailed analysis of the content.

<sup>5</sup> AntConc does not differentiate between uppercase and lowercase letters. This is due to the software's basic functionality. This is because AntConc generally operates in a case-insensitive manner, analyzing text at the word level without focusing on whether the letters are uppercase or lowercase. In other words, words like "Apple" and "apple," despite having different letter cases, are considered the same word. For this reason, throughout the analysis, all words, whether proper nouns or common nouns have not been distinguished by uppercase letters.



*“asem,” “cooperation,” “development,” “asia,” “international,” “economic,” “meeting,” “importance,” “un,” and “sustainable”* are some of the keywords with high frequency in the ASEM Summit Corpus. Although this short table may not be sufficient to represent the entire corpus, some inferences can be drawn based on these prominent words. Accordingly, the high frequency of terms such as *“leaders,” “asem,” “cooperation,” “development,” “economic,” “asia,”* and *“europe,”* suggests that there is a strong focus on fostering collaboration between Asia and Europe, emphasizing development and economic cooperation. Additionally, words like *“dialogue,” “sustainable,” “global,”* and *“security”* imply that the corpus also addresses broader global issues and sustainable development. Overall, the data suggests that the overarching theme of the ASEM Summit revolves around enhancing economic growth, regional cooperation, and sustainable development, with a clear focus on strengthening ties between the two continents.

Considering the aim and structure of ASEM, reaching this conclusion may not be interesting. Yet, the most remarkable findings that this table shows related to the first two words with high frequency are *“leaders”* and *“they”* as pronouns. Given that heads of state/government attend ASEM Summits, it is plausible to assume that *“leaders”* refers to them and that *“they”* serves as a pronoun to refer to these leaders.<sup>6</sup> In political discourse analysis, the use of pronouns has a significant meaning. As Mahmood and Alshahrani (2019: 18) state, “Pronouns function a key role in political discourses and empower the users to control the power relations through varying referents of the pronouns they use.” The extensive use of these pronouns in the documents indicates that ASEM is perceived and framed more as an intergovernmental dialogue than an interregional one. This suggests that, although ASEM was established with an emphasis on the interregional framework, the regions themselves are not represented as independent, singular actors. Instead, the focus is on the leaders of states from both regions and their perspectives as key actors. Thus, it can be argued that ASEM Summits operate as an intergovernmental forum among European and Asian countries in the form of interregional dialogue.

In addition to analyzing high-frequency words to pinpoint the essential themes within the documents, it is also crucial to examine the yearly fluctuations in word frequency. As previously mentioned, one of the primary aims of this research is to present a chronological

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<sup>6</sup> To confirm this assumption and clearly identify the referent of *“they,”* a collocation analysis was conducted using AntConc. The analysis reveals that *“leaders”* collocates with *“they”* with a likelihood score of 187.593 and an effect ratio of -4.274. While the high likelihood score suggests a statistically significant co-occurrence, the negative effect ratio implies that the association is not exclusive due to the overall frequency of *“they”* in the corpus. This nuanced relationship supports the interpretation that *“they”* predominantly refers to *“leaders,”* i.e., heads of state/government.

analysis of the ASEM process. Therefore, tracking the annual changes in high-frequency words found in ASEM documents may facilitate a comparative chronological examination of ASEM Summits. In this context, Table 3 displays the top 10 high-frequency words in the chair's statements from ASEM Summits for each respective year.

	1996		1998		2000		2002		2004	
Rank	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word
1	58	meeting	46	leaders	63	they	41	leaders	65	asem
2	41	asia	42	asia	60	leaders	40	asem	52	they
3	40	europe	39	europe	48	asem	21	economic	45	leaders
4	27	cooperation	35	asem	39	cooperation	17	cooperation	37	cooperation
5	23	agree	35	cooperation	33	asia	15	they	20	asia
6	22	region	32	they	29	europe	14	development	19	agree
7	18	asem	20	economic	27	economic	11	dialogue	19	dialogue
8	16	development	16	business	26	welcome	11	meeting	19	economic
9	16	promote	16	meeting	24	international	11	region	19	europe
10	15	two	16	promote	24	meeting	10	minister	18	development
	2006		2008		2010		2012		2014	
Rank	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word
1	100	leaders	78	leaders	125	leaders	132	they	99	leaders
2	75	they	67	asem	114	they	87	asem	77	asem
3	49	asem	56	they	54	development	72	leaders	44	they
4	34	cooperation	48	development	53	asem	57	development	35	cooperation
5	33	development	29	cooperation	43	cooperation	46	welcome	35	welcome
6	33	importance	28	welcome	38	un	44	cooperation	30	sustainable
7	31	welcome	27	international	34	international	37	held	28	asia
8	30	international	23	economic	30	stressed	36	international	28	development
9	27	asia	22	global	30	support	35	support	26	europe
10	26	un	21	asia	29	dialogue	33	asia	25	held
	2016		2018		2021					
Rank	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word	Freq.	Word				
1	90	asem	78	leaders	66	leaders				
2	89	leaders	56	asem	56	asem				
3	62	they	42	they	55	they				
4	46	cooperation	28	international	32	sustainable				
5	38	international	24	global	27	international				
6	36	development	23	importance	22	development				
7	33	promote	23	sustainable	20	cooperation				
8	24	importance	18	underlined	19	asia				
9	23	need	17	challenge	19	economic				
10	23	un	17	development	19	europe				

**Table 3:** Top 10 High-frequency Words in ASEM Yearly Documents (1996-2021)<sup>7</sup>

Based on Table 3, an analysis of the most frequently used words in ASEM summits over the years reveals that key themes include cooperation, leadership, development, and international relations. Starting from 1996, the process highlights the focus on fostering collaboration between Asia and Europe and emphasizing regional dynamics. In particular, terms like “*cooperation*,” “*region*,” and “*promote*” dominate the early years, reflecting ASEM's

<sup>7</sup> Table 3 lists only the 10 most frequently occurring words for each year to provide a clear and concise overview of the data. Since the purpose of this table is to give an initial impression of the data, the listed words have been kept limited without sorting them according to certain thresholds. Different analyses will be used in the subsequent sections to provide a more detailed analysis of the content.

mission to build bridges between the two continents. Words like “*meeting*” and “*agree*” also underscore the commitment to dialogue and consensus among participants.

Over time, the focus of ASEM summits appears to have shifted towards the role of leadership. In the 2000s, the increasing frequency of words like “*leaders*” and “*they*” suggests that the forum evolved into a platform at the level of heads of state and government leaders. Terms such as “*economic*,” “*business*,” and “*international*” highlight the forum's role in promoting economic development and fostering international cooperation. Additionally, the prominence of “*welcome*” indicates the diplomatic warmth among participants and the inclusion of new members into the process.

By the 2010s, the emergence of terms such as “*sustainable*,” “*global*,” and “*challenge*” demonstrates a growing focus on global issues and sustainable development. This shift indicates that ASEM has transformed into a dialogue platform in which global challenges are also discussed. In summary, the language used in ASEM summits illustrates the evolution from balancing mutual interests between Asia and Europe to embracing a broader and more sustainable vision on a global scale. Yet, this result reflects that the core themes of discussion in the ASEM Summit Corpus have remained relatively stable over the years, with only minor changes in emphasis to reflect emerging global priorities. Consequently, it reflects that ASEM's focus has consistently centered on economic collaboration, international dialogue, and sustainable development rather than undergoing significant thematic shifts over time.

Table 3 also reveals another interesting conclusion. Every ASEM Summit is organized by either a European or an Asian country. Therefore, chair statements are prepared by the hosting country. Yet, as seen in Table 3, there is no recognizable change in terms of the top ten themes dominating ASEM Summit Corpus. However, as indicated in Table 3, the top ten themes within the ASEM Summit Corpus remain consistent regardless of the hosting region. This consistency implies that while individual regional perspectives may shape certain nuances, the documents largely reflect a balanced approach that aligns with shared priorities and mutual interests rather than emphasizing one region's agenda over the other.

### 3.2. Keyness Analysis

The Word List Function of AntConc helps to determine the focus of the examined corpus and to track yearly change. Using only the Word List function is not sufficient to conduct a more detailed analysis of the context and content of the examined corpus. An additional function of AntConc, which is the Keyword List Function, may help do a deeper analysis of the examined corpus. In its most basic way, the Keyword List Function allows

highlighting unusually frequent or infrequent words compared to a reference corpus. A positive keyness value indicates that the word is used noticeably more often in the examined corpus than in the reference corpus, suggesting that it is one of the key characteristics of the examined text. A negative keyness value, on the other hand, means that the word is used less frequently in the examined corpus, indicating that it is less important or prominent in that examined text.

This study uses the Keyword List Function of AntConc for a comparative analysis between years in order to unveil chronological shifts in ASEM statements. Specifically, each chair's statement, starting from 1998, is compared to a reference corpus of statements from previous years. This comparison helps to reveal the center of attention shaping each year's meeting. Accordingly, Table 4 below shows the center of attention of indicated years' meetings. By comparing the key terms that stand out each year in contrast to previous years, it will be possible to understand how the priorities of each annual meeting have evolved over time.

	1998		2000		2002	
Rank	Keyness	Keyword	Keyness	Keyword	Keyness	Keyword
1	38.5	leaders	19.46	recognized	22.58	civilizations
2	28.64	they	17.6	they	18.81	doha
3	-48.85	meeting	-21.21	meeting	17.47	terrorism
4					16.16	endorsed
5					16.01	asem
	2004		2006		2008	
Rank	Keyness	Keyword	Keyness	Keyword	Keyness	Keyword
1	18.6	coordination	24.16	energy	0	
2	18.34	regions	18.42	iran	0	
3	-17.93	meeting	-17.44	two	0	
4			-17.18	regions	0	
	2010		2012		2014	
Rank	Keyness	Keyword	Keyness	Keyword	Keyness	Keyword
1	29.6	piracy	31.67	water	29.53	italy
2	28.27	labor	21.87	nuclear	26.68	milan
3	23.05	nuclear	17.49	held	18.35	innovation
4	17.39	somalia			17.14	connectivity
5	-20.84	asem				
6	-20.66	europe				
	2016		2018		2021	
Rank	Keyness	Keyword	Keyness	Keyword	Keyness	Keyword
1	35.93	connectivity	23.75	women	67.58	covid
2	24.73	ulaanbaatar	21.39	empowerment	36.65	pandemic
3	21.8	bank	21.32	rakhine	25.02	cambodia
4	17.98	agreement	19.81	committed	24.68	inclusive
5			16.5	notably	20.78	pollution
6			16.46	displaced	18.39	recovery
7			16.46	girls	16.57	digital

**Table 4:** Keyword List for Each ASEM Summit Chair's Statement

According to this table, it is seen that in 1998, the words “*leaders*” and “*they*” were replaced with “*meeting*,” which was the dominant word at the 1996 ASEM Summit. In the forthcoming years, “*leaders*” and “*they*” continued their domination. This suggests that while the importance was given to the event itself in 1996 when the first meeting was held, in subsequent years, rather than the event itself, the participants who were heads of state (governments) were prioritized. These findings are compatible with one of the early conclusions of the study, arguing that ASEM Summits operate as an intergovernmental forum among European and Asian countries.

In 2002, one of the most significant changes in the themes of ASEM was observed. “*civilization*,” “*terrorism*,” and “*doha*” surpassed other themes. It is highly related to the historical context of the meeting. Predictably, the Doha Round of trade negotiation of WTO members and the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 were reflected in these documents. As seen in 2002, the fact that international and regional events reflected in ASEM Summits are also relevant for the following years. In that manner, in 2006, “*iran*” and “*energy*” became a significant topic after the embargo on Iran. Whereas there was no significant new topic on the ASEM agenda in 2008, in 2010, “*piracy*” and “*nuclear*” after piracy activities around Somalia and nuclear escalation in Asia after North Korean nuclear tests. In 2014 and 2016, “*connectivity*” replaced other themes after the European Union declared its connectivity strategy. In 2018, along with other themes, women empowerment and issues related to displaced peoples found a place in the meeting. Lastly, after the outbreak of the global pandemic, themes like “*covid*,” “*pandemic*,” “*digital*,” and “*pollution*” found a place in the 2021 ASEM Summit.

As mentioned previously, when the ASEM Summit Corpus is analyzed yearly, it is hard to find a significant change in terms of the general themes of the ASEM Summits. However, the Keyness Analysis reveals that the topics addressed during ASEM meetings have evolved in response to regional developments and shifts in the international order. That shows that ASEM has demonstrated adaptability to emerging geopolitical challenges and evolving global priorities without deviation from foundational focus areas. In that regard, it can be concluded that ASEM Summits functions like a platform to discuss the dynamics shaping interregional dialogue and developments at the global scale.

### 3.3. Collocation Analysis on ASEM Pillars

As mentioned, ASEM has a three-pillar structure composed of political; economic and financial; and social, cultural and educational pillars. Therefore, in order to comprehend the content and context of these pillars, determining the collocation of these pillars in ASEM

documents may help to understand ASEM better. Doing this analysis is essential to answer one of the primary research questions of this paper, asking which themes ASEM's pillars collocate.

In the most basic way, collocation analysis in CL refers to the study of the way certain words tend to co-occur or appear in proximity to each other by calculating their statistical association (Ayson, 2020: 110). Collocation Analysis highlights words that frequently appear together in a corpus. In order to do Collocation Analysis in the corpus, it is necessary to select a specified focal word, and AntConc sorts all words in association with the focal word within the specified word range. In AntConc, "likelihood" refers to a statistical measure used in collocation analysis to assess the strength or significance of a word's co-occurrence with another word within a given context. Table 5 below is prepared by taking the words representing each ASEM pillar and identifying the words that collocate the most on their left and right sides based on the likelihood value. Accordingly, to extract the root words of the ASEM pillar names, the analysis is based on "politic\*," "econom\*," "financ\*," "soci\*," "cultur\*," and "educat\*."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In order to capture the full spectrum of word variants related to ASEM's thematic pillars, root words were used in this analysis. This approach allows for the inclusion of various morphological forms of the words, such as 'politic\*' (political, politics, politicized), 'econom\*' (economy, economics, economic), and 'educat\*' (education, educational, educator), among others. By using root words, the analysis ensures that all relevant instances, regardless of their grammatical variation, are considered in identifying the themes that ASEM's pillars address. This method provides a more comprehensive and inclusive analysis rather than focusing on individual word forms.

# Reconceptualizing Interregionalism through Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): A Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis

	POLITICAL PILLAR		ECONOMY AND FINANCE PILLAR				SOCIO-CULTURAL AND EDUCATION PILLAR					
Searched Keyword	Politic*		Econom*		Financ*		Soci*		Cultur*		Educat*	
Rank	Likelihood	Collocating Keyword	Likelihood	Collocating Keyword	Likelihood	Collocating Keyword	Likelihood	Collocating Keyword	Likelihood	Collocating Keyword	Likelihood	Collocating Keyword
1	46.904	dialogue	129.699	growth	103.290	ministers	135.245	economic	98.074	civilizations	83.422	training
2	41.721	economic	79.248	financial	71.755	economic	102.593	civil	82.658	diversity	81.603	vocational
3	22.670	fostering	74.318	social	26.134	crisis	80.299	cohesion	58.059	heritage	52.404	higher
4	19.162	lifting	64.620	socio	21.501	finmm	47.839	cultural	54.798	people	52.404	lifelong
5	15.775	restrictions	40.315	ministers	21.371	sustainability	37.214	protection	37.157	exchanges	33.109	learning
6	15.775	placed	35.085	closer	16.124	abuse	33.456	development	36.266	dignity	27.281	quality
7	15.494	socio	34.774	political	15.265	foreign	29.507	inclusion	28.897	ministers	25.073	me
8			30.539	integration			27.496	promoting	26.346	dialogue	24.833	asem
9			28.097	global			26.156	nets	25.891	social	21.577	education
10			25.754	sustainable			23.010	environmental	25.076	intellectual	19.426	ministers
11			24.210	recovery			21.432	media	24.202	expressions	18.802	presented
12			23.200	promoting			20.922	justice	22.606	educational	17.914	health
13			22.350	outlook			17.884	governments	21.843	equal	16.279	germany
14			20.358	partnership			17.706	growth	21.358	protect	15.679	basic
15			18.827	job			17.654	employment	20.222	understanding	15.494	secondary
16			18.620	crisis			17.150	social	19.989	conviction	15.487	exchanges
17			17.131	reinforcing			16.439	dimension	19.989	cmm		
18			16.647	un			15.399	improving	18.898	festivals		
19			16.073	emm					18.898	art		
20									18.832	respect		
21									16.354	festival		
22									16.259	religious		

**Table 5:** Collocation of Each ASEM Pillar

Collocation analysis sheds light on the themes associated with ASEM's three main pillars: Political; Economic and Financial; and Social, Cultural and Educational. Examining the top collocates for each pillar reveals insights into the discourse priorities and interconnections between these dimensions.

The collocation analysis for the political pillar shows significant associations with keywords like "dialogue" (46.904), "economic" (41.721), and "fostering" (22.670). These collocations suggest that political discussions within the ASEM framework often emphasize fostering cooperation and economic dialogue. Terms like "lifting," "restrictions," and "placed" point to policy discussions aimed at reducing barriers, potentially reflecting efforts to improve political relations between regions. The presence of "socio" (15.494) highlights an overlap with social themes, indicating a multidimensional discourse involving societal considerations.

The economic and financial pillars are deeply interconnected, with "growth" (129.699), "financial" (79.248), and "sustainable" (25.754) emerging as dominant themes in the economic context. These keywords underscore the emphasis on sustainable development, global



economic recovery, and fostering partnerships. On the financial side, "*ministers*" (103.290) and "*economic*" (71.755) dominate, reflecting the critical role of policymakers in financial sustainability and addressing crises. Words like "*crisis*" (26.134) and "*reinforcing*" (17.131) suggest ongoing challenges in economic resilience and stability, which ASEM seeks to address through multilateral collaboration.

The socio-cultural and educational pillar highlights the intersection of societal and cultural dimensions with education. Keywords like "*civil*" (102.593), "*cultural*" (47.839), and "*protection*" (37.214) emphasize civil society's role and the importance of cultural cohesion. Education-related terms such as "*training*" (83.422), "*vocational*" (81.603), and "*lifelong*" (52.404) illustrate a strong focus on improving skills and quality education. The frequent mention of "*diversity*" (82.658) and "*heritage*" (58.059) within cultural discussions highlights ASEM's commitment to celebrating and protecting cultural diversity as a unifying theme for its members.

Across all pillars, the interplay between political, economic, and social dimensions is evident. For instance, the strong collocation between the economic and social pillars suggests a shared focus on inclusive growth and addressing societal needs. Similarly, "*dialogue*" appears prominently in both political and cultural contexts, highlighting the centrality of communication and understanding across different domains. The presence of terms like "*sustainability*" in economic discussions and "*learning*" in education underscores a long-term vision within ASEM's pillars. A comparative analysis reveals that while each pillar has distinct priorities, they collectively align toward fostering cooperation, growth, and mutual understanding.

### 3.4. Concordance Line Analysis for "*interregional*"

In the literature on ASEM, the notion of *interregionalism* has a significant place because ASEM is considered an example of interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe. Therefore, how "*interregional*" is defined and constructed in ASEM documents might give an insight into how interregionalism is associated with the ASEM agenda. In that regard, one of the best ways to conclude the context in which "interregional" is used is to do the Concordance Line Analysis. In corpus linguistics (CL), Concordance Line Analysis is used for listing "all of the occurrences of a particular search term in a corpus" (Baker, 2006: 71). Like most corpus analysis software, AntConc functions as a concordance tool that sorts and lists



sentences or text parts associated with the searched term. This function allows the researcher to see the context in which the searched term is used in all corpora.

In the ASEM Summit corpus, the word “*interregional*” is used only 10 times. It is collocated with themes of 1) Political Dialogue, 2) Cultural Dialogue, and 3) Intensifying Economic Relations. Table 6 lists all instances where the word “*interregional*” is used.

Semantic Category	Text Part	Year
Political Dialogue	The Leaders agreed on the need to reinforce multilateral dialogue and cooperation in ASEM, as well as within regional and <b>interregional</b> frameworks, to help strengthen the global multilateral system.	2004
	Leaders welcomed the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015 as a significant step towards greater regional and <b>interregional</b> integration.	2016
	Leaders reviewed the progress made and achievements gained since the inception of ASEM in 1996 and set the course for further enhancement and evolution of the <b>interregional</b> process in the next decade.	2016
Cultural Dialogue	Leaders emphasized the importance of keeping the good momentum of the ASEM Interfaith Dialogue and welcomed the outcomes of the ASEM Interfaith Dialogues (Nanjing 2007 and Amsterdam 2008) and urged governments to actively facilitate interfaith and intercultural dialogues, particularly at the regional and <b>interregional</b> levels, which is part of a much broader dialogue between Asia and Europe.	2008
Intensifying Economic Relations	They reiterated strong and continued support to the implementation of Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) in infrastructure projects and noted that an improved environment for PPP financing could help boost the pace of development, as well as intra and <b>interregional</b> connectivity in both regions.	2012
	<b>Intra and Interregional Connectivity</b> Leaders stressed the importance of strengthening regional connectivity to support economic integration, including through subregional initiatives and frameworks, in narrowing development gaps and boosting sustainable development within and among the subregions in Asia and Europe.	2012
	Leaders acknowledged the necessity of further strengthening <b>interregional</b> financial cooperation between Asia and Europe.	2012
	Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to enhance <b>interregional</b> investment and trade flows through the market economy, open multilateral trading system, nondiscriminatory liberalisation and open regionalism.	2012
	Leaders underlined their commitment to enhancing <b>interregional</b> trade and investment flows, including through the implementation of the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) and the Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP), to actively resisting trade-distorting or protectionist measures, and to addressing restrictions, including nontariff barriers, which inhibit trade growth and investment.	2014
	Leaders reiterated their commitment to enhance <b>interregional</b> trade and investment flows as an engine of sustainable growth and deeper economic integration connectivity between Asia and Europe, to actively resist trade-distorting or protectionist measures, and to address restrictions, including nontariff barriers and especially behind-the-border barriers, which inhibit trade growth and investment.	2016

Table 6: Concordance lines of the word “*interregional*”

The term "interregional" is employed across a variety of contexts in ASEM summit documents, reflecting its multidimensional role in political, cultural, and economic dialogues.

In political discussions, "*interregional*" appears as a part of broader efforts to reinforce multilateral systems and frameworks. For instance, in 2004, leaders emphasized the need to strengthen interregional frameworks to bolster the global multilateral system. Similarly, in 2016, interregional processes were highlighted as crucial to the evolution of ASEM, suggesting that interregionalism serves as a cornerstone of ASEM's long-term vision. This use implies that interregionalism in the political sphere focuses on creating cohesive frameworks that align regional cooperation with global multilateral goals.

In cultural discussions, "*interregional*" serves as a bridge for fostering mutual understanding and dialogue across regions. The emphasis on interfaith and intercultural dialogues in 2008 reflects ASEM's role in promoting cultural exchange and shared values. This application highlights interregionalism as a mechanism for transcending regional divides, reinforcing ASEM's identity as a connector between diverse societies.

Economically, "*interregional*" is applied to connectivity, trade, and financial cooperation. References in 2012 and 2014 link interregionalism to economic integration, trade liberalization, and infrastructure development. These examples demonstrate how interregional dialogue is operationalized to address barriers, promote sustainable growth, and integrate markets. Together, these uses affirm the conclusion that ASEM functions as an intergovernmental forum where interregionalism drives dialogue and cooperation across political, cultural, and economic domains.

#### 4. What is ASEM? Reconceptualizing *Interregionalism*

Since its establishment, ASEM has held an important place in regionalism studies. Especially for the studies conceptualizing interregional relations with the concept of *interregionalism*, ASEM has been a critical case study for a long time. In its simplest definition, *interregionalism* refers to the cooperation and interactions established between different regions. Although we can identify the first interregional relations in the 1960s, *interregionalism* studies emerged as an area of research within regionalism studies in the mid-1990s, especially after the European Union started to establish and deepen interregional relations with other regional entities (Rüland, 2010: 1273). ASEM, which is the main subject of this research, is one of the interregional dialogue mechanisms that we can evaluate in that manner.

Scholars working on *interregionalism* have been heavily influenced by the "world of regions"(Katzenstein, 2005) approach, which dominated regionalism studies. According to this

approach, in the new international order, in addition to states, regions are recognized as actors in their own right due to their capacity to establish external relations. Henceforth, evaluating and conceptualizing relations of regional actors like regional organizations and regional entities should become a subject of International Relations and regionalism studies.

Yet, *interregionalism* studies have faced criticisms for structural weaknesses of interregional relations compared to traditional diplomacy dominated by states, potential inefficiencies in decision-making, and concerns over the effectiveness of verbose rhetoric in agreements. Considering the effectiveness of interregional relations all over the world, the validity of this criticism cannot be denied. For example, the trade deal between the EU and MERCOSUR has been negotiated for almost two decades, while the EU and ASEAN relations have nearly stuck due to different political and economic priorities. Even under ASEM, which is this study's main subject, the planned meeting has been postponed without an explanation. Nevertheless, this study argues that *interregionalism* should not be defined according to its effectiveness in producing tangible outcomes for relations between regions. Instead, the function of *interregionalism* within the international system should be evaluated from a broader perspective, emphasizing its role as a facilitator of dialogue and a layer of global governance.

Interregional relations are different from state-to-state relations, which International Relations as a discipline has been focusing on, especially in two respects. As Gardini and Malamud (2014: 1) stated, first of all, in Interregional Relations, the nature of the actors cannot be taken for granted, so interregional relations are built upon internal consultations more frequently, using complex and less formalized mechanisms. Secondly, since most interregional agreements and declarations are built upon verbose rhetoric rather than concrete outcomes, the scope of *interregionalism* is generally limited to "low politics." As a result, Gardini and Malamud (2014) perceive *interregionalism* "as a summitry exercise". Yet, it should not imply that *interregionalism* is a totally ineffective tool of diplomacy. On the contrary, it can be considered "an additional layer of multilateral governance which could facilitate the finding of solutions on a global scale in pre-discussing or even pre-negotiating issues to be taken up in a multilateral or global setting" (Reiterer 2006: 241). Therefore, rather than achieving tangible outcomes, exercises of *interregionalism* should be reconceptualized as a continuum of multilateral governance in which states and regional entities establish dialogue for topics concerning their regional space and common issues in the global system. This perspective highlights the importance of ongoing engagement and collaborative discourse, which fosters a

deeper comprehension of interconnected problems and promotes cooperative mechanisms that go beyond the interests of individual states.

Accordingly, although ASEM has often been questioned for being ineffective in shaping Asia and Europe relations, we must say that ASEM has fulfilled its targeted duty in establishing interregional dialogue. As Yeo (2013: 3; 2019) predicted, ASEM remains a forum for informal, shallow dialogue along with different strands of EU-Asia relations with no clear value added in terms of problem-solving. The empirical findings of this study support this argument by showing that “dialogue” is one of the most frequently used words in the ASEM Summit Corpus without a visible change in agenda. ASEM aims to intensify cooperation and dialogue between Asia and Europe for the sake of development and economic relations. Although interregional relations are defined mostly through economic relations, ASEM is a multidimensional dialogue platform in which a wide range of topics ranging from politics to security, education to culture is discussed. Moreover, dynamics shaping region-to-region dialogue have been discussed in conjunction with a wide range of issues on a global scale. As a result, as Fort (2004) describes, ASEM is a process of multidimensional dialogue.

This conclusion fits what Dent (2004) proposes with the “Theory of Multilateral Utility,” which underscores the idea that multilateralism can create a “utility” or positive net benefit for all parties involved, often by enhancing stability, pooling resources, or addressing complex global issues collectively. According to Dent (2004), “interregional frameworks like ASEM, and in general terms what proactive contribution they can make to foster stability, peace, prosperity, and equality in the global system, in partnership with multilateral institutions” as a multilateral utility. Considering the main themes prevalent in ASEM Summits and continuous emphasis on “dialogue,” and “cooperation,” it can be argued that ASEM is a manifestation of multilateral utility to facilitate constructive dialogue between Asian and European nations, fostering a more integrated and cooperative international environment.

ASEM was initially created to establish an interregional dialogue between the European Union and East Asia in particular. Not having an institutional structure and having a limited effect in implementing policies have been the main criticisms of ASEM. However, as the empirical data of the study shows, there has been no agenda to institutionalize it and to transform it into a framework that generates concrete outcomes. On the contrary, since its inception, it has sustained its aim of fostering dialogue between the participating states. As Gaens (2006: 32) claims, ASEM is designed on principles of “open, informal and non-binding dialogue.” Also, Yeo (2006: 80) points out that “ASEM is now on auto-pilot driven by bureaucrats, and while it is likely to continue, it is unlikely to create any excitement.”

Therefore, expecting tangible results from it might be misleading when defining the borders of ASEM's *interregionalism*. Instead, as claimed by Christiansen and Tsui (2017), despite its limitations, ASEM should be accepted as a “process adding value in the context of the wider diplomacy between the EU and its Asian partners.” In that regard, considering the range of topics discussed in the ASEM Summits, regardless of its effectiveness, as Pelkmans and Hu (2014: 12) put it, ASEM is “an effective facilitator of Asia-Europe dialogue in many ways, in many areas, and at all levels.” Therefore, in response to the question "What is ASEM?" it should be characterized as a platform for multi-faceted dialogue comprising interregional and inter-state aspects of cooperation.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, this study offers an overview of ASEM by critically examining the chair's statements from its summits over the years. CACDA showed the continuities and discontinuities within the discursive themes of these statements that have dominated them and brought further insight into ASEM's role in promoting interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe. The empirical findings revealed that ASEM Summits operate as an intergovernmental forum among European and Asian countries in the form of interregional dialogue. Moreover, it is seen that significant themes emerge that align with ASEM's three pillars—political, economic, and socio-cultural, while they show consistency in time. The findings also demonstrate that the role attributed to ASEM is a dialogue mechanism on complex issues, bridging Asia and Europe by highlighting common concerns and priorities of the two regions. Relatedly, while ASEM is often criticized for lacking tangible, enforceable outcomes, the study concludes that it fulfills a crucial role within multilateral governance by functioning as a platform that fosters trust and aligns regional priorities. Therefore, in conjunction with the discussion on what interregionalism is and its role in international politics, it concludes that exercises of interregionalism should be reconceptualized as a continuum of multilateral governance in which states and regional entities establish dialogue for topics concerning their regional space and common issues in the global system.

The main contribution of this study is to describe and analyze what ASEM is in more detail by using CACDA. This method helped to evaluate the themes that emerged in ASEM in detail, chronologically, and contextually. In addition, the study not only analyzed ASEM but also contributed to regionalism studies by relating empirical data to the concept of interregionalism. However, some shortcomings of the study should also be admitted. Firstly, the method employed relied exclusively on textual data, which constrained the ability to delve deeper into the relations between Asia and Europe and assess the role and impact of ASEM in

these interactions from a broader viewpoint. Nevertheless, future studies can provide a more comprehensive analysis of ASEM and its place in Asian-European relations, taking into account these shortcomings and the methodological contributions of this study. Second, all inferences on the notion of interregionalism are based on the ASEM case. On the other hand, there are other cases of interregionalism, such as FEALAC, EU-ASEAN, EU-MERCOSUR, etc. Hence, findings specific to ASEM may not be applicable to other interregional organizations or diplomatic frameworks, limiting the broader applicability of the conclusions. Utilizing a similar methodological framework and making a comparative analysis with ASEM may also reveal the complexity of interregional relations across different contexts and provide a deeper understanding of ASEM and interregionalism. In this respect, this study can be seen as a modest contribution to the studies and evaluations in this direction.

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## Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Origin, Transformation, and Discussions on Expansion(s)

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### Abstract

This article mainly examines the establishment, transformation, and expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In this respect, the article focuses on the four cumulative steps. The first of these investigates the security concerns of the states that paved the way for the Shanghai Five meetings. The second one reveals the organization's horizontal and vertical expansions have taken shape since 1996. The third of these concerns the opportunities, challenges, and controversies arising from the expansions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Relatedly, the fourth step questions Türkiye's potential membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, based on the discussions about expansions. The article's main argument is that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was initially organized with security concerns, has transformed into a more comprehensive and geopolitical-oriented international organization over time. The article supposes that this situation has brought new opportunities, challenges, and discussions to the organization, including Türkiye's potential membership.

**Keywords:** Shanghai Five, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Security, Transformation, Expansion.

## Introduction

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001 through an agreement signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The organization's origins date back to the first Shanghai Five meeting in 1996, when the leaders of the five countries, except Uzbekistan, came together. The initial aim of SCO was mainly to ensure border security by peacefully resolving border disputes and combating transnational radical, separatist, and terrorist elements together. Over time, the organization has experienced intense transformation and expansion in terms of its focus areas and the countries it includes. Thus, on the one hand, member states have sought to deepen their cooperation in several fields by going beyond the concept of security. On the other hand, over the past twenty years since its establishment, SCO has accepted new observers, dialogue partners, and members.

The sharing of knowledge, experience, and resources among states is an important part of modern international relations. Dealing with various problems or developing their capacities in any field alone may sometimes be impossible or extremely costly for states. Therefore, states often cooperate with other states in various fields to overcome a negative situation or to improve the opportunities provided by a positive situation. Functionalist and neofunctionalist views argue that cooperation efforts among states, which start in a technical field, can deepen (ramification) and spread to other fields timely (spill-over). Burley and Mattli offer that cooperation in technical fields may increase the communication and interdependence of members of the organization and thus reduce the possibility of war. Names like Mitrany, Keohane, and Nye, on the other hand, state that increasing interdependence and benefits may go beyond national interests over time and weaken the concept of sovereignty (Şehitoğlu and Karakuş, 2023: 300-303).

In terms of the establishment, transformation, and expansion of SCO, there are compatible and incompatible aspects with these perspective. On the one hand, it can be argued that the concepts of ramification and spill-over are in line with SCO's horizontal (diversification of areas and focus) and vertical (increase in the number of members and geography) expansion. SCO's cooperation story, which initially started in the field of security and with only five members, has expanded over time to include many different areas, ten members, fourteen dialogue partners, and two observers. Moreover, Shanghai Five's border security attempts, which were largely successful, have laid the foundation for SCO's further cooperation efforts. However, unlike the mentioned approaches, SCO is ultimately not an integration effort that aims to distance itself from national identities and transfer their

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members' sovereignties, but a quest for cooperation and solidarity that seeks to strengthen these. The emphasis on "respect for sovereignty" and "non-interference in internal affairs" in almost every documents of the organization is the most basic indicator of this claim.

Some concepts in the domestic and foreign policy of China, among the organization's driving forces, are also in line with SCO's transformation and expansion. For example, comprehensive national security and collective security focus not only on traditional security issues, but also on wide range of non-traditional issues from economy to terrorism, from culture to natural resources, from environment to technology (Kwan, 2024). Accordingly, SCO's rapid horizontal and vertical expansions point out not only a shift away from security, but also a more extensive perception of it. Coming economic issues to the fore in SCO, especially after the announcement of One Belt One Road (OBOR), has strengthened this argument. Also, partnership diplomacy emerges as a concept that is more flexible, mutually beneficial, and offers a wide range of cooperation, unlike traditional alliance relations (Men and Liu, 2015). This concept can help make sense of SCO's expansions to include countries with different interests and even conflicts. Moreover, the discourse of a "community of shared future for mankind", which is addressed by President Xi Jinping frequently, encourages non-interference in internal affairs and envisages equal rights and responsibilities for all member states (Jiang, 2018). This perspective enables SCO to realize its horizontal and vertical expansions in a way that strengthens the sovereignty of member states, contrary to expectations of functionalist/neofunctionalist approaches.

Therefore, this article will focus on the establishment, transformation, and expansion processes of the organization, to understand the cooperation efforts of SCO better. In this context, the article consists of three parts. The first section will examine border problems and other regional security concerns, which brought the leaders of the five countries together in the Shanghai Five meetings. In the second part, member states' efforts to diversify and expand cooperation areas and actors they interacted with, in Shanghai Five and SCO will be revealed. The third part will interpret the expansions of SCO and Türkiye's possible membership in light of the discussions in the literature. The article's main argument is that SCO, which initially set out with security concerns, has transformed into a more comprehensive and geopolitical-oriented international organization timely. It is assumed in the article that this situation has led to new opportunities and challenges, which are specific to the organization.

## 1. The Background of SCO: Border Issues and Three Evil

On April 26, 1996, the heads of state of China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan met in Shanghai, China. This meeting was a significant milestone as the first step of Shanghai Five and its successor, SCO. The content and scope of this meeting revealed traces of a security-centered understanding among the participating states. Therefore, two main agendas dominated the first summit of Shanghai Five: Long-standing border problems and multidimensional security concerns among neighboring countries. Accordingly, leaders' main objectives were to resolve the border problems inherited from the Soviet Union peacefully and to establish a cooperative and trustworthy environment in the border regions. From this perspective, it is reasonable to argue that security concerns in the post-Soviet environment, especially border disputes and perceptions of security threats, represented the initial step in the formation of SCO.

The border problems among the Central Asian countries, Russia, and China can mainly be classified into two categories. The first was the border disputes between The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China, dated back to the late 17<sup>th</sup> century and were particularly acute in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Liu, 1967: 18-25; Robinson, 1972: 1175-1177). Some of these disputes emerged as issues to be resolved among the newly independent states and the Beijing government after the collapse of the USSR. The second was the disputes among the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, declared independence in 1991. It could find intense traces of the Soviet administration in the source of these disputes among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Some of these border disputes were resolved peacefully and expeditiously. However, others caused deep disagreements among states, sometimes leading to bloody conflicts.

Border disputes and conflicts played a significant role in Sino-Russian relations over the past few centuries. These disputes, dating back to Tsarist Russia and the Qing Dynasty, were largely ignored at the beginning of the Cold War thanks to the harmonization in the communist world. However, the tensions in relations from the mid-1950s onwards and the disputes on the Xinjiang border in the early 1960s brought the border issues back into the table (Cheng, 2013: 3; Tang, 1969: 409). The border negotiations, beginning in 1964, focused on the 52,000 km<sup>2</sup> of land on the Pamir Mountains on the Xinjiang-Tajikistan border in the west and the disputes in the Manchuria region, including the Wusuri (Ussuriysky) River and its surroundings in the east. However, the negotiations, in which Beijing argued that the Soviets should return more than 1.5 million km<sup>2</sup> of land acquired through unfair treaties during the

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Qing Dynasty to China peacefully, failed. Even, by March 1969, border disputes escalated into low-intensity armed conflict in parts of Xingjiang and Manchuria, particularly on Zhenbao (Damanski) Island in the Wusuri River (Haines, 2014: 585; Tang, 1969: 409-412).

The conflict on Zhenbao Island ended when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and USSR Premier Alexei Kosygin agreed in September 1969 to hold new border negotiations (Mott and Kim, 2006: 168-169). Although the border negotiations, took place between October 1969 and June 1973, did not produce any official results, they significantly reduced the conflicts in the border regions (Tagirova, 2022: 131-133). The development that partially resolved the border disputes was the call of USSR Leader Mikhail Gorbachev for renegotiation in July 1986 and Beijing's positive response in February 1987 (Rosen, 1987: 50). After approximately four years of negotiations, an agreement was signed in May 1991 on the determination of border disputes. This agreement largely resolved the dispute over the eastern borders, with a few exceptions such as Wusuri Island and Abagaitu Islet. Whereas, the disputes over the western borders led to negotiation -and sometimes conflict- between China and the post-USSR countries after the USSR (Cheng, 2013: 10-14).

Border issues after the dissolution of the USSR can be analyzed from two perspectives. The first was the border disputes that post-Soviet countries, including Russia, had with China, inherited from the USSR. Accordingly, the May 1991 border agreement between the USSR and China was ratified by the relevant authorities of Russia and China in 1992 and entered into force (Dmochowski, 2015: 68). However, the dispute over Wusuri Island and Abagaitu Islet remained unclear throughout the 1990s. The complete resolution regarding the eastern border occurred in 2004, when the disputed territories were divided equally as a result of negotiations led by Presidents Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin (Cheng, 2013: 13-15). On the other hand, in the 1980s, efforts were initiated between the USSR and China to resolve problems not only on the eastern border but also on the western border. Nevertheless, after the collapse of the USSR, China's western border problems with this country were divided into four countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

In contrast to the western border, the dispute on the eastern border between Russia and China was a rather limited area, just over 50 km (Cheng, 2013: 11). To resolve this issue, the parties established a joint border demarcation commission in 1992, and a draft agreement was prepared in June 1993. The agreement, signed by the foreign ministers in 1994, was ratified in 1995, and the commission determined the final shape of the western border on September 10, 1998 (Zinberg, 1996: 78; Dmochowski, 2015: 67). Unlike with Russia, China's

border disputes with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan covered a wider area. For example, the disputed areas between China and Kazakhstan, such as the Baimurz Pass and the Sary-Charndy River, totaled more than 2,400 km<sup>2</sup> (Fravel, 2005: 57; BBC News, 1998). Even though Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan denied the existence of border disputes with China at the beginning, Nursultan Nazarbayev's Kazakhstan became the first country to sign a border agreement with China. The agreements signed in April 1994 and September 1997 ceded 22% of the disputed territories to China and 78% to Kazakhstan (Zheng, 2003; Fravel, 2005: 57).

Similarly, the total area of disputed lands between Kyrgyzstan and China, in Boz Aigyr, Zhanyzher, Erkeshtam Pass, Khan Tengri Peak, and Uzengi-Kush Basin, was almost 4,000 km<sup>2</sup>. This dispute was resolved by two separate agreements signed by the heads of state on July 4, 1996, and August 26, 1999. Thus, despite the reaction of the Kyrgyz opposition, 30% of the disputed areas were left to China and 70% to Kyrgyzstan (Tagirova, 2023: 363; ICG, 2002; Marat, 2012: 128). China's most difficult border dispute with post-Soviet countries was on the Sino-Tajik border. This disagreement mainly involved three disputed territories: The Great Pamirs, the Markansu River, and the Karazak Pass. The disputes over the latter two were resolved by the 1999 border agreement that ceded the entire Karazak Pass and 32% of the Markansu River to Tajikistan (Bitabarova, 2015: 71-72). However, a full resolution in the Greater Pamir Region, which is approximately 28,000 kilometers, was possible in 2010 (Kim and Blank, 2013: 777).

During this period, the border problems among Central Asian countries were more complicated than China's problems with Russia and other Central Asian countries. This was largely due to the USSR's border arrangements ignoring ethnic distinctions and parties' claims on each other's territories after independence. In this process, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan resolved border problems with their neighbors more easily (Zhunisbek, 2018). However, disputes among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, were more complex and even led to armed conflicts sometimes. The disputes in the Fergana Valley and border ambiguities were the focal point of the border problems and provided illegal groups, especially terrorist organizations, with a wide and comfortable field of activity (Baizakova, 2017: 231). This endangered the security of not only these three countries, but also the entire Central Asia and its surroundings.

For example, the main problems between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, sharing more than 1,300 kilometers of border, were border vagueness in the Fergana Valley and western



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Tajikistan, the existence of the Tajik-owned Sarvak Enclave in Uzbekistan, the ownership of the Forhad Dam, and the intermingling of the ethnic populations (Gulomov, 2023: 12-13). Tajikistan Civil War (1992-1997), increasing security threats due to the border permeabilities and Uzbek and Tajik leaders' incompatibilities exacerbated the border disputes and made it resolution difficult (Kraudzun, 2012: 182-183; The Monitor, 1998). The resolution attempts, mostly intensified after the Tajikistan Civil War, could be accomplished with three different border agreements signed by leaders in 2000, 2002, and 2018 (CABAR Asia, 2021; Karinbayev, 2020: 119-120). Similarly, Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border problems, which remained unresolved for many years, deeply affected their relations. These problems revolved around the Fergana Valley, enclaves<sup>1</sup>, leased lands/businesses including natural resources and water resources (Baizakova, 2017: 223-225). The weakness of the borders and the flexible nature of the enclaves provided ease of movement for terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and led to disputes among the states. Accordingly, the border negotiations, which first began among the parties in February 2000, could not conclude until January 2023 (Toktogulov, 2018: 100; Imanaliyeva, 2023; ICG, 2002: 16).

As another example, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also had disputes over the sovereignty of the Vorukh Enclave, the West Qalacha(Qayragach/Kayragach), and the Tortgul Reservoir of the Isfara River (Tutumlu, 2021; Mira, 2022: 5). For resolving the problems, the Dushanbe government took the 1924-27 border arrangements as a basis, while the Bishkek government emphasized the 1958-59 arrangements (Baizakova, 2017: 228). Issues such as illegal migration, terrorist activities, and the use of water resources also incited border disputes. In this context, following an inadequate attempt in 1990s, a joint border commission was established in 2000 for the first time and 90% of border problems were resolved by 2024 after many years of efforts (Putz, 2023; ICG, 2002: 18). However, the clashes between citizens and security forces of the parties on the border areas in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2021, 2022, and 2023 openly demonstrated the severity of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border disputes (Baizakova, 2017: 229; HRW, 2023).

In addition to border problems, the need to combat radical elements, especially terrorist organizations, was initially an incentive for Russia, China, and Central Asian countries to come together in SCO. Indeed, while Central Asian countries engaged in economic and political nation-building efforts in the 1990s, they also tried to counter radical elements in their countries. Similarly, Russia and China also faced religious and ethnic-based attacks within their

<sup>1</sup>Sokh, Shokhimardon, Jani-Ayil/Jangail, and Chon-Kara/Kalacha in Kyrgyzstan and Barak in Uzbekistan.



territories. During this period, political instabilities, weak governments, ethnic-religious diversities, economic problems, insecure borders, the spill-over effect of Afghanistan, and the spread of extremist ideologies were effective in strengthening radical/terrorist organizations in the region. In this context, these organizations were in close relations with each other and they posed a security threat not only for one country but also for many countries in and around Central Asia. Therefore, it is natural that combating radicalism, extremism, and terrorism was one of the initial objectives of Shanghai Five, and later SCO (SCO, 2001).

For example, according to the Global Terrorism Database, there were 133 terrorist attacks in China between 1989 and 2001, killing 216 people and injuring 968 others (START, 2024). In the same period, 162 people were killed and 440 people were injured in attacks by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which aims to establish an independent Islamic state in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) (Kam, 2016: 481). Considering the allegations on ETIM-Taliban relations throughout the 1990s, Beijing's desire to cooperate on border security and counterterrorism under Shanghai Five (later SCO) can be understood better. Similarly, Russia faced intertwined ethnic and religious threats throughout the 1990s. Most of these threats were the separatist activities of ultranationalist and Islamist groups in the Northern Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria) (Sinai, 2015: 96). Muslim communities that demanded independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in Chechnya, described these activities as a struggle for independence with religious and national dimensions. However, Russia has defined these as movements with separatist goals, adopting terrorism as a method, and having connections to transnational terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda (Hughes, 2007: 20).

In the 1990s, the biggest security threat to Uzbekistan came from the IMU. This organization, dated back to the Adolat (Justice) Movement founded in 1991 and transformed into a transnational militant group in 1998, had close ties with radical/terrorist organizations such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i Taliban Party, Haqqani Network, and ETIM (Hanks, 2007: 212). The organization's bloodiest attack in the 1990s was the bombings targeting President Islam Karimov on February 16, 1999, which caused 16 deaths and over 100 injuries (Polat and Butkevich, 2000: 541-542). Moreover, The Islamic Jihad Union, separated from IMU in 2002, had its finances from drug trafficking, human trafficking, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the Central Asian diasporas (Parker, 2003: 55-56). Likewise, Kyrgyzstan, which includes part of the Fergana Valley, also suffered from radical/terrorist activities. During this period, the biggest security concern for Kyrgyzstan was the IMU militants, who carried out violent

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attacks in this country with Taliban and Al-Qaeda support. For example, while IMU militants tried to infiltrate Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1999 and 2000, dozens of Kyrgyz and Uzbek citizens and over 100 IMU militants lost their lives in clashes (Weitz, 2004: 512-513).

Kazakhstan was less affected by terrorist threats in the 1990s compared to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, the presence of radical elements like Tableeghi Jamaat and Hizb-ut Tahrir in this country and the destabilizing influence of terrorist organizations in Central Asia pushed the Astana government to be sensitive to transnational radicalism/terrorism (Soliyev, 2016A: 443-444). On the other hand, after independence, Tajikistan emerged as the post-Soviet country where religiously motivated violence was used by radical groups the most. In the Tajikistan Civil War, IMU and Al-Qaeda militants fought together with the Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which aimed to overthrow the government and establish a religious-based regime. Although the IRPT disarmed after the peace agreement in 1997, the party maintained its ties with IMU until the 2000s. Even, some IMU members, who did not accept the peace agreement and wished to continue the armed struggle, later established Jamaat Ansurallah in 2006. This organization eventually collaborated with leading transnational terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida, Taliban, and ETIM (Soliyev, 2016B: 429-430). As can be understood from all these, border disputes were a regional concern not only because of the possibility of inter-state conflicts, but also the risk of giving space to radical groups.

### **2. The Transformation of SCO: Regional and Comprehensive Security**

As mentioned, security-related issues dominated the agenda of the first meeting of Shanghai Five and afterward. For instance, at the first summit in Shanghai in April 1996, leaders signed the Agreement on Strengthening Confidence in the Military Field in Border Area. Under this agreement, it was agreed to increase security measures, prevent aggressive activities, limit military operations/exercises, inform each other about these previously, and enhance the information exchanges among security forces (Bakshi, 2001: 165). About three months after the first summit, China and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement on the resolution of border problems and this demonstrated the concrete contribution of Shanghai Five meetings to preventing conflicts and stabilizing border regions. Similarly, at the second summit in Moscow a year later, the parties signed the Agreement on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in Border Areas. This agreement stipulated that the parties limit their forces in the border areas so that they could only defend themselves and not allow any aggression (Jia,

2001: 26-28; Akman, 2015: 313). Thus, leaders addressed the security relations in border regions with a defensive approach rather than an aggressive manner.

Since the third summit in Astana in July 1998, leaders have emphasized more on economic cooperation and international relations cooperation, in addition to security. As the functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches pointed out, this paved the way for Shanghai Five's transformation into a comprehensive international organization. In this context, firstly, China-Kazakhstan border problems were resolved at this summit (Özdaşlı, 2012: 111). Secondly, as an important step towards the common development goal, it was decided to implement a 3,000 km<sup>2</sup> pipeline project extending from Kazakhstan to Western China (Hansen, 2008: 224). Thirdly, separatism, radicalism, terrorism, and other transnational crimes like drug and arms trafficking were highlighted for the first time as common security threats (De Haas and van der Putten, 2007: 65). Similarly, at the fourth summit in Bishkek, the China-Kyrgyz border issue was resolved, the Bishkek Declaration attributed special importance to counter-terrorism, the establishment of the regional anti-terror structure was decided, and further cooperation on economic issues was stated. This summit's one of the most notable developments was the leaders' shared determination that human rights and other domestic issues should not be a tool for external intervention, in light of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia and the conflict in Afghanistan (Hansen, 2008: 219-220; Bakshi, 2001: 166).

In 2000, with the acceptance of Uzbekistan as an observer to Shanghai Five at the fifth summit in Dushanbe, the organization and expansion phase of these meetings began. Parallely, unlike the main argument of the functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches, leaders highlighted in the Dushanbe Declaration that Shanghai Five should transform into multidimensional regional cooperation without compromising the sovereignty of members (Shanghai Five, 2000). Indeed, with a joint statement signed on the first day of the summit in Shanghai on June 14-15, 2001, Uzbekistan became the sixth member of Shanghai Five. The next day, leaders of the six countries signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO and officially transformed Shanghai Five into an international organization. In the 11-article establishment declaration, it was pointed out that the purpose of SCO was not to oppose any actor/organization, but to ensure regional security and cooperation based on the security agreements of 1996 and 1997 (SCO, 2001). On the same day, the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism was signed and the idea of establishing a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) to implement this convention was once again

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included in the declaration. Thus, providing member states' security and stability was also the main priority of SCO's first summit.

Accordingly, SCO Charter and Agreement on RATS were signed at the second summit in St. Petersburg in July 2002. Although international security issues, especially counter-terrorism, were the main agenda due to the 9/11 effect and double standards were opposed by pointing to the UN principles in the fight against terrorism, the priorities of further economic cooperation were not ignored either. Also, the Afghanistan conflict, stability of Central Asia, commitment to the one-China policy, dialogue between two Koreas, and India-Pakistan Dialogue were St. Petersburg Declaration's prominent topics (SCO, 2002). Similarly, at the third summit in Moscow in May 2003, steps were taken to strengthen the organization's internal coordination and to establish a common position on international issues. Therefore, SCO bodies' working procedures were regulated, symbols such as the emblem and flag were determined, the organization's first budget was established and increased cooperation among the ministries of transport, economy, culture, foreign policy, and defense was encouraged. Beyond that, it was emphasized that the UN should be restructured in a more pluralistic and fairer way to keep up with the changing world order (SCO, 2003).

The fourth and fifth summits also showed that member states gave increasing importance to diversifying their partners, security, economic cooperation, and international prestige efforts. At the summit in Tashkent in 2004, Mongolia was accepted as an observer, some legal documents regarding the operation of RATS were adopted, a cooperation agreement to prevent drug trafficking was signed and the establishment of economic institutions such as SCO Development Fund and SCO Business Council was envisaged. As a striking emphasis, the Tashkent Declaration underlined the region's stability and security depends on members' economic development and meeting their people's basic needs (SCO, 2004A; SCO, 2004B). Correspondingly, the fifth summit in Astana in 2005 came across the time of the organization's growing international prestige. Indeed, SCO obtained observer status at the UN General Assembly in December 2004 and signed a memorandum of understanding with ASEAN and CIS in April 2005 (Giustozzi and Matveeva, 2008: 1, 20). Also, at this summit, India, Iran, and Pakistan were accepted as observers. Moreover, SCO leaders called on non-regional countries, especially the United States of America (USA), to accelerate their troops' withdrawal from Central Asia and to set a date for this (SCO, 2005).

In line with the functionalist and neofunctionalist approach, SCO, which started out primarily as a security cooperation organization, continued also its efforts to diversify its focus

in the sixth and seventh summits. At the sixth summit in Shanghai in June 2006, a special declaration for the fifth year, an agreement on cooperation in education, and a statement on information security were issued. This summit also prioritized cooperation opportunities in energy, information technologies, transportation, agriculture, infectious diseases, and environment (SCO, 2006: 1). Similarly, at the seventh summit of SCO in Bishkek in August 2007, issues related to peace and security intertwined with the agenda of economic, social, and cultural cooperation. In this context, on the one hand, leaders signed the Treaty on Long-term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation and supported the development of ties with CSTO (CSTO, 2023). On the other hand, issues related to energy cooperation stood out, based on the idea that energy cooperation is the basis for members' sustainable economic growth and security and the Energy Club initiative established in 2007 (SCO, 2007). Moreover, the participation of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, CIS Executive Secretary Vladamir Rushailo, ASEAN Deputy-Secretary General Wilfrido V. Villacorta, and Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov as guests in these summits was a reflection of SCO's quest to expand its international cooperation circle (China Daily, 2006; De Haas and van der Putten, 2007: 68).

A similar situation was also present at the eighth summit. Accordingly, India, Pakistan, Iran, Mongolia, and Afghanistan participated as observers in SCO summit in Dushanbe in August 2008. Although an agreement was signed on counter-terrorism exercises and a declaration was issued on the smuggling of explosives, arms, and ammunition, the Dushanbe Declaration emphasized that security measures alone are not sufficient for regional stability and highlighted the necessity of diplomacy (SCO, 2008). The declaration's pointing out the balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability and the signing memorandum between SCO Interbank Consortium and Eurasian Development Bank were tangible examples of non-security cooperations. As expected, the agenda of the ninth summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009 was mostly shaped by the global economic crisis that broke out the previous year. In this context, leaders made suggestions to minimize the crisis's side effects in SCO region and to ensure economic recovery. Some of these were "bolstering trade, economic and investment cooperation", "expansion of transport potential", "improving access to world markets", "construction of new factories" and "introduction of innovative and energy saving technologies" (SCO, 2009A). Beyond that, the personnel training agreement for counter-terrorism, the international information security cooperation agreement, and the convention against terrorism showed the ninth summit also focused on new efforts for security cooperation (SCO, 2009B).

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Afterward, the summit held in June 2011 in Astana issued a declaration assessing the organization's past decade. In this context, SCO was defined as a bloc-free, transparent, and equality-based organization aiming to ensure multilateral cooperation and security in the Asia-Pacific (SCO, 2011A). Also, the declaration emphasized that cooperation in areas ranging from security to economy, from humanitarian issues to science and technology was deepened in these ten years. Application of Türkiye, which has been part of the Western alliance, to SCO as a dialogue partner was one of the leading developments of the eleventh summit. Moreover, the gathering of member states' premiers in November 2011 to discuss economic developments in SCO region and the world demonstrated once again that SCO is not only a security-centered organization (SCO, 2011B). At the twelfth summit in Beijing in June 2012, the leaders presented a vision for developing cooperation in economic relations, energy security, transportation integration, and food security, to improve member states' prosperity (SCO, 2012). Likewise, the acceptance of Afghanistan as an observer member and Türkiye as a dialogue partner constituted a notable example of the organization's efforts to expand and deepen its sphere of influence. Besides, a strong call for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the Arab Spring protests was voiced at both summits.

The quest for security and deepening economic cooperation was also the main agenda of SCO leaders at their thirteenth and fourteenth summits. In the thirteenth summit in Bishkek, leaders drew attention to terrorism and other non-traditional security threats, sought to prevent the use of developments in information and communication technologies by radical ideologies, and declared support for multilateral efforts to end the Syrian conflict (SCO, 2013). As another example, the Joint Statement on Future Development of Cooperation in Transport was released and the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation was signed. The accreditation of over 350 local and foreign journalists to the thirteenth summit was also an indication of SCO's expanding international influence (AKI Press, 2013). Similarly, the ISIS threat and the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative came to the fore at the fourteenth summit in Dushanbe in 2014. For SCO leaders, the biggest security concern stemming from the ISIS threat and the conflict in Syria was that jihadist militants, who went to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS, could return to their home countries and destabilize Central Asia and XUAR (Karmon, 2017: 83-84). On the other hand, China's declaration of the Silk Road Economic Belt (then OBOR) was also welcomed at the summit, and leaders expressed the need for further consultation and cooperation on it (SCO, 2014A). The Agreement on Creating Favorable Conditions for International Road Transportation was



another product of the efforts to enhance economic cooperation within the SCO (SCO, 2014B).

In 2015, the fifteenth summit in Ufa witnessed three important developments for deepening cooperation and expansion. Firstly, membership procedures of India and Pakistan, which applied for membership in 2014, were initiated and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, and Nepal were granted dialogue partner status. Secondly, as China's collective security and comprehensive national security approaches envisaged also, with the adoption of "Development Strategy of the SCO until 2025", leaders expressed their desire to enhance cooperation in areas like development, foreign policy, security, economy, culture, information, and humanitarian affairs (SCO, 2015). Thirdly, SCO leaders signed an agreement to increase interaction on border security and supported the further development of RATS activities. In parallel, at the sixteenth summit in Tashkent in 2016, the South China Sea dispute was mentioned for the first time. Accordingly, it was pointed out that the parties should resort to the basic principles of international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, for a peaceful settlement of the dispute (SCO, 2016A). Beyond that, this summit paid special attention to efforts for economic and cultural cooperation, such as the adoption of "Programme for Expanded Tourism Cooperation" (SCO, 2016B).

### 3. The Expansion of SCO: Potentials and Controversies

During SCO's seventeenth summit in Astana in June 2017, the organization's expansion, new counter-terrorism measures, and other multi-dimensional cooperation efforts stood out. For instance, India and Pakistan were officially admitted as full members. Thus, the first integration process was completed with these two countries, which have nuclear powers and a total population of over 1.5 billion. Moreover, India's and Pakistan's membership, despite potential problems, was relatively compatible with the philosophical background of China's partnership diplomacy. As another example, the "SCO Convention on Countering Extremism" was signed and the "Statement on Joint Counteraction to International Terrorism" was issued to enhance cooperation in the fight against extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Moreover, leaders set forth their goals to strengthen cooperation in areas such as trade, energy, transportation, investments, finance, agriculture, customs, telecommunications, environment, and health (SCO, 2017). Supporting member states to formulate their own economic plans and implement long-term development strategies, and the increased focus on the use of renewable and alternative energy sources were also concrete examples in this regard. Overall, from the beginning of Shanghai Five meetings to the admission of India and Pakistan



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as full members, SCO leaders, who mostly concentrated on security-centered objectives initially, diversified their focus areas and the actors they cooperated with over time.

Acceptance of Pakistan and India, which had been observers since 2005, as full members at the 2017 summit brought new possibilities and discussions regarding SCO's expansion(s). In this context, at the summit in Dushanbe in 2021, it was announced that Iran would be the next member and this country's full membership process began. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were recognized as dialogue partners at the same summit (MFA of Türkiye, 2024). Accordingly, Iran's membership process was completed with the online summit on July 4, 2023, under the chairmanship of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Moreover, membership procedures of Belarus, announced to join the organization at this summit, were finalized expeditiously, and officially approved at the 24th summit in Astana in 2024 (State Council of PRC, 2024). Thus, the Minsk government became the ninth member of SCO. Considering the organization already has two observers and 14 dialogue partners, it can be argued that attempts and discussions on expansion(s) will not be out of the agenda soon.

From this perspective, it can be argued that SCO's expansions could serve as a catalyst for the organization's evolution from a regional security cooperation to a multi-dimensional geopolitical actor. SCO, which initially consisted of some countries in East Asia, Central Asia, and North Asia predominantly, has expanded its borders to include countries from the West and South Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Broadestly, 74% of Eurasia is countries that are SCO's members, observers, or dialogue partners (Aydın, 2024: 156). This may allow both to obtain more prestige in international relations and to diversify the geographies and issues of interest. Similarly, SCO's expansions can also contribute to the increase of its economic potential. In its current form, this organization is a huge market of over 35 million km<sup>2</sup>, including over 40% of the world's population and 30% of the world's GDP (Tu, 2024; Bellaby, 2023). More specifically, two of the world's five largest economies, China and India, are members of SCO. Likewise, 10 of 25 countries with the largest oil reserves and gas reserves (separately for each) are this organization's members or dialogue partners.

The organization's expansion also has the opportunity to make a diversified contribution to SCO's efforts toward its cooperative approach in international relations. It is highly possible that the expectation of more equitable and multilateral international relations would be placed at the center of these efforts. For example, despite having good relations with the USA, India is not distant from the reform idea in the international system, especially the UN Security Council (Dabhade, 2022: 63-79). Similarly, Iran, which is otherized by Western

actors of the system, seeks to diversify its foreign policy alternatives and overcome its isolation through SCO (Mousavi and Khodaei, 2013: 204). It is likely that Belarus, which has close relations with Russia, and Pakistan, one of China's leading cooperation partners, may also desire a new type of international relations based on "respect for sovereignty" and "non-interference in internal affairs" principles. At this point, SCO can bring these countries, which have different characteristics and interests, closer together under a similar foreign policy paradigm. On the other hand, SCO's expansion process is also not contrary to the organization's initial goal of security cooperation. Accordingly, India's, Pakistan's and Iran's nuclear capacities and counter-terrorism experiences can contribute to new quests for developing and deepening security cooperation.

There are also various concerns and criticisms regarding SCO's expansions. The most prominent one is related to the organization's decision-making and agenda-setting processes. As a custom, every SCO member has equal voting rights, and decisions are taken unanimously without any objection. However, it is thought that an increase in members may make the decision-making and agenda-setting processes more difficult than before (Liang and Kozinets, 2022: 17-30). Also, it is argued that China's and Russia's decisive positions within the organization may diminish due to the expansions (Guo, 2023: 50-68). Indeed, although decisions are taken consensually, Beijing and Moscow, which are economic and political driving forces of the organization, had more dominant weight in SCO compared to other countries, before expansions. With new members, it is worried that this situation called the "2+4" balance may be disrupted and the positions of China and Russia may face significant challenges. Accordingly, some authors claim that the new situation may limit the setting agenda, operation of the decision-making mechanism, and effective functioning of SCO (Liang and Kozinets, 2022: 17).

On the other hand, according to some authors, these expansions also point to China's and Russia's conflicting interests. China's rising economic and military power, increasing influence in Central Asia, and global strategic orientations pose a challenge for Russia and this may limit cooperation in SCO (Hamilton, 2024). The reflection of this situation on the organization was most clearly seen in the SCO membership of India and Pakistan. According to common belief, Russia's desire to include India, one of the emerging economies of Asia and having problematic relations with China, in this organization stemmed from the goal of balancing Beijing. In return, the Beijing government also suggested the acceptance of Pakistan, which is one of the significant allies in South Asia, to SCO. In the end, both countries were

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accepted into the organization, and this situation brought about new discussions about the stability of the organization. Furthermore, some believe that the Kremlin tries to balance China's increasing influence more both in the organization and region by integrating countries like India, Belarus, and Türkiye into SCO also. (Maduz, 2018).

Another concern about SCO's expansion is the organization's main focus might change. In his speech at the 2015 SCO summit, Uzbek leader Islam Karimov pointed out that a possible expansion could reduce the weight of Central Asian issues (Tolipov, 2015). Also, It should not be ignored that the expansion of the organization means an increase in its problems as well as in its prestige in international relations. Accordingly, the increase of members and the expansion of geographical reach may cause to focus on various new problems and issues, such as instabilities in South Asia (Kaleji, 2023). For example, the Kashmir issue, which has continued for many years between India and Pakistan, was not among SCO's priorities previously. However, after expansion, this became a vital problem that has caused serious conflicts between the organization's two notable members. Therefore, as Karimov and other experts emphasized, this situation threatens to confront SCO with serious problems and limit its effectiveness. Moreover, SCO's expansion has made some countries that are at odds with each other, like India-Pakistan or China-India, members of the same organization (Liang and Kozinets, 2022: 17-18). Even, with possible membership of dialogue partners such as Saudi Arabia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Egypt, and Qatar, the number of disputing members is likely to increase.

It can be mentioned two main scenarios on SCO's expansion to include disputing members. Firstly, SCO can create a favorable platform for the resolution of disputes among the new members, as it did in the past for the border problems of Central Asian republics, Russia, and China. However, some experts are skeptical about this scenario (Yefremenko, 2019: 77). This is because the nature of the problems and countries' capacities are different from those in the past. For example, the Kashmir issue is more lethal than the border problems in Central Asia in the 1990s. Moreover, it seems more difficult to convince Pakistan and India to compromise than newly independent post-Soviet republics. The second scenario points out that states with divergent interests and conflicts in SCO may vague decision-making processes or complicate the implementation of decisions (Denisov and Safranchuk, 2016: 498). To overcome this, it is emphasized that the organization's institutional basis should be strengthened and decision-making procedures should be reviewed. For example, some Chinese experts suggest that decisions should be taken by a simple or qualified majority to

maintain SCO's effectiveness and enhance its response capacity, especially in times of crisis (Liang and Kozinets, 2022: 17-30; Zeng and Yang, 2017: 34-62).

The risk of undermining Shanghai's spirit is among the main concerns about the expansion. According to Article 4 of SCO's founding treaty, members must not join any grouping/alliance targeting other members or supporting hostile actions against them (SCO, 2001). However, India's presence in QUAD, the ongoing Kashmir-related disputes, and recent border conflicts between China and India are incompatible with this article (Avdaliani, 2024). Based on this point, some Chinese experts even argue that India should be expelled from SCO (Karan, 2024). Beyond that, it is also discussed whether the horizontal and vertical expansion of SCO is taking place too intensively or rapidly. As the functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches pointed out, SCO, which started with five members and focused mainly on security issues initially, has increased its members over time and diversified its focus to include areas such as trade, transit, industrial cooperation, innovation, start-up projects, poverty reduction, digital transformation, tourism, and public diplomacy (Kaleji, 2023). This is also compatible with China's collective security and comprehensive security approaches. On the one hand, this is crucial in terms of transforming SCO into a multidimensional international organization and increasing its international influence. On the other hand, this excessive and rapid expansion may make it difficult to coordinate and manage the organization's agenda, commitments, and activities. Therefore, new reforms may come to the agenda in other institutional and administrative areas soon, as in decision-making processes.

#### **4. Türkiye's Potential Membership: Is A New Expansion Possible?**

Accordingly, the most striking discussion for the new expansion projections of SCO is Türkiye's possible membership. After an unsuccessful membership application in 2005, the Ankara government was accepted as a dialogue partner at SCO's Beijing summit in 2012 (Işık, 2016: 152). Thus, Türkiye has become the only NATO member to establish an official tie with this organization. The Ankara government's growing interest in SCO membership is mostly driven by expectations of increasing influence in regional/global equations, benefiting from the economic, political, and military potential of SCO, balancing deteriorating relations with Western actors, improving interaction with Turkic-origin countries in Central Asia, and diversifying foreign policy alternatives. In return, especially according to Turkish experts, Türkiye's membership can contribute to SCO in several ways. Some of these are Türkiye's rising effectiveness in foreign relations, its support for global reform demands, its unique

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geographical, economic, and political position between the East and the West, and its long-standing experience in security (Aksu, 2022: 947-950).

In particular, Türkiye's long-standing experience in counterterrorism can be useful for SCO, whose one of the pillars is security cooperation. Also, combating other non-traditional and transnational security threats like drug and arms trafficking is a potential cooperation area between Türkiye and SCO members (MFA of Türkiye, 2024). Moreover, Türkiye, which has a strategic position in energy transportation, assumed the chairmanship of SCO Energy Club in 2017 (Aydın, 2024: 161). This shows the cooperation will not be limited to security and can be expanded to other areas. However, despite this positive outlook, Ankara's possible SCO membership faces intense debates and dilemmas from various perspectives. The most important of these is about the country's political position and foreign policy orientations. As mentioned, Türkiye has been one of the leading allies of Western countries, especially since the Cold War. Although this country's SCO membership has recently been on the agenda as a result of its deteriorating relations with Western actors, this has led to the emergence of two main -and somehow contradictory- criticisms of Türkiye.

On the one hand, Türkiye's possible SCO membership brings with it discussions of an axis shift at domestic and international levels. The most fundamental argument is that Türkiye is moving away from the West and redesigning its foreign policy based on anti-Western sentiment (Tüysüzöğlu, 2023: 83). The Turkish government, however, interprets this process not as an axis shift but as a multidimensional and proactive foreign policy quest. Even, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu's emphasis during the announcement of the Asia Anew Initiative in 2019 is in line with Türkiye's perspective. In this respect, Çavuşoğlu highlighted that this initiative was not a shift, but rather the completion of Türkiye's axis (MFA of Türkiye, 2019). Nevertheless, Türkiye's positive statements regarding SCO membership, the reflection of this membership as an alternative to the EU, and the participation of Turkish officials in SCO events, especially during times of crisis, can be the target of criticism from Western actors. For instance, the Turkish government's first presidential-level participation in SCO summit held in Samarkand a few months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine had a great impact. Despite growing criticism, some Western experts see Türkiye's SCO membership aspirations as a trump card against Western actors and argue that Ankara cannot distance itself from the West completely (Ellis, 2022).

On the other hand, it can be said that this view has found a partial response on the SCO side and that Türkiye's position in the Western alliance has led to hesitations regarding

SCO membership. Indeed, various scholars, including some Chinese experts, have debated whether SCO membership is Ankara's ultimate goal or a means to balance the West (Yuan, 2022). In this respect, some academics or experts adopt the second view on Türkiye's possible SCO membership. Moreover, Türkiye's SCO membership requests or discussions are inevitably associated with Ankara's NATO membership. Accordingly, it raises questions about how can a NATO member become a member of SCO, which has emerged as a strong alternative to the Western-centric order. In this respect, Russia and Central Asian countries are relatively in favor of Ankara's SCO membership. However, some Chinese experts claim that Türkiye's membership to SCO is equivalent to accepting the USA and that the Turkish government may act as an extension of the West within the organization (Xu, 2024; Contessi, 2019:106).

From this perspective, these experts argue the provision in the fourth article of SCO's founding treaty, which is mentioned above for India's membership, is also available to Türkiye. Moreover, Türkiye's potential membership may also be controversial due to pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism concerns. Recently, the Ankara government has been strengthening its influence in Central Asia, especially through the Organization of Turkic States. Also, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, of which Türkiye is one of the leading actors, has been seeking to expand its effectiveness in this region. This may conflict with the national and regional interests of China and Russia, which have citizens of Turkic-origin and Muslim (Wang and Yang, 2024). In this respect, to increase the possibility of Türkiye's membership, Ankara should develop its relations -especially- with Beijing and establish more mutual trust (Karan, 2024). In such a situation, in coherent with China's partnership diplomacy, a flexible and mutually beneficial cooperation environment can be possible.

In fact, although it is not prominent in the literature compared to Türkiye, it is possible to bring up similar discussions regarding the possible membership of Saudi Arabia too. For example, the Riyadh government has usually had close relations with the USA for many years on issues such as security and foreign policy. Moreover, like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia has also turned to new opportunities emerging from the East, especially SCO, to diversify its foreign policy alternatives, but it is unclear how permanent this will be (Siddiqui, 2023). Once again, it is a strong question whether Riyadh's membership in SCO will increase intra-organizational cooperation or deepen divisions among its members. For instance, to what extent would Saudi Arabia, which has serious ideological and political differences with Iran, be able to act in harmony with the Tehran government in case of a possible membership? Also, it



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should not be ignored that the Riyadh government accused Qatar, another dialogue partner and a potential member of SCO, of financing terrorism just a few years ago (Browning, 2017). Therefore, it is obvious that SCO's existing and possible expansions are both an opportunity to increase the organization's multifaceted capacity and also a source of new controversies.

### **Conclusion**

Security concerns, especially border disputes and transnational radical threats, played a dominant role in the establishment of the SCO. Indeed, the main agenda of the leaders, who came together in Shanghai in April 1996 for the first time, was to resolve border disputes inherited from the Soviet era peacefully and to improve mutual understanding and cooperation, especially in border regions. In this context, it can be said that Shanghai Five and subsequently SCO meetings made significant contributions to the resolution of member states' border disputes. China's signing of an agreement with Kyrgyzstan at the 1996 summit and with Kazakhstan at the 1998 summit were some examples of this. Similarly, preventing aggressive attempts to each other and cooperating in fighting against rising terrorism, separatism and extremism were among the leading security priorities of member states.

The rapid deepening (ramification) and widening (spill-over) of the organization's areas of focus (horizontal) and actors of cooperation (vertical), especially after SCO's establishment. In light of official documents, security-related issues were at the forefront in early SCO summits. However, in compatible with functionalist/neofunctionalist views and China's collective security and comprehensive national security understandings, several cooperation opportunities such as in trade, investments, energy security, industrialization, agriculture, finance, poverty alleviation, customs, telecommunications, environment, health, digital transformation, tourism have included the agenda of SCO summits in the following years. Similarly, there were only leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan at the founding meeting of Shanghai Five. In the last twenty-three years, SCO has accepted new dialogue partners, observers, and members. Also, this organization has increased its official cooperation in various fields with many regional and international organizations, especially UN. Therefore, SCO has transformed an actor that is constantly increasing its influence in international relations and geopolitical capacity. At this point, unlike the expectation of functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches, the concept of sovereignty has remained SCO's core principle, despite the organization's horizontal and vertical expansions. In this respect, SCO's this attitude has highly consisted with China's "community of shared future for mankind" discourse.



SCO's horizontal and vertical expansions have brought some opportunities and challenges, which are specific to this organization. Some of these opportunities can be interpreted as the expansion of its geography, increase in its economic potential, diversification of cooperation opportunities in security, the strength of its right to speak at international forums, and improvement of its prestige in international relations. On the other hand, the literature highlighted some risks to SCO's expansion such as getting difficulty of decision-making and agenda-setting processes, changing the balance within the organization, over-concentration of focused areas, diminishing the role of Central Asian issues on the agenda, and undermining the Shanghai spirit with increasing members. Beyond the opportunities and challenges, the interest of Türkiye, which has long-standing good relations with the Western world, to SCO membership points to the growing prestige of the organization and its emergence as a strong alternative. However, discussions on Ankara's possible membership are not entirely free of these opportunities and challenges. From this point of view, it would not be surprising that discussions on SCO's further expansions and proposals for reforming the organization's institutional structure will be on the agenda more soon.

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## Understanding the Fear of Terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan\*

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### Abstract

This study investigates the heightened fear of terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan, two countries with distinct histories of terrorism yet similar levels of fear, despite differing exposure to terrorist incidents. Utilizing data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey, the research employs Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) to examine the effects of various media sources -television, newspapers, and the internet- on fear of terrorism in both countries. The findings indicate that while internet usage increases fear of terrorism in Türkiye, it has no significant effect in Taiwan. Conversely, exposure to television elevates fear of terrorism in Taiwan but not in Türkiye. Furthermore, the study underscores the influence of demographic and sociocultural factors, such as gender and the importance of religion, in shaping perceptions of terrorism. Women in both countries report higher levels of fear, and participants with stronger religious beliefs demonstrate increased fear. This research contributes to the existing literature by providing a comparative analysis of two geographically and politically distinct nations, highlighting the role of media and contextual factors in understanding public fear of terrorism. The findings offer valuable insights for policymakers in developing targeted interventions to address these fears.


**Keywords:** Taiwan, Türkiye, Fear of Terrorism, Ordinal Logistic Regression.

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## Introduction

Terrorism has emerged as one of the most significant challenges for individuals, societies, and countries, posing an escalating threat to global security in recent years (Tulga, 2022: 85-108; Tulga, 2024: 27-48). The impact of modern terrorism is no longer limited to specific locations or regions where terrorist groups carry out their attacks, as was the case in the past (Tulga, 2022: 85-108; Tulga, 2024: 27-48). With advancements in television, the internet, satellite communication, social media, and artificial intelligence, millions of people worldwide can access visuals, videos, and information about terrorist attacks more rapidly (Oksanen et al., 2020: 1047-1066; Tulga, 2024: 27-48). Terrorist organizations are cognizant of this speed and effectively integrate emerging technologies into their strategies (Lavanco et al., 2008: 305-308).


For these reasons, today's terrorist organizations differ significantly from earlier groups, and their impact is more global (Tulga, 2022: 85-108). Based on these arguments, it can be argued that modern terrorist groups employ a far more diverse array of resources, motivations, and tactics than their predecessors (Tulga, 2022: 85-108). In other words, contemporary terrorist organizations, unlike earlier groups, adversely affect individuals in various countries not only through weapons or suicide attacks but also through propaganda and posts on social media and the internet (Tulga, 2020: 47-64; Tulga, 2024: 27-48). Reflecting this situation, although terrorist attacks have decreased worldwide in recent years, the results of the 6th and 7th waves of the World Values Survey indicate that the fear of terrorism has increased globally.



**Figure 1.** Number of Terrorism Attacks in the World (START, 2022)

### Understanding the Fear of Terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan

However, classical terrorism literature is inadequate in explaining the negative effects of terrorism on individuals across different countries. In addition to that, the number of studies examining the negative effects of terrorism on individuals using comparative methods is also limited. Consequently, in recent years, to address these gaps, academic studies have increasingly focused on the impact of terrorism on the behavior, thoughts, and psychology of individuals in various nations (Conway et al., 2019: 141-160; Tulga, 2020: 47-64). Despite these efforts, few studies specifically investigate nations that are not direct targets of global terrorism yet still experience a significant fear of terrorism.



**Figure 2.** Fear of Terrorism in the World (Inglehart et al., 2022)

In this context, this study focuses on Taiwan, which is not a direct target of global terrorism and has experienced few terrorist attacks, yet exhibits a high level of fear of terrorism, and the case of Türkiye, which has witnessed a significant decline in terrorist attacks, in line with global trends, but shows an increase in fear of terrorism. The cases of Türkiye and Taiwan, which have distinct political histories and experiences with terrorism, and are located in different geographical regions, were analyzed using a comparative method. Specifically, this study examines the relationships between traditional media tools, such as television and newspapers, and emerging technologies and platforms, such as the internet and social media, which are believed to influence the heightened fear of terrorism in both countries, using a quantitative approach. Data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) were utilized for these analyses, and the survey results were examined employing the Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) approach.

The first part of this study reviews the academic literature on the factors that influence the fear of terrorism. The next section provides a detailed explanation of why the cases of Taiwan and Türkiye were selected, emphasizing the significance of these two cases. The subsequent section outlines the methodology used in the analysis, the distribution of key variables, and the variables included in the study. The following sections present the analysis results for the cases of Türkiye and Taiwan, discuss the significance of these findings, and compare them with existing literature. The study concludes with a final section that presents its conclusions.

## 1. Literature Review

Terrorism refers to politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, typically aimed at influencing a broader audience. In recent years, terrorism has evolved into a more global and complex issue, especially following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 (Tulga, 2020: 47-64; Tulga, 2024: 27-48). This problem has garnered significant attention from the academic community and has emerged as a critical topic that scholars closely examine.

Accordingly, the number of studies focusing on terrorism worldwide has steadily increased each year since the September 11 terrorist attacks (Tulga, 2022: 85-108). For instance, Richard Jackson (2012: 1-16) notes that terrorism studies gained global prominence following these attacks, resulting in the establishment of terrorism programs at universities, the emergence of think tanks specializing in terrorism, and a significant rise in the number of academic articles and research on the subject. Jackson (2012: 1-16) further argues that these developments have expanded, evolved, and enriched the literature on terrorism studies worldwide. Similarly, Aradau and Van Munster (2008: 191-210) observe that the volume of academic research on terrorism has consistently grown since the September 11 attacks.

The definition of terrorism is a central topic frequently addressed in terrorism studies. Desmarais et al. (2017: 187) state that academic articles published between 1990 and 2015 predominantly focused on defining terrorism. Similarly, Schuurman (2020: 1020) contends that terrorism research primarily focuses on defining and conceptualizing terrorism through literature reviews. However, numerous academic studies have proposed varying definitions of terrorism. For instance, Easson and Schmid (2011: 149) examined different definitions of terrorism in the literature and discovered that there are over 250 distinct definitions. The diverse, evolving, and broad nature of these definitions has hindered the literature from achieving a consensus on a common definition of terrorism (Arblaster, 1977: 420).

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This situation has prompted scholars to concentrate on various issues, such as the purposes of terrorism, rather than its definition. However, similar to studies on the definition of terrorism, research on its purposes reveals a spectrum of perspectives and contends that terrorist organizations pursue diverse and multifaceted objectives (Akçınaroğlu and Tokdemir, 2018: 165-182). Nevertheless, the most dominant view regarding the purpose of terrorism is that it aims to instill an atmosphere of fear and panic among individuals to achieve its goals (Schmid, 2005: 140; Wessely et al., 2001: 878). In this context, Alexander (1976: 59) argues that fostering an atmosphere of fear among individuals is a strategy employed to attain the political aims of terrorism. The author argues that terrorist organizations can achieve their political objectives by using violence against random civilian targets to intimidate people or instill fear within the community (Alexander, 1976: 70). Consequently, terrorist organizations often strive to cultivate a pervasive atmosphere of fear among the population (Weinberg, 2009: 76).

Some studies examining how terrorist organizations create an atmosphere of fear to achieve their goals argue that terrorist groups utilize traditional media channels, such as newspapers and television, to spread fear (Altheide, 2007: 300; Wilkinson, 1997: 51-64; Kavoori and Fraley, 2006: 47). Other research suggests that terrorist organizations exploit emerging technologies and platforms, including the internet and social media, to instill fear among the populace (Smelser, 2007: 221-229; Oksanen et al., 2020: 1047-1066; Näsi et al., 2020: 582).

Accordingly, there are two primary perspectives in the literature regarding the relationship between terrorism and traditional media tools, such as newspapers, television, and radio (Barnhurst, 1991: 120). The first perspective suggests that terrorist organizations escalate their attacks to garner media attention (Nacos, 2000: 174-178; Sui et al., 2017: 895-908). The second perspective posits a “symbiotic” relationship between terrorism and traditional media sources (Wilkinson, 1997: 51-64; Camphuijsen and Vissers, 2012: 20). Scholars who support the second perspective argue that the relationship between traditional media and terrorism is complex and interdependent. The media seeks compelling stories, while terrorists provide frightening and violent narratives that capture public attention (Hoffman, 2006: 103-121; Wilkinson, 1997: 51-64). For instance, Hoffman (2006: 110) argues that, with the assistance of the media, terrorism can easily reach a global audience, and the media benefits from reporting on these attacks.



Focusing on the relationship between terrorism and traditional media tools—such as newspapers, television, and radio—these two perspectives largely agree that traditional media significantly amplifies the negative effects of terrorism on individuals, particularly in terms of fear. In this context, Godefroidt and Langer (2018: 1492) argue that consuming news from traditional media sources broadens the scope and impact of terrorism, directly influencing the negative emotions experienced by individuals exposed to terrorism-related news. Specifically, over the past 40 years, the development of mass media has enabled graphic images of terrorist incidents to reach millions of homes instantly, allowing people to follow the brutal details of attacks from the comfort of their own residences (Somer et al., 2005: 165-182). These details in traditional media sources heighten the fear of terrorism among individuals across various regions of the world (Hoffman, 2017: 84-92; Mahat-Shamir et al., 2018: 306-312).

However, in contrast to these studies, other academic research in the literature asserts that traditional media tools are ineffective in fostering an atmosphere of fear related to terrorism (Menkhaus, 2014: 160). Nellis and Savage (2012: 758) argue that there is no statistical relationship between exposure to terrorism-related news on traditional media sources and personal fear of terrorism. In this context, studies indicating that traditional media sources have little or no effect on individuals' fear of terrorism tend to emphasize the relationship between terrorism and emerging platforms, such as the internet and social media, rather than traditional media channels (Smelser, 2007: 225). Research on this relationship argues that the internet and social media are more personal, and therefore, exposure to shocking content on these platforms has a more direct impact than similar content presented on television news or in newspapers (Oksanen et al., 2020: 1050). In other words, social media and the internet exert a more immediate and detrimental effect on people's fear of terrorism and related behavioral changes than traditional media sources (Lemyre et al., 2005: 316-330; Tulga, 2022: 85-108).

In this regard, Goodwin et al. (2017: 111-115) found that individuals who used social media and internet platforms following traumatic terrorist attacks experienced higher levels of terrorism-related stress and fear compared to those who relied solely on traditional media. Similarly, Năsi et al. (2020: 585) discovered that individuals who followed news about terrorist attacks through social media and online sources perceived terrorism as a greater threat to themselves than those who obtained information exclusively from traditional media channels. Finally, Finseraas and Listhaug (2013: 220) argue that the internet and social media enable people to receive news and information about terrorist attacks occurring in other parts of the

### Understanding the Fear of Terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan

world more rapidly, resulting in greater negative psychological impacts from attacks that do not take place within their own country.

Some studies in the literature argue that the primary factor contributing to the fear of terrorism is geographical proximity to the location of terrorist attacks, rather than exposure to traditional media, such as newspapers and television, or emerging media, such as the internet and social media (Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt, 2007: 78; Legewie, 2013: 1239). In this context, Mahat-Shamir et al. (2018: 306-312) found that being physically close to terrorist attacks rather than being exposed to terrorism-related news and content through newspapers, television, social media, or the internet is strongly associated with both psychological distress and fear of terrorism. Böhmelt et al. (2019: 80) suggested that the highest levels of fear were observed among residents of the city where the attack occurred, as well as those living in surrounding areas. Similarly, Agerberg and Sohlberg (2021: 2534) found that the 2017 terrorist attack in Stockholm had more significant negative effects on individuals residing in close geographical proximity to the city.


Most studies in the literature that focus on the various reasons behind the fear of terrorism primarily examine the fear experienced following significant terrorist attacks, such as the September 11 and Oklahoma City attacks in the United States (e.g., Ahern et al., 2002: 289-300), the September 11 terrorist attack in Australia (e.g., Aly and Balnaves, 2007: 113-122), the July 7, 2005 attacks in London (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011: 151-181), and the Mumbai attacks in Western Europe (Finseraas and Listhaug, 2011: 213-228). Additionally, while there are studies in the literature that investigate the fear of terrorism in Türkiye, few focus on the reasons for the increasing fear of terrorism despite a decrease in terrorist attacks; thus, the underlying causes of this fear remain underexplored (e.g., Çardak and Bilgin, 2022: 347-386; Çınğı and Suğur, 2020: 514-536; Türk and Hamzaoglu, 2019: 176-193). Similarly, there is a limited body of research on the reasons behind the fear of terrorism in a country like Taiwan, which has not been a direct target of global terrorism and has experienced few terrorist attacks, reports a high level of fear regarding terrorism.

Moreover, most comparative studies on the fear of terrorism focus on countries with similar characteristics or neighboring regions (Ross and Gurr, 1989: 405-426; Van Der Does et al., 2021: 1276-1294). In other words, there is a lack of research analyzing countries such as Taiwan and Türkiye, which have differing histories of terrorism and geographical contexts, yet exhibit similarly high levels of fear regarding terrorism. This study aims to address these gaps in the literature by examining Taiwan, where a significant fear of terrorism is observed despite

the absence of direct threats from global terrorism, and Türkiye, where fear of terrorism has persisted even as the number of terrorist attacks has declined in recent years. Using quantitative methods, this study will investigate the underlying reasons for the high fear of terrorism in these two cases, which possess distinct terrorism backgrounds and are located in different geographical regions.

## 2. Case Selection

This section aims to provide a more in-depth explanation of why Taiwan and Türkiye have been selected as case studies in this research. To achieve this, a cluster analysis was conducted using data from 77 countries included in the seventh wave of the World Values Survey, which is also utilized in this study. The countries were grouped into different clusters based on their number of terrorist attacks and their levels of fear regarding terrorism. The silhouette method was employed to determine the optimal number of clusters. The analysis indicated that three clusters offered the best fit, leading to the division of the 77 countries into these three clusters.




**Figure 3.** Optimal Number of Clusters

The countries in the first cluster, represented by the red circle, share the common characteristic of experiencing a low incidence of terrorist attacks. Correspondingly, the fear of terrorism among citizens in this cluster is relatively low compared to those in other clusters. In the second cluster, represented by the blue circle, citizens exhibit a heightened fear of terrorism compared to those in the first cluster. Meanwhile, the third cluster, represented by the green circle, demonstrates the highest levels of fear of terrorism among citizens, exceeding the levels observed in both the first and second clusters. However, the countries in the third cluster display diverse characteristics regarding the number of terrorist attacks. For instance,


### Understanding the Fear of Terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan

countries such as the Maldives (MV) and Zimbabwe (ZW), which have experienced few terrorist attacks, are grouped in the same cluster as Nigeria (NG) and Pakistan (PK), which have faced a significantly higher number of attacks.




**Figure 4.** Cluster Analysis Results

Considering the characteristics of countries across all clusters, this study focuses on those in the third cluster, where a high level of fear of terrorism is observed. Türkiye and Taiwan, both part of this cluster, are particularly noteworthy due to their distinctive features. For instance, although Taiwan has experienced relatively few terrorist attacks—similar to countries such as Singapore (SG), Poland (PL), and South Korea (KR)—the Taiwanese population exhibits a greater fear of terrorism compared to the citizens of these countries.



**Figure 5.** Fear of Terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan (Inglehart et al., 2022)

On the other hand, Türkiye, which is part of the third cluster, has experienced fewer terrorist attacks than countries in the second cluster, such as Colombia (CO) and Thailand (TH), as well as Pakistan (PK) and Nigeria (NG) within the third cluster. However, the fear of terrorism among Turkish citizens is greater than that in these countries. Furthermore, although terrorist attacks in Türkiye have significantly decreased in recent years due to successful operations carried out by the Turkish Security Forces against terrorist organizations, the fear of terrorism among the Turkish population has notably increased.



**Figure 6.** Global Terrorism Index (Taiwan and Türkiye) (START, 2022)

The high level of fear of terrorism, coupled with the relatively low or declining number of terrorist attacks and the distinct experiences of both countries, renders these two cases particularly significant. Moreover, Taiwan's situation diverges from many studies in the existing literature, as it demonstrates a high level of fear of terrorism despite its geographical distance from regions targeted by global terrorist organizations. Similarly, Türkiye experiences fewer terrorist attacks compared to other countries in its vicinity. Additionally, the body of literature comparing the fear of terrorism across different nations is quite limited, with most studies concentrating on countries with similar characteristics or neighboring regions (e.g., Ross and Gurr, 1989: 405-426). In other words, research employing comparative methods to analyze countries such as Taiwan and Türkiye—where the historical context of terrorism and geographical circumstances differ, yet fear of terrorism is observed at comparable levels—is scarce. For these reasons, this study focuses on these two countries, examines the factors contributing to their heightened fear of terrorism, and analyzes these factors through a comparative approach.

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### 3. Research Design

This study examines and compares the factors contributing to the heightened fear of terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan using quantitative methods, drawing on data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey. The World Values Survey is a global research project involving numerous social scientists that investigates individuals' values and beliefs, changes in their perspectives over time, and the opinions of people from various countries regarding social and political developments (Inglehart et al., 2022; Tulga, 2022: 91).

The seventh wave of the World Values Survey spans the period from 2017 to 2022 and was conducted across 77 countries, despite the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (Tulga, 2022: 91). This wave includes a total of 69,578 observations and 536 variables. However, as it was not necessary to use all 536 variables for this study; therefore, 14 variables were selected for analysis (see Tables 1 and 2).

Variables	Number of Observation	mean	Sd	min	max
Importance of Religion	2409	1,52303861	0,72076791	1	4
National Pride	2382	1,58102435	0,94845357	1	5
Urban or Rural	2415	1,26376812	0,44076631	1	2
Fear of Terrorism	2398	1,72727273	0,74198157	1	4
Internet	2401	1,88629738	1,45085595	1	5
Social Media	2405	1,92349272	1,48955357	1	5
Radio News	2394	3,43859649	1,50545376	1	5
TV News	2406	1,36699917	0,84147671	1	5
Daily Newspaper	2392	3,00585284	1,57084452	1	5
Talk with friends or Colleagues	2400	2,06916667	1,24131301	1	5
Age	2414	38,8318144	12,6741122	18	95
Gender	2415	1,50020704	0,50010351	1	2
Education	2406	2,33374896	1,92294382	0	6
Income	2329	5,34349506	1,72150387	1	10


**Table 1.** Descriptive Information (Türkiye)

Since the study focused exclusively on Türkiye and Taiwan, only participants from these two countries were included in the sample. A total of 1,223 participants from Taiwan and 2,415 participants from Türkiye participated in the seventh wave of the survey, and the analysis was conducted using data from these participants.

Variables	Number of Observation	mean	Sd	min	max
Importance of Religion	1223	2,40392478	0,87540552	1	4
National Pride	1223	2,04905969	0,73993874	1	5
Urban or Rural	1223	1,12428455	0,33004085	1	2
Fear of Terrorism	1223	2,01390025	1,00602266	1	4
Internet	1223	2,23793949	1,71155685	1	5
Social Media	1223	2,64431725	1,79704203	1	5
Radio News	1223	3,44399019	1,59323276	1	5
TV News	1223	1,64186427	1,14752154	1	5
Daily Newspaper	1223	3,50449714	1,56624721	1	5
Talk with friends or Colleagues	1223	3,25756337	1,42799561	1	5
Age	1222	48,2888707	16,8089673	18	85
Gender	1223	1,51430908	0,49999967	1	2
Education	1222	4,16530278	2,00625738	0	8
Income	1223	4,50286182	1,74704332	1	10

**Table 2.** Descriptive Information (Taiwan)


In this context, before proceeding with the regression analysis, it is essential to examine missing values to ensure the reliability of the results. For Taiwan, the variables with the highest amounts of missing data among the selected variables are “education level (Q275)” and “age (Q262).” Each of these variables has one missing value, which corresponds to 0.08% of the total data. There are no missing values in the other variables.

**Figure 7.** Missing Data Percentage (Taiwan)



### Understanding the Fear of Terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan


On the other hand, among the variables selected for the analysis of the Türkiye, the variable with the highest proportion of missing data is “income (Q288),” with 4% of its data missing. The variable with the second-highest proportion of missing data is “national pride (Q254),” which has 33 missing values, corresponding to 1% of the total data. The other variables have between 0 and 23 missing values, with missing data percentages ranging from 0% to 1%.



**Figure 8.** Missing Data Percentage (Türkiye)


Scholars such as Schafer (1999: 3-15) and Bennett (2001: 464-469) argue that a missing data rate of less than 10% is acceptable for analysis. Accordingly, the variables selected for this study are suitable for analysis, as the percentage of missing data ranges from 0% to 4%.

After examining the missing data, the demographic distributions of the Turkish and Taiwanese participants were analyzed. The first demographic variable considered was gender. Among the Turkish participants, 50% were female and 50% were male. In contrast, 50.7% of the Taiwanese participants were female, while 49.3% were male.



**Figure 9.** Distribution of Gender (Inglehart et al., 2022)


Secondly, the age distribution of the participants was analyzed. Among the Turkish participants, 29.5% were aged 18 to 29, 45% were aged 30 to 49, and 25.5% were aged 50 and older. In contrast, 42.6% of the Taiwanese participants were aged 50 and older, 38.1% were aged 30 to 49, and 19.3% were aged 18 to 29.



**Figure 10.** Distribution of Age (Inglehart et al., 2022)


Thirdly, the distribution of participants' education levels was analyzed. Among the Turkish participants, 58.3% had a low education level, 24.2% had a medium education level, and 17.1% had a high education level. In contrast, 62.5% of the Taiwanese participants reported a low education level, 22.1% reported a medium education level, and 15.4% reported a high education level.

### Understanding the Fear of Terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan




**Figure 11.** Distribution of Education (Inglehart et al., 2022)

Fourth, the distribution of participants' income levels was analyzed. The majority of the Turkish participants, 72%, belonged to the middle-income category, while 14.4% were classified as low-income and 10.1% as high-income. Similarly, among the Taiwanese participants, 67.6% were from the middle-income category, 29.4% were classified as low-income, and 3% were categorized as high-income.



**Figure 12.** Distribution of Income (Inglehart et al., 2022)

The final demographic variable examined is the participants' residence, specifically whether they live in urban or rural areas. Among the Turkish participants, 73.6% reside in urban areas, whereas 26.4% live in rural areas. In contrast, 90.2% of the Taiwanese participants inhabit urban areas, while only 9.8% reside in rural areas.



**Figure 13.** Distribution of Urban vs. Rural (Inglehart et al., 2022)

The dependent variable for all analyses concerning the cases of Taiwan and Türkiye is "fear of terrorist attacks." Among the Turkish participants, 85.6% reported being very much or a great deal afraid of a terrorist attack in their country, while 13.8% indicated that they are not afraid. In contrast, 67.4% of the Taiwanese participants expressed fear of a terrorist attack in their country, whereas 8.6% stated that they are not afraid.

The analyses were conducted using six distinct models, with the first three focusing on the case of Taiwan and the last three on the case of Türkiye. Three distinct independent variables were selected from the literature for their potential negative impact on the fear of terrorism. Specifically, the internet was chosen as the independent variable representing developing technological tools and platforms in both the first model concerning Taiwan and the fourth model concerning Türkiye. In these models, the independent variable is defined as obtaining information from the internet. Given the high correlation between "getting information from social media," another developing technological tool, and "getting information from the internet," the study concentrated solely on the internet variable, as the analysis results would be nearly identical. It was observed that 60% of Taiwanese participants accessed information from the internet daily, while 9.1% did so weekly, 3.3% monthly, 4.3% rarely, and 23.3% never. In contrast, 64.7% of Turkish participants reported obtaining information from the internet daily, 13.1% weekly, 4.4% monthly, 2.7% rarely, and 14.5% never.

The independent variable in the second model, which focuses on Taiwan, and the fifth model, which centers on Türkiye, is getting news from newspapers. Among Taiwanese

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participants, 19.1% report obtaining news from newspapers daily, 11.7% weekly, 5.6% monthly, and 24.2% rarely. Additionally, 39.4% of participants indicated that they never obtain news from newspapers. In contrast, 24.5% of Turkish participants receive news from newspapers daily, 19.2% weekly, 16% monthly, and 10.1% rarely, while 29.3% of participants report that they never get news from newspapers.

The independent variable for the third model, which focuses on the Taiwan case, and the sixth and final model, which centers on the Turkish case, is obtaining news via television. Among the Taiwanese participants, 67.5% reported obtaining news from television daily, 17.5% weekly, 3% monthly, and 7% rarely, while 5% indicated that they never receive news from television. In contrast, 78.3% of Turkish participants reported obtaining news from television daily, 12.4% weekly, 4.7% monthly, and 2.1% rarely, with 2.1% stating that they never receive news from television.

In the analysis, in addition to the dependent and independent variables, the variables that include information obtained from radio and friends, or colleagues, as well as national pride and the importance of religion, were selected as control variables. Due to the decline in the use and significance of radio, which is one of the traditional media tools, it was not included as an independent variable in this study; instead, it was treated as a control variable. Alongside these control variables, all demographic variables, whose distributions were described at the beginning of this section, were also incorporated into the analysis models.

Since the dependent variable is categorical, the Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) method was employed for the analysis. The regression analysis consists of six primary models: the first three focus on the Taiwan case, while the last three concentrate on the Türkiye case. The first and fourth models examine the internet variable, which represents emerging technologies and platforms. The second and fifth models focus on the variable of obtaining information from newspapers, one of the traditional media tools. Finally, the third and sixth models address the television variable, another significant traditional media tool.

#### 4. Results

	<i>Dependent variable (Ordinal Logistic Regression):</i>					
	Fear of Terrorism (Q147)					
	Model 1	Taiwan Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Türkiye Model 5	Model 6
Internet	-0.001 (0.042)			0.075** (0.031)		
Daily Newspaper		-0.022 (0.036)			-0.061** (0.030)	
TV News			0.128*** (0.048)			0.035 (0.048)
Age	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.014)
Gender	-0.592*** (0.108)	-0.586*** (0.108)	-0.600*** (0.108)	-0.315*** (0.082)	-0.256*** (0.084)	-0.300*** (0.082)
Education	0.483*** (0.093)	0.483*** (0.082)	0.455*** (0.083)	0.063 (0.057)	0.027 (0.056)	0.039 (0.056)
Income	0.142 (0.114)	0.139 (0.114)	0.153 (0.114)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.025)
Radio News	-0.005 (0.034)	-0.0001 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.035)	0.045** (0.028)	0.076** (0.031)	0.053** (0.028)
Talk with friends/Colleagues	0.030 (0.043)	0.032 (0.041)	0.023 (0.041)	-0.109** (0.036)	-0.077** (0.035)	-0.084** (0.035)
Proud of Nationality	0.122 (0.075)	0.124 (0.075)	0.117 (0.075)	0.303*** (0.046)	0.319*** (0.046)	0.307*** (0.046)
Importance of Religion	0.183*** (0.064)	0.185*** (0.063)	0.181*** (0.063)	0.399*** (0.058)	0.363*** (0.058)	0.366*** (0.058)
Urban/ Rural	0.074 (0.163)	0.075 (0.164)	0.080 (0.163)	-0.411*** (0.094)	-0.400*** (0.094)	-0.416*** (0.094)
1  2	0.845** (0.493)	0.805** (0.469)	0.913** (0.464)	-0.089 (0.272)	-0.258 (0.268)	-0.187 (0.269)
2  3	1.959*** (0.496)	1.918*** (0.472)	2.032*** (0.467)	2.124*** (0.277)	1.953*** (0.272)	2.018*** (0.274)
3  4	3.688*** (0.505)	3.647*** (0.482)	3.769*** (0.478)	4.343*** (0.314)	4.200*** (0.310)	4.244*** (0.311)
Observations	1,221	1,221	1,221	2,264	2,258	2,266
Log Likelihood	-1,502.590	-1,502.399	-1,499.084	-2,313.104	-2,307.285	-2,319.757

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 3.** Regression Analysis Results

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The regression analysis provides insights into the factors contributing to the heightened fear of terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan, and it compares the variables that influence this fear in both countries. The results from the Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) analysis, which uses information sources such as the internet, daily newspapers, and television as independent variables related to fear of terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan, reveal several findings.


The first finding indicates a statistically significant, positive, and strong relationship between obtaining information from the internet—one of the emerging technologies—and fear of terrorism in Türkiye ( $\beta = 0.075$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). In other words, as the frequency of obtaining news from the internet increases, fear of terrorism among Turkish participants also rises. However, in the case of Taiwan, no statistically significant relationship was found between internet usage and fear of terrorism.

In the second model focusing on Taiwan, no statistically significant relationship was found between daily newspapers and fear of terrorism. Conversely, in the fifth model focusing on Türkiye, a statistically significant, negative, and strong relationship was observed between daily newspapers and fear of terrorism ( $\beta = -0.061$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). Interestingly, contrary to the generally expected effect, the frequency of obtaining information from daily newspapers in Türkiye appears to reduce fear of terrorism.

There is a statistically strong, positive, and significant relationship between the fear of terrorism and television, a traditional media tool, in Taiwan ( $\beta = 0.128$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). In other words, as the frequency with which Taiwanese participants obtain news from television increases, their fear of terrorism also rises. However, in contrast to the case of Taiwan, no statistically significant relationship was found between the fear of terrorism and the consumption of television news in Türkiye.

To provide a more detailed understanding of the regression analysis results, the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable were visualized using the estimated coefficients (log-likelihoods). Visualizing these estimated coefficients highlights the differences in effect sizes between the two countries.





**Figure 14.** Coefficient Comparison for Fear of Terrorism in Türkiye and Taiwan

The coefficients comparison regarding the impact of various information sources (Internet, newspapers, and TV news) on the fear of terrorism in Taiwan and Türkiye reveals that obtaining information from the Internet has almost no statistical effect in Taiwan, whereas it has a statistically significant positive effect in Türkiye. Receiving information from daily newspapers negatively influences the fear of terrorism in both countries; however, this effect is statistically significant only in the Turkish context. Finally, while TV news exerts a statistically significant positive effect on the fear of terrorism in Taiwan, its effect is not statistically significant in Türkiye.

An examination of the relationships between the demographic variables utilized in all models of the regression analysis and fear of terrorism reveals that there is no statistical relationship between age and income and fear of terrorism in either country. Conversely, a statistically significant, strong, and negative relationship exists between gender and fear of terrorism in both countries. As numerous studies in the literature have indicated, women are more fearful of terrorism than men in the cases of Taiwan and Türkiye. On the other hand, in Taiwan, a statistically significant and robust relationship is observed between education level and fear of terrorism across all models. However, unlike the relationship between gender and fear of terrorism, the relationship between education level and fear of terrorism is positive. In other words, as education levels decrease, fear of terrorism increases. Conversely, in Türkiye, there is no statistically significant relationship between education level and fear of terrorism. Finally, in Türkiye, a negative and highly significant relationship was found between the final

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demographic variable, Urban/Rural, and fear of terrorism. Specifically, participants residing in rural areas in Türkiye exhibited a greater fear of terrorism. Conversely, no statistically significant relationship was found between the Urban/Rural variable and fear of terrorism in Taiwan.

The analysis indicates that there is no statistical relationship between receiving information from the radio—used as a control variable in all models—and fear of terrorism in Taiwan. This finding is consistent across all models focused on Taiwan. In contrast, a statistically significant, positive, and strong relationship exists between receiving information from the radio and fear of terrorism in Türkiye. In other words, as the frequency of receiving information from the radio increases in Türkiye, the fear of terrorism also rises. Furthermore, while a statistically significant, negative, and strong relationship is observed between receiving information from friends or colleagues (another control variable) and fear of terrorism in Türkiye, no statistically significant relationship is found between receiving information from friends or colleagues and fear of terrorism in Taiwan.

Another control variable, national pride, exhibits a positive and highly significant relationship with the fear of terrorism in Türkiye. In other words, as national pride increases among Turkish respondents, their fear of terrorism also rises. However, this positive and highly significant relationship between national pride and fear of terrorism is not observed in Taiwan, where no statistically significant relationship was found between the two variables.

Finally, a positive and significant relationship was identified between the importance of religion and fear of terrorism in both countries. In other words, as the importance of religion increased among participants in both countries, their fear of terrorism also increased significantly.

### 5. Discussion

The regression analysis, which examined and compared the cases of Türkiye and Taiwan, yielded several significant findings. This section will discuss the implications of these findings, compare the results from both cases, and explore the similarities and differences between these findings and those reported in the existing literature.

The first finding indicates that different media platforms influence the fear of terrorism in both cases. In Türkiye, there is a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between emerging technologies—such as the internet and social media—and the fear of terrorism. In other words, as Turkish participants receive more information from the

internet and social media, their fear of terrorism increases significantly. Conversely, in the case of Taiwan, these emerging technologies do not have a statistically significant effect on fear of terrorism. Instead, a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship was found between information received from television—one of the traditional media tools—and fear of terrorism. In other words, as Taiwanese participants received information from television more frequently, their fear of terrorism also increased significantly. However, this strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between receiving information from television and fear of terrorism in Taiwan does not apply to the Türkiye case, where receiving information from television has no statistically significant effect on fear of terrorism.

In summary, in Taiwan, increased exposure to television content elevates concerns about terrorism, while the internet and social media have no statistically significant effect on fear of terrorism. In Türkiye, however, internet and social media usage heightens fear of terrorism, whereas information from television does not have a statistically significant impact. These findings, specific to the cases of Türkiye and Taiwan, align with some studies in the literature but diverge from others. For example, Mahat-Shamir et al. (2018: 306-312) found no statistical relationship between information from social media or the internet and fear of terrorism, suggesting that other factors contribute to the fear of terrorism and its associated negative psychological effects. Similarly, Debrael et al. (2021: 158) concluded that television content influences fear of terrorism, while another traditional media tool—printed newspapers—has no statistically significant effect. These findings align with the Taiwan case but differ from those observed in Türkiye. However, other studies support the findings related to the Türkiye case. For instance, Da'san and Alsawalqa (2021: 302) found that social media and the internet can increase the negative effects of terrorism on individuals, such as heightened fear, and contribute to adverse social and psychological consequences.

The second significant finding is that, when examining the impact of traditional media or emerging technologies on fear of terrorism, it is more effective to analyze each source individually rather than treating different media sources as a collective entity, as was done in this study. This finding aligns with some studies in the existing literature. De Coninck et al. (2018: 420) found that internet and traditional media sources exert different effects on individuals' fear of terrorism; therefore, it is beneficial to avoid generalizations and to examine each source separately.

Another significant finding is the statistically significant negative relationship between obtaining information from daily newspapers and fear of terrorism in the Turkish context. As

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Turkish participants consume more news from daily newspapers, their fear of terrorism decreases. The primary reason behind this intriguing finding appears to be the declining use of daily newspapers. For instance, in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey, 42% of Turkish participants reported obtaining news or information from newspapers daily, while 27% indicated that they never received information from newspapers (Inglehart et al., 2022). However, in the 7th wave of the World Values Survey, only 24% of Turkish participants reported obtaining information or news from newspapers daily, while 30% stated that they never received news from newspapers (Inglehart et al., 2022).

The fourth significant finding of the study reveals a strong, negative, and statistically significant relationship between gender and fear of terrorism in both the Taiwan and Türkiye cases. In other words, women exhibit a greater fear of terrorism than men in both cases. These results align with the findings of many studies in the existing literature. For over 25 years, academic research has indicated that gender is the strongest predictor of fear related to crime and terrorism, with the gender variable being twice as influential as other demographic factors (Ferraro, 1995: 680). Supporting this, Nellis (2009: 328), Corradi and Egan (2024), and May et al. (2011: 1-22) concluded that women are more afraid of terrorism and perceive the risk of terrorism to be significantly higher than that perceived by men.

It was found that there is no statistically significant relationship between other demographic variables, such as age and income, and fear of terrorism in either case. This finding aligns with the results of some studies in the literature. Tuba Gün Çıngı and Nadir Suğur (2020: 514-536) found that age and income are not statistically related to fear of terrorism. Conversely, Karakus et al. (2010: 174-184) identified a statistical relationship between education, income, and fear of terrorism. Similarly, Moore (2010: 19) also found a statistical relationship between income and fear of terrorism, concluding that there is a negative relationship between fear of terrorism and income; individuals with higher incomes are less likely to express fear of a terrorist attack compared to those with lower incomes.

The relationship between education and rural/urban variables within demographic factors and fear of terrorism differs in both cases. In the case of Taiwan, there is a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between the level of education and fear of terrorism, which aligns with findings of some studies in the literature. For instance, Boateng (2019: 580) found a statistical relationship between education level and fear of terrorism. Similarly, a study conducted in the United States reported a statistically significant association between education level and fear of terrorism (Brück and Müller, 2010: 1-15). Conversely, in

the case of Türkiye, no statistically significant relationship was found between education level and fear of terrorism. This finding aligns with existing studies focused on Türkiye. Çıngı and Suğur (2020: 514-536) concluded that fear of terrorism in Türkiye is not statistically related to demographic variables, including education level.

The difference between the two cases is also evident in the urban/rural variable. In contrast to the Taiwan case, the Turkish case demonstrates a negative and highly significant relationship between the urban/rural variable and fear of terrorism. Consistent with the findings of May et al. (2011: 1-22), participants residing in rural areas of Türkiye were found to exhibit greater fear of terrorism. However, this finding contradicts the results of Jacops and van Spanje (2023: 492), who argued that urban participants are more likely to perceive the risk of terrorism.

The final significant finding of the study concerns the relationships between the control variables used in the analyses and fear of terrorism. In both cases, there exists a positive and highly significant relationship between the importance of religion and fear of terrorism. Consistent with this finding, Leite et al. (2019: 316) found that more religious participants expressed greater concerns regarding terrorism. Similarly, Haner et al. (2019) identified a positive and significant relationship among Americans between the importance of religion, national pride, and fear of terrorism. Consistent with Haner et al. (2019), the analysis for Türkiye also revealed a positive and highly significant relationship among the importance of religion, national pride, and fear of terrorism. However, in the case of Taiwan, no statistically significant relationship was identified between national pride and fear of terrorism.

### Conclusion

Terrorism represents one of the most significant challenges that has threatened countries across various regions in the world for many years. With advancements in technology, terrorism has become increasingly global and complex (Tulga, 2022: 85-108; Tulga, 2024: 27-48). Today, the negative effects of terrorism extend beyond the countries or regions where terrorist organizations conduct their attacks; individuals residing in nations that are not direct targets of global terrorism are also adversely affected (Tulga, 2024: 27-48). Furthermore, in some countries, despite a notable decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in recent years, there has been a marked increase in the fear of terrorism among their citizens (Tulga, 2024: 27-48). In this context, this study focuses on two cases: Taiwan, where a heightened fear of terrorism is observed despite not being a direct target of global terrorism,

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and Türkiye, where there has been a significant decline in terrorist attacks in recent years but a substantial increase in the fear of terrorism.

Although Taiwan is not a direct target of global terrorist organizations and has experienced relatively few terrorist attacks compared to many countries worldwide, the fear of terrorism in Taiwan remains high. In contrast, Türkiye has seen a significant decrease in the number of terrorist attacks since 2016, largely due to successful operations conducted by the Turkish Security Forces; however, public fear of terrorism has increased. Despite this, there is a limited number of academic studies in the existing literature that examine the phenomenon of heightened fear of terrorism in Taiwan and similar countries, despite their low incidence of attacks, or the rising fear of terrorism in countries like Türkiye, even as the frequency of attacks declines. Furthermore, most comparative studies on the heightened fear of terrorism tend to focus on countries with similar characteristics or neighboring regions. In other words, studies that use comparative methods to analyze countries such as Taiwan and Türkiye—where the histories of terrorism and geographical contexts differ, yet similarly high levels of fear of terrorism are observed—remain scarce.

In this context, to address the limitations present in the existing literature, this study focuses on the cases of Taiwan and Türkiye, examining and comparing the effects of various media sources on the heightened fear of terrorism in both countries. Specifically, the statistical relationship between fear of terrorism and traditional media tools, as well as emerging technologies, is analyzed using regression methods, utilizing data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey.

The regression analysis yielded several significant findings. Firstly, different media sources exert varying effects on the fear of terrorism across countries. For instance, in Türkiye, emerging media tools such as social media and the internet have a statistically significant, strong, and positive effect on the fear of terrorism. In contrast, no statistically significant relationship was identified between emerging media sources and fear of terrorism in Taiwan. Conversely, in Taiwan, there exists a statistically significant, strong, and positive relationship between receiving news from television and fear of terrorism, whereas this relationship does not hold true in Türkiye.

The second finding of the study, which is related to the first finding, indicates that examining the relationships between fear of terrorism and various media tools, avoiding generalizations and analyzing each media source individually, as this study does, yields more meaningful results. For instance, in the case of Taiwan, a statistically significant and strong

relationship was found between receiving information from television—a traditional media tool—and fear of terrorism. Conversely, no statistically significant relationship was found between newspapers, another traditional media tool, and fear of terrorism. In contrast, in Türkiye, television had no effect on fear of terrorism; however, a statistically significant and negative relationship was observed between newspapers and fear of terrorism, which aligns with the decline in print newspaper readership in recent years.

The third significant finding of the study is that, consistent with numerous studies in the existing literature, there is a statistically significant, strong, and negative relationship between gender—a demographic variable—and fear of terrorism. In other words, women exhibit a greater fear of terrorism than men in both Taiwan and Türkiye. However, different relationships were identified between other demographic variables and fear of terrorism in each case. For instance, while a statistically significant relationship exists between the rural/urban variable and fear of terrorism in Türkiye, no such relationship is observed in Taiwan. Similarly, although a statistically significant relationship is found between education level and fear of terrorism in Taiwan, this relationship is not observed in Türkiye.

The final significant finding of the analysis is that there exists a statistically significant and strong relationship between the importance of religion and the fear of terrorism in both cases. Similar to demographic variables, the relationships between the fear of terrorism and other control variables vary between the two countries.

In summary, in the case of Türkiye, participants who received more information from the internet or social media, were female, lived in rural areas, were more religious, and exhibited higher levels of national pride reported greater fear of terrorism. In the case of Taiwan, participants who received more information from television news, were female, had lower levels of education, and were more religious also expressed heightened fear of terrorism. While some of these significant and noteworthy findings align with existing literature, others diverge from previous studies.

However, while the results clearly demonstrate the differing impacts of media sources on fear levels in the two countries, more in-depth examinations, such as face-to-face interviews, could elucidate how these variations reflect broader sociocultural and geopolitical contexts. For instance, understanding why television influences fear more significantly in Taiwan compared to the internet's role in Türkiye could offer insights into media consumption habits and trust in traditional versus digital media across different cultural settings. Additionally, demographic factors, such as gender and the importance of religion,



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which consistently associate with heightened levels of fear, warrant further investigation into how these elements intersect with historical experiences of terrorism.

In conclusion, it is essential to synthesize the study's findings with broader implications for future research. Future studies could build upon these findings by investigating the psychological mechanisms underlying media-induced fear and conducting face-to-face interviews to evaluate the long-term impact of media exposure on public perceptions of terrorism.

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## War and Peace Journalism: The Role of Local and International Media during the Intra-Afghan Peace Talks

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### Abstract

The former government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (hereinafter referred to as the Islamic Republic) and the Islamic Taliban Movement (hereinafter referred to as the Taliban) attached great deal of importance to media coverage of the intra-Afghan peace negotiations (can also be called Doha peace talks) that took place in Doha, the capital of the State of Qatar, between September 2020 and August 2021. They, for their part, claimed that the local media in particular had been taking sides and disseminating propaganda throughout the peace negotiations. This comparative case study has used mixed method to elaborate on how the local and international media covered Doha peace talks on Afghanistan. Using John Galtung's model of peace and war journalism as its theoretical framework, this article analysed 229 stories—including news articles, roundtables, interviews, and Op-Eds—published on the English websites of TOLONews, CNN, and Al Jazeera during the peace negotiations. Consequently, it was revealed that though the war journalism continued to be predominant reporting approach for all selected media outlets, TOLONews, as a local media, relatively deployed peace journalism compared to CNN and Al Jazeera, two worldwide major media outlets. Finally, it is recommended to explore why local media, despite being directly affected by the conflict, failed to adequately apply peace journalism in their coverage of the intra-Afghan peace negotiations.

**Keywords:** Peace Journalism, War Journalism, Intra-Afghan Peace Talks, Local Media, International Media.



## Introduction

By virtue of an accord signed between the United States of America and the Taliban on February 29, 2020, in Qatar, the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban, who presently control the country, entered into direct negotiations in September 2020 for the first time in around twenty years of war. However, these peace talks concluded catastrophically on August 15, 2021, when the Islamic Republic collapsed following the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Amidst the intra-Afghan negotiations, both parties involved to the conflict, for their part, claimed that the local media, in particular, had been taking sides and disseminating propaganda. As a case in point, in May 2021, then National Security Directorate (NDS) chief of Afghanistan accused a number of media outlets in the country of either broadcasting or publishing propaganda in favour of the Taliban. Simultaneously, the Taliban threatened some local media that they would face consequences for reporting in support of the government (Ariana News, 2021). In addition to the conflicting sides, some civil society activists also cautioned the media not to approach the peace talks with a biased reporting-especially they should avoid whitewashing the Taliban (حسين، 1399). Additionally, the intra-Afghan peace talks also garnered considerable attention from international media outlets. For example, as will be deliberated upon in the sections to come, Aljazeera and CNN contributed significantly in covering these talks. Overarching coverage of both media outlets included geopolitical implications of the talks, insights from domestic and international stakeholders, concerns over the peace process, and obstacles in reaching a perpetuate ceasefire.

In light of above-mentioned illustrations, the present paper, with a comparative perspective, will analyse English language news coverage on the websites of TOLONews, CNN and Aljazeera to find out whether these media outlets incorporated Peace Journalism or War Journalism during their reporting on the intra-Afghan peace talks. While TOLONews stands for local media, CNN and Al Jazeera represent international media in the context of the current study.

The following pages will provide a quick literature review with a focus on outlining the gaps and illustrating the importance of this paper accordingly. Although, the researches that have thus far been conducted offer valuable insight on coverage of peace and conflict in Afghanistan in general, a comparative study of the role played by local and international media in reporting the intra-Afghan peace negotiations has remained vital for further investigation. Therefore, the study at hand will attempt to address this critical aspect by specifically



deploying peace and war journalism theoretical framework in the context of the intra-Afghan peace negotiation with an in-depth concentration on local and international media. Methodology shall be discussed subsequently, followed by the findings and discussion. Lastly, a recommendation will be made concerning the future direction of the topic.

### **1. Existing Debates on Media and Intra-Afghan Peace Talks**

Information is seen as a power that impacts public discourse. Media, as a pivotal source of information, can change our perception of how we view the world around us. Media can be a platform for debate and different opinion expressions, which leads to dispute resolution. However, they can also be abused to incite hatred and escalate tensions. In general, media can take on two different roles: either be active in the conflict or stay out of it independently for the sake of peace. While the former role contributes to the deterioration of violence and conflict, the latter seeks means to resolve conflict and alleviate violence. Although the rapid evolution and diversification of mass media have provided more direct access to news for the public, conventional mainstream media, such as television, still maintains its influence and has a crucial contribution in shaping the public's view about events (Puddephatt, 2006; Kuusik, 2010; Wang, 2022). The geopolitical landscape of intra-Afghan peace talks was deeply complex due to presence of multiple players, encompassing domestic, regional and international actors. This complexity was further deepened by internal division in Afghanistan, and lasting more than forty years of conflict. In such context, media could significantly either fuel skepticism or promote hope for peace amongst the involved players and public.

As already noted, the Taliban and the government placed significant importance to media coverage of the Doha talks. Both parties were concerned that media coverage might depict them as obstacles to peace or undermine the morale of their supporters. They tried to warn the media to stay away from what they referred to bias reporting on the peace talks. For instance, the Taliban issued a statement on June 24, 2019, stating that a week would be given to the radio stations, TV channels, publication or other kind of outlets to cease anti-Taliban ads that are paid by the government (Radio Free Europe, 2019). The Afghan Journalists Safety Committee (AJSC) similarly condemned both the Taliban and the government for their approaches towards media. In a press release issued on May 5, 2021, the committee asserted that “both sides involved in the conflict accuse the media of violating the principle of impartiality also shows that the media is not affiliated with any party and media do not bolster interests of a particular party.” Given the duration of the conflict and its devastating

implications, the intra-Afghan peace negotiations were considered as a critical juncture for bringing about a sustainable peace to the country. How did local and international media approach that historic breakthrough? This is a question which has been rarely addressed. Lynch & Freear (2023) examined war and peace journalism with regard to the intra-Afghan peace negotiations. Nevertheless, they only investigated the local media with a short timeframe, namely September 2020, the initial phase of the peace talks. Lynch & Freear argue that the local media in Afghanistan failed to support peace efforts. This claim holds some accuracy, yet it can be challenged provided that we look from a comparative perspective to the issue, taking also the international media into account. Furthermore, the period that these authors examined to assess the coverage of the intra-Afghan talks is insufficient for generalizing the results across the entire duration of the negotiations, which extended far beyond a month, from September 2020 to August 2021. They overlooked new facts and developments that emerged during the peace negotiations following September. Consequently, the validity of the study to generalize the conclusions drawn from a single month to the entire process is subject to question.

Raiszada (2020) is of the opinion that Afghanistan's media outlets have made effective efforts in support of peace: "Afghanistan media outlets have made continued effort to create understanding, tranquillity and peace in accordance to their human and national commitment". Raiszada does not explain how she reached such an outcome. Her argument relies more on subjective approach than on evidence-based perspective. This methodological shortcoming offers a great potential for bias, lacking sufficient evidences and methodical support in her article. For instance, she refers to an interview of Sediqullah Tawhidi, then Afghanistan's director of Journalists Safety Commission, who says "media outlets are playing as bridge between the government and people; therefore, it is the duty of media to make effort to aware the public of developments of peace talks and reflect them neutrally". Tawhidi's statement can be described as a recommendation that does not provide any evidence in support of Raiszada argument.

In their article "War and Peace Journalism: Representation of Conflict on Afghan Soil through Global Media", Elham, Haand, & Sadiq (2021) examined the coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan by New York Times and Daily Mail, two international newspapers that belong to the U.S. and China respectively. The article found out that according to Galtung's model of war and peace indicators, the two newspapers' coverage virtually focused on Elite-Oriented, with Visible Effects of War coming as the next.

Rahimi, Ziarmal, & Jalali (2021), in their article “War and Peace Journalism: Evaluating the Media Coverage of Afghan Conflicts” focused on TOLONews, Arianna (local) and Azadi Radio (U.S.) coverage of the conflict in post-Islamic Republic between 15 August and 21 November 2021. Employing the same theory used in this study, they focused on conflict between Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), a regional affiliate of ISIS, and the Taliban, as well as the United States. Though, this article investigated the two local media outlets and one external, the main concentration is on conflict state not conflict resolution. Furthermore, Ottosen (2010) discussed war and peace journalism approach utilising a Norwegian media outlet to understand whether or not peace journalism had been implemented during the U.S.-Islamic Republic war against the Taliban.

Mahmoodi, Saeed & Rahman (2021) see the peace and war journalism in Afghanistan’ conflict through analysing local print media photographs. They attempted to understand to what extent merely the local media employed peace or war journalism in the photographs that they posted. This approach is more about Visible Effects of War, which serves as an indicator to evaluate peace and war journalism in a media outlet, as stipulated in John Gultang’s theory.

As a gap in common, none of the previously discussed literatures have examined war and peace journalism (i) in the context of the intra-Afghan peace talks, and (ii) a comparative study of the local and international media combined concerning the present topic. Instead, they have overwhelmingly delved into the Afghanistan’s conflict as a whole. Distinguishingly, the current study will, first, contribute to the literature by filling this gap. Secondly, the fact that the Afghanistan’s conflict has not yet been resolved adds practical significance to the paper. This implies that negotiations could once more be a solution. In light of this perception, the article provides insights to the practitioners concerned on the media’s critical role in promoting possible peace opportunities for a long-term political settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan.

Media, especially mainstream international media outlets, function as the “fourth power” or “fourth estate” extending its role beyond mere reporting to exert political influence. Consequently, conducting a comparative analysis of local and international media may enhance our understanding of the stances held by the entities or countries hosting these media outlets regarding the intra-Afghan peace talks. Additionally, each media outlet covers an event in line with its editorial policies, target audiences, and geopolitical interest. Against this backdrop, a comparative study, which is undertaken by the present paper, will offer insights to understand local and international media policies towards the peace talks, thereby assisting

policymakers to developed more informed strategies for future peace negotiations to avoid shaping narratives that could affect the public opinions and the stances of conflicting parties in reaching peace.

## 2. Peace and War Journalism—Theoretical Approach

A conflict can be viewed in two different ways depending on whether the focus is on the meta-conflict that results from violence and war and the question of who prevails, or on the root causes of conflict and how to peacefully transfer it. While war journalism sees a conflict as a battle or sport competition, peace journalism spares no effort on conflict transformation. In war journalism, the reporting model has been assimilated to military command, wherein military advance, numbers killed, wounded, and material damage speak. It is also sport model reporting where the zero-sum perspective is applied and the idea wining is not everything, it is only thing serves as the core pillar. Contrary to this, peace journalism seeks opportunities in conflict to find new ways for the progress of human beings. With a win-win point of view, peace journalism attempts to answer why and where a conflict has been occurred (Galtung, Fischer, & Fischer, 2013, pp. 96-97).

In the word of the authors mentioned above, war journalism is ‘applied to negotiations as verbal battles: who outsmarts the other, who comes out closest to his original position’. Whereas peace journalism can motivate the parties concerned to improve negotiations for a peaceful resolution by covering the experiences of the people and the costs of waging war on society and on the conflicting parties. To present a competent picture about peace and war journalism, this paper prefers to resort to the model used in the book ‘Johan Galtung: Pioneer of peace research’ (2013, p.98), as well as, utilises Shinar’s (2009) explanation in this regards.

Peace Journalism	War Journalism
<b><i>Peace/conflict-oriented:</i></b> Explores the root causes of the conflict formation. Focuses on win-win situation. 'Emphasis on longer term processes and wider aspects'. Absence of military vocabulary...	<b><i>War/violent-oriented:</i></b> Focus on zero-sum. Seeing the parties as 'us' and 'them'. Concentrating on visible effects of violence. 'Emphasis on 'here and now' events'. Deploying military vocabulary...
<b><i>People-oriented:</i></b> Reporting on people's suffering, giving voice to the voiceless, women...and give name to 'all evil doers'- regardless of a bad action is committed by which conflicting parties. It gives voice to multi-parties...	<b><i>Elite-oriented:</i></b> Focusing on 'our' suffering. Reporting based on the elite source. Give name of 'their evil doer' to one of the conflicting parties...
<b><i>Solution-oriented:</i></b> Peace = nonviolence + creativity. Launching peace initiatives, and focusing on structures and culture.	<b><i>Victory-oriented:</i></b> Peace = victory + ceasefire. Concealing peace initiatives...
<b><i>Truth-oriented:</i></b> Expose untruths on all sides, impartiality.	<b><i>Propaganda-oriented:</i></b> Expose 'their' untruths; help 'our' cover-up/lies.

**Table 1:** Johan Galtung's Model of Peace and War Journalism (Galtung, 2013, p.98)

This study will explore John Galtung's (2013) war and peace journalism to analyses the intra-Afghan peace talks which were underway in the absence of a ceasefire. This means that the conflicting parties engaged in negotiations and fighting on the battlefield simultaneously. Therefore, the peace and war journalism theory is literally relevant to analyse whether or not the media prefers to work for peace in such circumstances.

### 3. Methodology of the Study

The present article, with a mixed methodological perspective, is a content analysis of stories, interviews, and Op-Eds published on the English websites of TOLONews (news in local languages Persian/Drai and Pashto are not included), CNN, and Al Jazeera about intra-Afghan peace talks to find out how the local and international media covered the aforementioned negotiations. Broadly speaking, content analysis can be divided into two categories: conceptual content analysis and relational content analysis. Conceptual analysis defines the presence and frequency of concepts in a text, whereas relational content analysis concentrates on the meaning of language through the relationships between words and phrases. The study benefitted from both types with respect to the criteria stated in the theoretical model. English websites of the chosen media outlets serve as the primary sources for this comparative study.

The 229 stories, including interviews, and Op-Eds between September 2020 and August 2021 (henceforth referred to as reports) make up the population of this study. This timeframe is selected due to the occurrence of the intra-Afghan negotiations within the

aforementioned period. These reports were hand-picked from among all the results that TOLONews, CNN, and Al Jazeera's websites displayed for the search of the term 'Intra-Afghan Peace Talks'. Stated differently, reports pertaining to the peace negotiations have been reached by entering the term 'intra-Afghan peace talks' on the websites of each selected media.

The authors look for the most dominant media outlets. Hence, TOLONews, CNN and Al Jazeera reach to the most people. Other media were investigated as well using the same method mentioned above for the selected media outlets. It has been discovered that their contents are mostly similar to that of the chosen media. This offers a venue for them to be represented by TOLONews, CNN and Al Jazeera.

Logic	TOLONews	CNN	Al Jazeera
Ideology	A variety of people with different ideologies follow TOLONews. Because this media outlet is an extended news channel for TOLO TV, which broadcasts traditional <sup>1</sup> , religious <sup>2</sup> and secular <sup>3</sup> programmes, particularly up until the collapse of the Islamic Republic. TOLONews also conducts diverse political and cultural discussions in comparison with other local media, such as 1TV, Ariana TV, National TV (RTA). As a moderate multi-programme agency, the outlet holds more audiences.	Hosting different people with various ideological background.	Hosting different people with various ideological background and political views (Telhami, 2023).
Recognition	TOLONews is the most trusted and popular local media. For example, it has 1.6 million <sup>4</sup> You Tube subscriber, compared to 750K for Ariana TV <sup>5</sup> , 637K for 1TV <sup>6</sup> , and 157K for National TV. <sup>7</sup> With 80.5% of news program	CNN is one of the most popular broadcasting outlets in the west. For instance, it has 17.3 million <sup>8</sup> You Tube subscriber, compared to 12.5M for Fox News. <sup>9</sup> These are the most dominant media in the	Al Jazeera is available in 430 million homes (Al Jazeera, n.d). Al Jazeera (English and Arabic) has a total of 34.2M subscribers on You Tube <sup>12</sup> . While the

<sup>1</sup> *ON the Road*: "The show explores the beauty, culture, and everyday life of different Afghan villages and provinces": <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wov8r3gTdFw&list=PLBC6D67D837E3A153&index=1>

<sup>2</sup> فرهنگ و تمدن اسلام - اسلام چگونه به زن نگاه میکند؟ (Islamic Culture and Civilization) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhGZflpuP2E>

<sup>3</sup> *Afghan Star*. "Afghan Star is a talent quest which scours for hot new musical talent in the nation of Afghanistan." This programme does no longer functional since the Taliban return to the power.

<sup>4</sup> See: <https://www.youtube.com/user/TOLONewsLive>

<sup>5</sup> See: <https://www.youtube.com/@Ariana.Television>

<sup>6</sup> See: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCNYssWlc1i2oC54Tive3c2g>

<sup>7</sup> See: [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC3q8PirPi\\_Dx8z28GiBgTbQ](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC3q8PirPi_Dx8z28GiBgTbQ)

<sup>8</sup> See CNN: <https://www.youtube.com/cnn>

<sup>9</sup> See Fox News: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXIjgqnII2ZOINSWNOGFTThA>

# War and Peace Journalism: The Role of Local and International Media during the Intra-Afghan Peace Talks

	viewers, TOLONews is in the first position, followed by National TV (4.9%), Ariana TV (2.4%), and others (25%), according to Auzarmi (2024).	United States, implicitly inclined to the Democrat and the Republican parties respectively. It also has the highest number of subscribers on YouTube, surpassing France 24 English, which has 3.14 million <sup>10</sup> , and CCTV of China, which has 600K subscribers <sup>11</sup> .	number is 17.2M for Al Arabia (English and Arabic). <sup>13</sup>
Politics	TOLONews has a major impact on Afghanistan's political environment. It is the first 24-hour news channel in the country and provides in-depth coverage of both domestic and international political events. TOLONews is known for its in-depth reporting, political commentary, and investigative journalism. During the Islamic Republic, it was encouraging public discussions and debates by giving a platform to a variety of political voices, including of the Taliban <sup>14</sup> , government officials, and civil society leaders.	The countries where these media operate, i.e., Afghanistan, United States of America and the State of Qatar, had been involved directly in the peace process. The US facilitated to make the intra-Afghan talks happened. CNN to some extent, reflect the point of view of the United States- especially in terms of this news channel's inclination towards the Democrats (as the ruling party within the period of the current study).	Qatar hosted and informally mediated the intra-Afghan peace talks. Al Jazeera, to some extent, reflect the point of view of the State of Qatar since the outlet is controlled by the state.
Geopolitics	As previously demonstrated, TOLONews is a mainstream media outlet that provides a local perspective on war and peace journalism.	CNN can relatively support us to understand the Western approach.	Al Jazeera can relatively support us to understand the Non-westerns Islamic Countries approach.
Culture	TOLONews, as a pioneering media outlet focused on societal and cultural transformation, more or less can open up a way to understand to what extent this media outlet was working genuinely for a transformed peaceful society.	Broadcasting with variant languages in different continents (e.g. CNN English, CNN Arabic, CNN Turkish).	Broadcasting with variant languages in different continents (e.g. Al Jazeera English, Al Jazeera Arabic, as two international languages)

<sup>12</sup> Al Jazeera English: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCNye-wNBqNL5ZzHSJj3l8Bg> Al Jazeera Arabic: <https://www.youtube.com/@aljazeera>

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQfwfsi5VrQ8yKZ-UWmAEFg>

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCmv5DbNpxH8X2eQxJBqEjKQ>

<sup>13</sup> AlArabiya العربية: <https://www.youtube.com/alarabiya> Al Arabiya English: <https://www.youtube.com/AlArabiyaEnglish>

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Taliban's Zabihullah Mujahid: Full Transcript: <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-173452> (this interview was conducted when the Taliban were fighting the government)



Pervious Literature	TOLOnews is mentioned in the majority of those previous investigated literatures that focus on assessing local medias activities on different issues as a mainstream media representing the local broadcasting outlets. As an example, see: (Auzarmi, 2024; Sakhawati & Maihanyar, 2023; Nijat, 2022; Aria, Bayan, & Hazeem, n.d; Mahdiyar, 2021).	This study revealed that CNN covered the intra-Afghan negotiations more than other US media. This makes it perfectly relevant to the study at hand.	Al Jazeera CNN covered the intra-Afghan negotiations more than other media in the middle east as discovered during the review of their websites. This makes Al Jazeera appropriately relevant to the topic in question.
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Apart from that Al Jazeera and CNN benefit from their extensive geographical reach (Gowing, 1994; Sakr, 2001), driven by their distinctive editorial approaches (Seib, 2008; Thussu, 2007) and their use of English as a lingua franca, with Al Jazeera also offering access in Arabic. Their strong digital and social media presence, combined with frequent breaking news updates, positions both networks as leaders in the global media community (Newman & Levy, 2021; Shirky, 2011). From the perspective of the Global South, non-Western, and Muslim societies, Al Jazeera exerts significant influence, while CNN holds substantial sway over Western and broader international audiences (Nossek, 2004; Amin, 2002). These factors make the selection of these two international media outlets central to this study.

In connection to the codifying, due to the time constraint concerning the submission of this article, the paper probed into titles, available in the appendix, of those 229 reports one-by-one. Then each of them was classified as peace journalism, war journalism or neutral according to their relevancy to the criteria given in Gultang's model. Despite the fact that this study did not fully follow their approach, the codifying techniques used in this work is, more or less, influenced by Shinar (2009), Rahimi, Ziarmalv & Jalali (2021), as well as Siraj (2008). Although, the headlines provide a great deal of insight, they may simplify complex issues, leading to a less comprehensive and analysis of the subject. To mitigate this limitation, this study chooses the most relevant headlines to the Gultang's war and peace journalism criteria.

The term 'neutral', which will be seen in the coming pages, refers to news and stories that hold a potential of being cautiously categorized as peace journalism but do not explicitly and adequately meet the theoretical framework requirements to be defined as either peace or war journalism. In other word, neutral in the context of this study means a news that does not use an emotional or provoking language, lacking potential for interpretation of a report. A neutral content can be as the same as these sentences: *Next Round of Doha Talks to Resume Tuesday* (TOLOnews). *Biden administration resumes Taliban peace talks* (CNN). *Pakistan-US hold talks on restarting intra-Afghan peace talks* (Al Jazeera).

Emphasizing on *multi-party/Two parties reporting* in Galtung's model, the study also explored peace and war journalism by examining of the selected media reporting based on their coverage diversity. Moreover, this article classified the selected media' reports as peace or war journalism with regards to *people-oriented, visible impact of the conflict* (military photos plus damages), and *military vocabulary*. The paper looked at military photos showing soldiers with equipment or photos of places where buildings, houses, and other structures have been destroyed due to conflict. Likewise, this study looked into the military terminology used in the headlines of each media outlet's reporting and Op-Eds. Finally, the time constraints associated with conducting further research on the subject matter of this study may limit the results comprehensiveness and their in-depth exploration.

#### 4. Findings and Analysis

A total of 229 reports, including Op-Eds, roundtables, and interviews about the intra-Afghan peace talks were published. Out of these reports, TOLONews allocated 132 (57.64%), CNN published 59 (25.77%), and Al Jazeera posted 38 (16.59%).

Media	TOLONews	CNN	Al Jazeera	Total
Number of reports	132	59	38	229
Percentage (%)	57.64	25.77	16.59	100

**Table 2:** Distribution of Reports according to the Selected Media Outlets

Table 2 shows that, compared to CNN and Al Jazeera, TOLONews has given the intra-Afghan peace talks the highest coverage, regardless of whether war or peace journalism is being deployed. This indicates that TOLONews was more concerned about the peace talks, as it may have expected a direct effect from the negotiations, either favourable or unfavourable.

As also shown in Table 3, in contrast to CNN and Al Jazeera, TOLONews covered the talks in a diversified framework. It implies that, in comparison to the other two media outlets, TOLOws may offer a chance to apply peace journalism.

Media Outlets	TOLONews	CNN	Al Jazeera	Total
News	106	42	26	174
Op-Ed	12	14	11	37
Interview	4	00	00	4
Roundtable	4	00	00	4
Ad hoc report on people	6	3	1	10
Grand Total				229

**Table 3:** Distribution of Reports according to Diversification

Since it offers a potential opportunity for *multi-party framing*, the diversity in coverage of the peace negotiations can serve peace journalism. Table 3 has revealed that TOLONews applied this manner of coverage appropriately than the other two.

CNN and Al Jazeera are in the same status of diverse coverage of the talks, but with a difference in quantity. CNN ranked the second after TOLONews in terms of reporting. Additionally, taking the criteria of war journalism ‘*here and now*’ into consideration, the entire three media outlets performed in accordance with the war journalism. The ‘*here and now*’ approach focuses on the current situation concerning the conflict. Some examples are provided hereunder for each selected media outlet:

*A Taliban delegation in Moscow said on Friday that it will not attack provincial centres – despite fighting by the group on the outskirts of many cities, including Qala-e-Naw in Badghis, over the last three days...Insufficient progress in the Doha peace talks and the escalation of the war all over Afghanistan has drawn strong criticism among the people of Afghanistan (TOLONews).*

*US ‘not ready to throw in the towel’ on Afghan talks even as Taliban violence grows. Talks with Taliban are making ‘very little progress’ as militant group gains momentum, says Afghan official (CNN).*

*Taliban kills 28 police officials as Doha peace talks continue... Some freed Taliban returned to battlefield: Top Afghan official: ABDULLAH (Al-Jazeera).*

However, TOLONews conducted interviews, roundtables and ad hoc reports on people. These programmes potentially carry some sort of opportunities in favour of peace journalism. Because such kind of programmes, especially those that deal with the subject matter of this study, typically cover a wide range of topics including discussion of the conflict’s root causes, reflecting voice of people, and ways to encourage peace. These issues are clearly evident in the

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roundtables that TOLONews hosted. Diversification in coverage of the peace talks provided a chance for TOLONews to have interviewed people or parties involved in negotiations, where it brought more information and thoughts related to the peace talks to the eyes of public. As a case in point, of the four interviews, TOLONews interviewed two officials from the government and two from the Taliban. In doing so, this media deployed relatively impartiality as one of the significant criteria for peace journalism reporting thanks to those multiple coverage programmes and frameworks. For these reasons, a media with diverse coverage programmes has a potential room for peace journalism rather than of those lacking such activities.

The following tables classify the reports to peace and war journalism based on the overall characteristics of these two concepts mentioned under the theoretical framework.

Media Outlet	Peace Journalism	War Journalism	Neutral	Total
TOLONews	34	68	30	132
CNN	10	47	2	59
Al Jazeera	6	17	15	38
Grand Total				229

**Table 4:** Distribution of the Reports according to Peace and War Journalism

Here are some examples for peace and war journalism reporting mentioned in table 4.

Outlet	Peace Journalism (Solution-oriented)	War Journalism (Victory-oriented)
TOLONews	<i>"Aisha Khurram writes that there's a need for a bottom-up approach led and owned by the Afghan youth to accompany the elite-driven peace process."</i> <sup>15</sup>	<i>"Asadullah Khalid, acting defense minister, speaking at the handover of four new A-29 Super Tucano attack aircraft to the Afghan forces on Thursday, said that the Afghan army will not allow any deal that compromises the achievements of the past two decades."</i> <sup>16</sup>
CNN	<i>"<b>Biden is making a major mistake on Afghanistan:</b> Without question, between now and September, Biden and his top diplomats will be making their most valiant efforts to ensure a peace that can last beyond America's departure. Indeed, there may even be some Taliban elements who will do their best to negotiate a deal that can be sold to the American people as a face-saving victory and still pave the way for a rapid withdrawal of US forces"</i> <sup>17</sup>	<i>"The Taliban now control half of Afghanistan's provincial capitals"</i> <sup>18</sup>
Al Jazeera	<i>"<b>Peace can still be achieved in Afghanistan...</b> With the US and the world signalling their interest in Afghanistan is waning, it is time for Afghans to take the lead in the negotiations and to agree on a permanent ceasefire and a peace settlement"</i> <sup>19</sup>	<i>"Taliban cheers Trump vowing early troop withdrawal, Kabul sceptic"</i> <sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Saving the Future of Afghanistan: It Truly Is 'Now or Never' | TOLONews

<sup>16</sup> Army 'Will Not Allow' Setback to Republic's Gains: Khalid | TOLONews

<sup>17</sup> Opinion: President Joe Biden is making a major mistake on Afghanistan | CNN

<sup>18</sup> The Taliban now control half of Afghanistan's provincial capitals | CNN

<sup>19</sup> Peace can still be achieved in Afghanistan | NATO | Al Jazeera

Regarding the examples for Table 4, TOLONews reflected a content, on the peace journalism side, which concerns about structural shortcoming of the peace process. To further strength the peace process, the author of content proposed a bottom-up approach, focusing on youths to be included in the decision makings related to peace talks. The proposal is a solution on how to reach a lasting and comprehensive peace. This is aligned with the solution-oriented approach in peace journalism, which explores on the role of structures in peace and conflicts, peace initiatives and alike. On the other hand, the sentence “*Afghan army will not allow any deal that compromises the achievements of the past two decades*” implicitly seeks peace from a military victorious point of view. The defence minister asserted that the army is able to continue the war should there be a compromise on it. The language is not encouraging peace, rather showcasing the army’s power to the Taliban since the statement was being made in a military occasion.

CNN warns the United States about its hasty withdrawal’s consequences on peace talks in Afghanistan. The author criticised Biden being not genuine to bring peace in Afghanistan, rather to end the US war against the Taliban. Similarly, the Taliban use, according to CNN, the negotiation to encourage the US to withdraw quickly. This would jeopardize then on-going intra-Afghan peace talks. The warning came true with the collapse of peace talks between the Taliban and the government. As for as the war journalism is concerned, CNN portrayed a victory approach reporting by speaking on the Taliban advancement throughout the country. This report potentially exaggerated on the violent victory.

The headline for Al Jazeera over peace journalism attempts to give hopes on the future of the peace talks. To materialise this hope, the author suggested an agreement on ceasefire to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Encouraging peace, he tried to prevent the society to get desperate for intra-Afghan negotiations by the US withdrawal. However, the way Al Jazeera portrayed the second headline, indicated a victory-oriented language concerning the Taliban.

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<sup>20</sup> Taliban cheers Trump vowing early troop withdrawal, Kabul sceptic | Taliban News | Al Jazeera

Media Outlet	Total reports	Peace Journalism	War Journalism	Neutral
TOLOnews	132	25.75%	51.52%	22.73%
CNN	59	16.94%	79.67%	3.39%
Al Jazeera	38	15.78%	44.74%	39.48%

**Table 5:** Percentage of War and Peace Journalism Coverage by each Media

Tables 4 and 5 show, of the 132 reports that TOLOnews published about intra-Afghan peace talks, 34 (25.75%) depicted peace journalism, 68 (51.52%) portrayed war journalism, and 30 (22.73%) deployed neither peace nor war journalism. Of 59 reports published on CNN, 10 (16.94%) set out peace journalism, 47 (79.67%) characterized war journalism, and 2 (3.39%) drew a neutral status. Finally, of the 38 news that were published concerning the talks, Al Jazeera used 6 (15.78%) for peace journalism, 17 (44.74%) for war journalism, and 15 (39.84%) for neutral reporting. The followings are some example of peace and war journalism for every single selected media outlet. Each instance is identified with an indicator enshrined in the theoretical model.

Media Outlet	Peace Journalism (Indicators used)	War Journalism (Indicators used)	Neutral
TOLOnews	<p>(i) <i>Afghans Fear Losing Gains in Women's Rights in Peace</i> (ii) <i>Afghans Will Suffer if Peace Fails.</i></p> <p>-----</p> <p>These are some examples for those kind of news which are people-oriented. The current headlines expressed demands of the people and implicitly cautioned that peace talks should regard voice of women and reach an agreement. The current situation in Afghanistan which is resulted from the failure of the peace negotiations, confirm the accuracy of TOLOnews prediction on the suffer of people.</p>	<p><i>As Violence Intensifies, Abdullah Asks Taliban to Engage in Talks</i></p> <p>-----</p> <p>This example is regarded as war journalism reporting. Because it included military vocabulary, violence-orientation, and here and now. The report focused on a current situation where there is an increase in violence. This violence led the government to ask for peace talks. The main concentration is on military advance of the Taliban.</p>	<p><i>Next Round of Doha Talks to Resume Tuesday.</i></p> <p>-----</p> <p>This sentence neither reflects peace and war journalisms characteristics explicitly. Hence, it is categorized as neutral.</p>
CNN	<p>(i) <i>What civilians in Afghanistan say about America's withdrawal?</i> (ii) <i>For Afghan women, the US rhetoric of liberation has fallen short.</i></p> <p>-----</p> <p>Critical/people oriented has been used in these headlines. The Unites States as a player in the conflict has been criticized for its policy on Afghanistan's peace.</p>	<p>(i) <i>Taliban threaten to seize first provincial capital as fighting intensifies across Afghanistan.</i> (ii) <i>Besieged on a 'Taliban-made island,' Kandahar's residents see no way out as militants advance ever closer.</i></p> <p>----</p> <p>The present report has used violence, military vocabulary, and victory language, which make it as war journalism reporting.</p>	<p><i>Biden administration resumes Taliban peace talks.</i></p> <p>-----</p> <p>This sentence neither reflects peace and war journalisms characteristics explicitly. Hence, it is categorized as neutral.</p>

<b>Al Jazeera</b>	<p><i>Afghanistan: Peace demands sacrifice.</i></p> <p>-----</p> <p>This example encouraged all parties involved in the negotiations to acknowledge that peace would not be achieved if they do not show flexibility and concession during the negotiations. With a long-term perspective, the report asks the negotiation parties to compromise their personal and short term interest for a durable peace.</p>	<p><i>(i) Taliban kills 28 police officials as Doha peace talks continue. (ii) Dozens killed in fighting in Afghanistan as peace talks continue.</i></p> <p>----</p> <p>such a reporting approach in a circumstances where the peace negotiations are underway hider the public sense and the negotiating sides towards result of the talks. This a violence-based portray that could make the society and the parties concerned pessimistic for peace. here and now, military vocabulary and victory-based characteristics of war journalism are used.</p>	<p><i>Pakistan-US hold talks on restarting intra-Afghan peace talks.</i></p> <p>.....</p> <p>This sentence neither reflects peace and war journalisms characteristics explicitly. Hence, it is categorized as neutral.</p>
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Table 4 and 5 demonstrate that while all the selected media focused on war journalism more than peace journalism, TOLONews allocated a significant portion of its reporting to peace journalism compared to CNN and Al Jazeera. One of the reasons that might have contributed to the rise in war journalism on CNN part can often be related to focusing on the US departure from Afghanistan. When it comes to war and peace reporting, Al Jazeera has achieved a somewhat balanced coverage than CNN. Conversely, the greatest proportion of neutrality, as defined under the method, indicates a degree of indifference by Al Jazeera about applying either war or peace journalism to the talks.

In those tables, the paper defined the percentage of peace and war journalism in relation to the reports published on each media outlet separately. In table 6, this article will repeat the same process while taking the entire study's population (229 reports) into consideration.

Media Outlet	Peace Journalism	War Journalism	Neutral	Study's population
TOLONews	14.85% (34)	29.70% (68)	13.1% (30)	<b>229 (100%)</b>
CNN	4.36% (10)	20.53% (47)	0.88% (2)	
Al Jazeera	2.63% (6)	7.43% (17)	6.55% (15)	

**Table 6:** Percentage of Peace and War Journalism based on the Entire Study's Population

Though, table 6 illustrates that war journalism continues to be the most common reporting approach for all the chosen media, CNN and Al Jazeera being far less comparable with TOLONews in terms of peace journalism deployment. TOLONews accounts for around 15% of the total population (299 reports), while CNN and Al Jazeera combined make less than half (6.72%) of this contribution. This table discovers a consistent position of TOLONews in terms of leading peace journalism compared to those two media outlets.



Furthermore, in order to support the findings in tables 4 to 6, this paper has elaborated on peace and war journalism using people-oriented reporting, the conflict visible effects, and military vocabulary indicators.

Media	People Oriented	Visible impact of the conflict (military photos plus damages)	Military vocabulary
TOLOnews	13 (9.85%)	12 (9%)	20 (15%)
CNN	5 (8.48)	31 (52.54%)	30 (50%)
Al Jazeera	2 (5.26%)	4 (10.53)	10 (26.31)

**Table 7:** Distribution of Reports according to People Oriented, Visible Impact of the Conflict, and Military Vocabulary Considering the Total Reports on each Media (132, 59, and 38)

Both the visible impact of the conflict and military vocabulary can be seen on the photos displayed on page 14. The terms “blast, troops, Taliban fighters, armed group, and capture” represent deployment of military vocabulary by the selected media outlets, as mentioned in the preceding pages of this article. Concerning the visible impact of the conflict, Al Jazeera and TOLOnews did post some regular images of soldiers and rebels, whereas CNN posted combined images of military and damaged areas. Furthermore, it has been figured out that officials, authorities, and elites make up the absolute majority of the sources for the news published by all, with some contrast, of these media. In spite that table 8 still reflects war journalism as a common aspect of reporting in all those three media, TOLOnews appears to continue its pioneering contribution to peace journalism, focusing, to some extent, on people-oriented reporting, as opposed to CNN and Al Jazeera.



*Source and explanation: CNN - Afghanistan-kabul-car-blast-08-04-2021*



*US Troops in Afghanistan (TOLONews, 21 Feb 2021)*



*Al-Jazeera (12 August 2021): Taliban fighters patrol inside the city of Ghazni, southwest of Kabul, which the armed group captured on Thursday*

The examples for people oriented can also be seen as follow:

<b>TOLONews (people-oriented)</b>	<b>CNN (people-oriented)</b>	<b>Al Jazeera (people-oriented)</b>
<i>Afghans Urge Unity, End to Violence on the Threshold of Talks: “The Afghan people are tired of the war. They want a lasting and real peace,” said Mohammad Hamid, a resident of Herat.<sup>21</sup></i>	<i>The next chapter of the story of Afghan women does not have to be a tragedy (CNN)<sup>22</sup>.</i>	<i>A peace deal alone cannot solve Afghanistan’s myriad problems: There is a need for a clear plan to address systemic problems such as corruption that undermine reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan<sup>23</sup>.</i>

TOLONews devoted around 10% of its 132 reports to representing the voice of people directly or indirectly, 9% to the invisible effects of conflict, and 15% of the total reports contained military terms. CNN attributed 8.5% of its 59 reports to voice of people (not directly

<sup>21</sup> <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/afghans-urge-unity-end-violence-threshold-talks>

<sup>22</sup> <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/04/opinions/afghan-women-us-withdrawal-lemmon/index.html>

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/6/a-peace-deal-alone-cannot-solve-afghanistans-myriad-problems>

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in most cases), 52.54% to the visual effects of conflict, and 50% to the usage of military terminology. Finally, Al Jazeera assigned 5.26% of its 38 reports to people-oriented issues, 10.53% to visible impact of war, and 26.31 to military terms.

TOLONews conducted interview with the ordinary people to ask them for their opinions and demands from the peace talks. As an example, a citizen from Herat province stated how a lasting conflict frustrated the people. They were eager for peace. The reporting of this kind could have influenced the decision makers in both sides of the conflict if the media enhanced and adapted people-oriented approach during peace negotiations. Because the conflicting parties would think they would lose the support of public if did not progress in peace talks.

The concerns of the women of Afghanistan over their future, reflected by CNN, and the importance of a comprehensive plan for peace, reflected by Al Jazeera, both reminded the decision makers to prioritise the public interest through effective mechanisms that could produce perpetuate peace. Though the selected media deployed an aspect of this kind coverage for the intra-Afghan peace negotiations, they remained ineffective in relation to the peace talks due to dominance of war journalism.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

This study sought to understand how the local and international media covered the intra-Afghan peace negotiations. The overarching findings of the study about coverage of the intra-Afghan peace talks by TOLONews, CNN, and Al Jazeera can be filed into three categories: coverage quantity, coverage variety, and coverage type in relation to war and peace journalisms.

Category	TOLONews	CNN	Al Jazeera
<b>Coverage Quantity</b>	TOLONews ranks on the top as it covered the peace negotiation with the highest number of reports (132 reports).	CNN ranks in the second position (59 reports).	Al Jazeera received the last position (38 reports)
<b>Coverage variety</b>	In terms of diversity in coverage on peace negotiations, TOLONews distinct with an upper hand since it offers a variety of reporting framework and programmes, including interviews, Op-Eds, and ad hoc reports on people demands.	CNN mostly focused on regular reporting and Op-Eds.	Al Jazeera mostly focused on regular reporting and Op-Eds.

<b>Coverage Type: War or Peace Journalism</b>	Deployed war journalism as predominant reporting approach rather than peace journalism. However, comparatively speaking, TOLONews incorporated peace journalism more effectively than CNN and Al Jazeera, although war journalism remained dominant.	CNN focused on war journalism in general	Al Jazeera appeared to have not created an extreme distance between war and peace journalism reporting in comparison to CNN. Nonetheless, it also allocated most of its reports to war journalism.
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The findings potentially suggest that the local media applied peace journalism more successfully than the international media, even though they did not cover the peace talks with an emphasis on peace journalism adequately. To give an example, as a result of war journalism dominance, people were not being aware sufficiently of the consequences of the mechanisms deployed in the Doha peace process. The process began with US-Taliban negotiations, excluding the Afghan government as the primary party to the conflict. The media, especially local, did not conduct serious discussions on the consequences of the government's exclusion from the talks. As was seen later, the US-Taliban deal, signed on February 29, 2020, undermined the leverage of the Islamic Republic in the intra-Afghan peace talks, and thus the negotiations failed.

A brief examination of the current study's findings and focus in relation to ongoing discussions reveals that this research makes a valuable contribution to the literature by offering a fresh perspective on the media within the context of Afghanistan. For instance, Lynch and Fear (2023) contended that local media did not adequately support peace negotiations; however, their analysis is confined solely to local media. The current research discovered that while the implementation of peace journalism by local media is not satisfying, they are comparatively in a more favourable position than the prominent international media. Likewise, the objectives and findings of the studies carried out by Raiszada (2023), Elham, Haand, and Aidiq (2021), Rahimi, Ziarmal, and Jalil (2021), as well as Mohmoodi, Saeed, and Rahman (2021), diverge from those presented in this paper. Each of these works addressed various topics, including the role of local media in fostering peace, the portrayal of the Afghan conflict by the New York Times and Daily Mail, the reporting on the conflict involving the Taliban, ISIS-Khorasan, and the United States by TOLONews, Ariana, and Azadi Radio, and the approaches employed by local photographic media regarding peace negotiations (for additional information, refer to the literature review). A comprehensive review of supplementary literature was also conducted, encompassing works by Auzarmi (2024), Sakhawati and Maihanyar (2023), Nijat (2022), Aria, Bayan, and Hazeem (n.d.), as well as Mahdiyar (2021).

Auzarmi utilized a theoretical framework similar to this study; however, he specifically investigates the news reporting tendencies of Afghanistan's broadcast media. His focus is on determining whether these media outlets emphasise truth, the public interest, and solutions, or if they lean towards propaganda, elite agendas, and narratives of victory, possibly undermining national interests. His initial findings indicate that Afghanistan's broadcast media, such as TOLONews, plays a role in fostering positive coverage of events occurring within the country. The findings of Auzarmi, while seemingly aligned with the findings of this study regarding local media, especially TOLONews, arise from distinct contexts. Auzarmi emphasizes the local media's role in fostering social understanding, education, and protecting national interest, whereas the present study unpacks media within the framework of peace and conflict, specifically concentrating on intra-Afghan negotiations. Sakhawati and Maihanyar employed a distinct methodology, utilizing questionnaire techniques, to investigate the level of trust in TOLONews and BBC among the populace. Their findings have suggested that TOLONews emerged as the most trusted source. Furthermore, in their semi-structured interviews, Aria, Bayan, and Hazeem examined the influence of local media, particularly TOLONews, on fostering political engagement within the community. The findings indicated that TOLONews had a beneficial impact. Mahdiar examines the coverage of terrorist activities by TOLONews in Afghanistan. His research reveals that TOLONews lacks the competence to function as a socially responsible media outlet within the Afghan context. The primary issues identified in the news reported by TOLONews include misleading and sensitive headlines, overly brief leads, and inadequate contextual information. Although TOLONews serves as a shared reference point between the current study and Mahidiar's research, each examines it from distinct perspectives. The former investigates whether this media outlet maintained an appropriate approach to reporting on terrorist activities amid the ongoing incidents in Afghanistan, while the latter focuses on analysing the portrayal of peace and conflict in TOLONews coverage during the peace negotiations.

To conclude on the existing reviewed debates, none of them have explored war and peace journalism (i) in relation to the intra-Afghan peace talks and (ii) a comparative analysis of both local and international media regarding this subject. The present study has now addressed this gap to further enrich the relevant literature.

The practical importance of this paper arises from the ongoing unresolved conflict in Afghanistan. This indicates that a resolution may once more depend on negotiations. In light of this perspective, the study provides practitioners with valuable insights regarding the critical role



of the media in fostering potential peace initiatives aimed at achieving a sustainable political resolution to the conflict.

Eventually, the study fills a crucial gap by offering a comparative analysis of war and peace journalism in context of the intra-Afghan peace talks. Given Afghanistan's ongoing conflict, media's role in shaping public discourse and influencing future negotiations remains a critical area for further investigation. The comprehensiveness and depth of this study could have been more significantly enhanced had there not been a time constraint.

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 حسین (1399)، رسانه‌ها و هیاهو برای طالبان، سلام و پندار:

## Greed versus Grievance in Contemporary Civil Wars in Africa

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### Abstract

Civil wars, as intrastate conflicts, play a significant role in contemporary debates within peace and conflict studies. The end of the Cold War marked a notable increase in the prevalence of these wars, particularly in the global south. While academic scholars have highlighted the destructive nature and human impacts of these conflicts, they have also developed theories to explain their underlying causes. One prominent theory is the “Greed and Grievance” theory, in which Collier and Hoeffler investigate whether civil wars arise from motivations rooted in greed or grievances. Although various theories have been employed to analyze post-Cold War civil wars, there is an ongoing debate about the relevance of theories like greed and grievance in explaining contemporary conflicts. This study uses the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Sudan and Libya as case studies to explore this issue due to the availability of data from these four countries. These conflicts have been widely documented by international organisations such as the United Nations, African Union and International Non-governmental Organisations. Additionally, all four cases involve active or recent conflicts, making the research timely and relevant for policy discussions. We contend that greed and grievance theory continues to be pertinent in understanding modern civil wars.

**Keywords:** Civil Wars, Greed and Grievance, Cold War, Contemporary Armed Conflicts.

## Introduction

War can be devastating and catastrophic, often resulting in unimaginable suffering for countless civilians. In addition to the tragic loss of innocent lives, conflicts can cause long-term damage to infrastructure, environmental destruction, disruptions to economic activities, negative impacts on social life, and psychological trauma for many individuals (Murshed, 2007, p.2). Between 1945 and 1999, 127 civil wars occurred in seventy-three countries, leading to 16.2 million battle deaths and displacing over fifty million people (Taydas et al., 2011, p.2627). Moreover, civil unrest in one nation can pose regional security threats, particularly to neighboring countries. A notable example of this is the conflict that began in Liberia in 1989, which spilled over into Sierra Leone in 1991.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, numerous regions across the globe, particularly in the Global South, experienced significant armed and civil conflicts. For instance, Sierra Leone and Liberia experienced eleven and fourteen years of civil conflict, respectively (Bangura, 2016, p.39). Today, countries like the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and Sudan are witnessing similar trajectories, with even more devastating consequences. The underlying causes of many of these conflicts have been framed within the "Greed and Grievance" debate.

The civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Cambodia, and Rwanda emerged in the immediate post-Cold War context. The change in conflict dynamics today raises the question of whether this theory framework is still relevant to contemporary civil wars and armed conflicts in places such as the CAR, Sudan, and South Sudan. We argued that the Greed and grievance theory remains relevant in explaining the onset of contemporary civil wars. Consequently, this paper examines the applicability of the "greed" and "grievance" theory in explaining the emergence of today's civil wars using the CAR, South Sudan, Libya and the ongoing conflict in Sudan as case studies. The research aims to contribute to various areas of International Relations. For instance, it will explore policy implications that could inform peacebuilding strategies to determine whether economic incentives, such as resource sharing, or political buy-ins, like power sharing, are the most effective mechanisms for conflict resolution. Moreover, it can contribute to theoretical debates regarding whether modern civil wars are mainly driven by greed (economic interests, warlordism) or grievances (ethnic, political, and historical injustices).

First, we introduced the article, establishing a foundation for the subsequent discussion. Next, we delved into the "Greed" and "Grievance" theory, contextualizing it

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within conflict situations of the immediate post-Cold War era. In the third section, we evaluated the theory in light of various critical reviews. The fourth section of the paper explored the relevance of the theory to contemporary civil conflicts, utilizing the case studies above. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the key arguments presented throughout the paper.

#### **1. The “Greed” versus “Grievance” Theory: An Overview**

The main proponents of the Greed and Grievance theory, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, contend that the primary drivers of conflict stem from two contrasting motives: “greed” and “grievance.” The greed perspective posits that conflicts are largely fueled by self-serving or selfish interests, whereas the grievance approach attributes political actions to feelings of discontent and frustration. Firstly, they examined the concept of rebellion, suggesting that it tends to arise when grievances reach a critical threshold, prompting individuals to engage in violent protest. Rebellion may be motivated by a desire to attain wealth through the illicit capture of resources (greed). Secondly, they explored the funding sources for these rebellions, identifying three common avenues: the extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas, and financial support from adversarial governments. Thirdly, they addressed the notion of proxying objective grievances, identifying four measurable indicators of grievance: ethnic or religious animosity, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality. Lastly, they considered scale effects, examining factors such as primary commodity exports, income levels, and school enrollment, which they analyzed in relation to the size of the country (Collier and Hoeffler, 1990).

Collier and Hoeffler (1990) assert that the explanations they provide may represent the primary causes of conflicts rooted in greed and grievance. This framework can be observed in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 1990s. In both instances, the theories of greed versus grievance proposed by Collier and Hoeffler are applicable. The rebellions in Sierra Leone and Liberia were initiated by discontented individuals, such as Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front and Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, who were frustrated with their countries' governance systems. They also enlisted aggrieved youth from their nations to join their rebel movements.

#### **2. Literature Review**

The “greed and grievance” theory has received several critical reviews. Many scholars have had their say on the subject, with many arguing based on theoretical perspectives. Some scholars on the subject have also designed some models. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (1999), developed a model called “the looting and justice model of rebellion”. They argued

that loot is acquired during the process of rebellion and not upon prior victory (Collier et al., 1999, p.1). They further argued that the risk of conflict is influenced by both the desire for justice and the expense of providing it (Collier et al., 1999, p.5). They further looked at three types of grievances: hatred arising from relations between distinct social groups, repression in political decision-making, and poor economic outcomes (Collier et al., 1999, p.5).

Murshed, et al. (2007, p.1), argued that grievance can exist independently without greed, but it is hard to sustain greedy motives without some underlying grievances. Both are regarded as competing views and can complement each other. They further argued that (Murshed, et al, 2007, p.1) for greed and grievance to escalate into large-scale violence, additional factors must be at play, particularly the breakdown of the social contract. Thus, even if resources can be seized to offer important rewards, violent conflict is unlikely to arise if a country has a widely accepted set of rules, both formal and informal, that regulate resource distribution and the peaceful resolution of disputes (Murshed, et al, 2007, p.1).

De Soysa, (2001), pointed out that the availability of natural resources is a powerful indicator of potential conflict, highlighting the influence of 'greed'. De Soysa also concluded that a higher population size and density are linked to increased conflict. The impact of grievances from lack of democracy (justice) is less significant compared to the opportunity costs of conflict, as the effects of democracy follow a curvilinear shape.

Collier (2000) argued that conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance. For him, civil wars create economic opportunities for certain groups. In this case, during the process of conflict greed might also come into play. Collier further maintained that even if where the rationale at the top of the organization (in this case it could be a rebel group) is inherently greed, the actual discourse might be entirely dominated by grievance. Collier argues that both rebel groups motivated by greed and those driven by grievances often present their actions within a narrative of grievance. However, simply observing this narrative does not provide researchers with genuine insight into the true motivations behind the rebellion. Collier concluded that significant exports of primary commodities, lack of proper education, a significant number of young men, and economic decline highly increase the risks of conflict.

Taydas et al., (2011) pointed out that apart from both grievance and opportunity, three other factors that can be attributed to armed conflict, are: economic development, repression, and regime type. Poor economic conditions boost the mobilization of the aggrieved community. They also argued that motivation and opportunity should be seen as jointly vital

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conditions rather than alternative explanations that are mutually exclusive. They concluded that in addition to the basic motivations and opportunities, the potential for mobilization - shaped by factors such as the group's size, level of organization, shared identity, and cohesion - can significantly influence the onset of civil conflict and should not be overlooked. For them, it is challenging to incite groups to engage in conflict without historical grievances, even when valuable resources are involved (Taydas et al. 2011).

### **3. Where is the “Greed” or “Grievance” in the Case Studies?**

#### **3.1 The Central African Republic Case**

The CAR has a long, chequered history dating back to 1960 when it gained independence from France. Like many other African countries, CAR has faced tough political and economic challenges. The CAR's history has been marked by ten military coup attempts which occurred between 2005 and 2015 and hindered its development (Siradağ, 2016, p.86). This escalated into a major civil war in 2013, where the government and various armed groups, primarily the Seleka and the Anti-Balaka fought for control over territories and the civilian population (Alecú and Miroiu, 2021, p.5; Weyns et. al., 2014, p.8). The Séléka rebels include some non-Muslims and are linked to Islam while the anti-balaka mainly consists of Christian and non-Christian militias (Kah, 2014, p.35; Alecú and Miroiu, 2021, p.5). After a few years of intense fighting, several peace initiatives have been undertaken including the demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) program and security reform (2015), the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation (2015), the Brazzaville Agreement (2014), the Nairobi Agreement to restore peace to the country (2015), and the electoral process (2015) (Natalia, 2016, p.26).

At the peak of the conflict, rebels from the Seleka group overthrew the Bozizé government after taking control of the capital city, Bangui. As the leader of the Seleka coalition, Michel Djotodia declared himself as the new president of the CAR; he dissolved Bozizé's government, suspended the country's constitution and informed the citizens of his intention to rule by decree for the next three years (Natalia, 2016, p.2). By 2015, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, who mostly relies on Russia's Wagner group for national security, was elected president in 2015 (Kunkel and Ellis, 2024, pp.11-12). After amending the nation's constitution to provide for such a clause, President Touadéra, who is presently spending his second term in office, hopes to serve a third.

The civil war in the CAR, like those in many other African nations, clearly reflects a combination of grievance and greed. In the case of grievance against the Bozize government,

members of armed militias often aired out their frustration about the country's existing economic predicament and marginalization. For instance, Abdel Khader Khalil, a general of the Seleka militia group and a close ally to President Djotodia explains his frustration with former President Bozize's government in the following excerpts:

“The core issue is Bozizé and his family, who have held power in our country for over thirteen years. For anyone not from the Gbaya ethnic group, securing employment has been nearly impossible, irrespective of their education or qualifications. This systemic discrimination has left many Central Africans feeling frustrated and marginalized. This widespread discontent motivated us to rise against President Bozizé, leading to the formation of the Union of Democratic Revolutionary Forces (UFDR). From there, we united to create the Seleka, which became a formidable force of 5,000 armed members dedicated to bringing about change.” (Vice News, 2014: 15:50).

As noted in the excerpt above, this marginalization of specific groups, combined with extreme poverty levels, created an environment where rebel groups could thrive; with religious rhetorics providing a veneer of legitimacy to their actions (Isaacs-Martin, 2017, p.133). Expanding on this legitimacy and marginalization, Weyn et. al., (2014, p.24) wrote that while the Seleka did not start their rebellion on the grounds of religious discrimination, some of its members felt their Muslim population were being discriminated against and as such made several attacks on non-Muslims especially Christians leading to the need to protect the Muslim community.

Greed has also been a key component of the CAR conflict. Despite that the media has painted the conflict as a religious conflict, many scholars have argued otherwise citing greed as a key root cause of the civil war. For example, Sıradağ (2016) asserts that the conflict in the CAR is fundamentally driven by a power struggle among political elites. While the violence has contributed to the polarization of Muslims and Christians, the primary issue lies with the political ambitions of those in power. Specifically, rebel groups like the Seleka demonstrated clearly, the pursuit of greed in their war efforts. For instance, in December 2012, they asked for financial compensation for the combatants especially those who had fought alongside former President Bozize until he took power in 2003 but felt less compensated (Weyns et. al., 2014). By 2017, rebel groups such as the ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka had devolved into criminal activities as a means of survival and to sustain their movements (Knoope and Buchanan-Clarke, 2017). Similar to the other case studies below, it is clear that the greed and grievance hypothesis can be used to explain the civil conflict in the CAR as demonstrated above.



### 3.2 The South Sudan Case

After gaining independence, political leaders became fixated on retaining power and were willing to destroy the nation to achieve it. South Sudan, located in East Africa, is the youngest country in the world. It used to operate autonomously under the supervision of the central government in Khartoum, Sudan's capital city. After many years of prolonged conflict, South Sudan gained independence from its northern neighbour, Sudan. A significant aspect of this conflict is the Darfur Conflict in the Darfur region. The country shares borders with Ethiopia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Uganda, and Kenya. As of 2024, South Sudan has a population of just over eleven million people (Worldometer, 2024, para: 1).

In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the North (the central government in Khartoum) and the South (the Sudan People's Liberation Movement) to end Africa's longest civil war (Brosché et al., 2016, p. 73). This war resulted in the deaths of more than two million people (Brosché et al., 2016, p. 73). It was a historic agreement because it led to South Sudan becoming an autonomous state.

Immediately after its independence in July 2011 from Northern Sudan, South Sudan was plunged into a civil war (ethnic conflict and political tensions) that has left thousands of people dead and displaced. The conflict constituted the two main ethnic groups the Dinka (to which President Salva Kiir belongs) and the Nuer (to which former vice president Riek Machar belongs). However, ethnic tensions and tribalism are far more deeply rooted within the country than just the Dinka-Nuer polarity (Rolandsen, 2015, p: 165). The main causes of the civil war in South Sudan are complicated. However, many believe that it has an ethnic undertone and political cleavages, especially within the ruling party Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Pinaud, 2021, p: 1).

In 2013, fighting broke out between factions within the ruling government and some members of the presidential guard (Brosché et al. 2016, p: 68), this occurred between members of Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups within the presidential guard (Amnesty International, 2014, p: 9). There were rumours that some members of the ruling party SPLM, including Vice President Riek Machar wanted to overthrow President Salva Kiir after signaling his intentions to run for political power (Rolandsen, 2015, p: 163). Within just a few months, more than 10,000 people were killed (Brosché et al., 2016, p: 76), and well over one million people have been forced from their homes (Amnesty International, 2014, p: 7). Following the political skirmishes, President Salva Kiir sacked all his cabinet members, including Vice

President Machar (Pinaud, 2021, p: 123; Al Jazeera English, 2019, para: 5). Machar and others including the party secretary general voiced their grievances, accusing President Kiir of being dictatorial, undemocratic, and his failure to adhere to the agreements made in the CPA (Rolandsen, 2015). One of the agreements included a provision for the National Liberation Council (NLC) to organize National Conventions every five years. However, the failure to hold these conventions sparked strong resistance from Machar's camp (Rolandsen, 2015, p: 169). Additionally, it was only a matter of time before the SPLM leadership had to confront increasing public grievances. After independence, Juba, the capital, became the focal point of the nation, with political power concentrated there. Meanwhile, the rural areas, home to diverse communities, were seeking constitutional inclusion within a unified state (Al Jazeera English, 2013, para: 10).

Corruption is also widespread within the ruling elites (Clémence Pinaud, 2021, p: 115). For instance, in an investigation, 11,000 revealed fake names on the police payroll, with 16,000 under suspicion (Al Jazeera English, 2013, para: 1&2). Corruption allegations also raised concerns about the ability of Kiir's administration to maintain transparency and accountability in public spending (Al Jazeera English, 2013, para: 11). There is a fight for the control of natural resources (especially oil and gas), as political leaders see it as the only means to enrich themselves. Also, the possibility of getting rich outside of government is very low (Brosché et al., 2016, p: 80).

Following the failed attempted coup, many critics were arrested, but Machar managed to escape. Intense fighting continued between the government and the rebel group Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) headed by former Vice President Machar (Brosché et al., 2016, p: 77). Machar succeeded in mobilizing many aggrieved youths in the periphery. These youth, as argued by Jalloh (2024), became mere victims of their political and economic predicament perpetrated by years of bad governance, endemic corruption, marginalization, youth neglect, and ethnocentrism.

A brokered Peace deal in 2015 in Addis Ababa by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) ended the conflict. However, the peace deal was short-lived by another relapse in violence in July 2016 (Accord, 2019, para: 1). Another Peace deal between the government of President Kiir and former Vice President and Rebel Leader Riek Machar was signed in 2018. The Revitalized Peace Agreement in Addis Ababa at the 33<sup>rd</sup> Extraordinary Summit of IGAD (Accord, 2019, para: 1).

### 3.3 The Sudan Case

Since the fall of President Bashir's government, the military has chosen to maintain its grip on power by refusing to transfer authority to a civilian government and disregarding the people's demands. Two former allies are now fighting each other, causing further destruction to the nation.

The Republic of Sudan is a country in Northeast Africa, it is bordered by the Central African Republic, Egypt, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and South Sudan. The country used to be the largest in Africa until the secession of its Southern neighbour, South Sudan in 2011. The country has just over forty-nine million people (Worldometer, 2024, para: 1). The country gained independence from Britain in 1956 (Sharkey, 2008, p: 23). Since its independence, Sudan has experienced a checkered history with lots of coup d'états (power struggles) and civil wars. The most notable one is the civil war in the Darfur region that started in 2003, which many, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), have described as a genocide (ICC, 2005).

Following al-Qaeda's twin bombing of the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998, the US launched Operation Infinite Reach (US State Department, 2022). In 1993, the US had already designated Sudan as a State-sponsored Terrorist country and suspended its diplomatic operations in 1996 (US State Department, 2022, para: 1).

Former President Omar al-Bashir led a coup d'état in 1989, which saw him rule the country for three decades. Under his leadership, Sudan became a one-party state (Sharkey, 2008, p: 36). President Bashir held onto power until a popular protest against a rise in bread prices and other essential commodities broke out in 2018, leading to his removal by the defense minister in April 2019 (Al-Jazeera English, 2019, para: 1). Many believe that the effect of the Arab Spring spread to Sudan. After the overthrow of President Bashir, the military wanted to stay in power, however, mounting pressure from the pro-democratic movement, the military agreed to share power with a civilian government. Under the civilian-led transitional government (CLTG), Abdalla Hamdok served as prime minister and head of government until he was overthrown by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in 2021 (US State Department, 2022, para: 2). Prime Minister Hamdok was again reinstated to office in November 2021 but subsequently resigned in January 2022 (US State Department, 2022, para: 2).

Following months of mounting tensions between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the para-military forces known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in April 2023, fighting broke out between the two forces over the integration of thousands of RSF forces into the main armed force (Human Rights Watch-HRW, 2024, para: 1). Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (popularly known as “Hemedti”) of the RSF and General Burhan of the SAF, the leaders of the two factions used to be allies, and they had been since the war in Darfur, and both fought together in Yemen (Al Jazeera English, 2023; International Crisis Group, 2023, p: 4). The RSF, which is widely known as the Janjaweed, was used by former President al-Bashir to fight rebels in the region of Darfur. As part of Sudan’s transition to democracy, there have been talks to integrate the RSF into the army, but they disagreed on a timeline, according to reports, the army proposed two years, but the RSF wanted it to be ten (International Crisis Group, 2023, p: 5). The SAF realized that the RSF had been multiplying, and Hamdan Dagalo had political ambitions, so if the RSF did not integrate quickly, it would become uncontrollable (International Crisis Group, 2023, p: 5). When the fighting started in April, it was unclear who started the fighting as both sides started trading accusations (International Crisis Group, 2023, p: 6).

The failure to fully integrate the RSF into the primary army forces has been perceived as a contributing factor to their grievances and subsequent decision to engage the SAF. Additionally, it appears that Burhan views Hamdan Dagalo as a potential threat to his leadership position. Today, fighting has spread into places like western Darfur, EL Geneina, Kordofan, etc. In June last year, the West Darfur governor was brutally killed (International Crisis Group, 2023; HRW, 2024, para: 14). Both sides have international support. The SAF has closer ties with Egypt, which wants the military rule to continue in Sudan, whilst the RSF enjoys support from the United Arab Emirates (International Crisis Group, 2023, p: 2).

There have been international efforts by the African Union, the US, Saudi Arabia, etc. to end the conflict in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, but those talks have failed. The AU and IGAD have also weighed in to try to mediate between warring factions, however, those talks have also not been successful. Instead, General Burhan has accused Kenyan President William Ruto and IGAD, of being too friendly, biased, and lenient with Hamdan Dagalo (Al-Jazeera English, 2024, 14:00). However, President Ruto denied these accusations in a recent interview with Al-Jazeera.

Another, thing that complicates diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Sudan, is the lack of communication between external actors (International Crisis Group, 2023, p: 8). For

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instance, the AU, European Union (EU), and United Kingdom (UK) complain about the lack of communication from the US. Western diplomats agreed that UAE officials felt blindsided by their exclusions in Jeddah (International Crisis Group, 2023, p: 8). And, such a move could have dire consequences and may jeopardize any peace talks agreements, because the UAE is a key player in the conflict supporting the RSF.

Since the fighting started, there have been reports of serious violations of human rights committed by both sides in the conflicts. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (ONOCHA) estimates more than fifteen thousand fatalities so far (ONOCHA, 2024, p: 1). Furthermore, it also estimates that twenty-four million people need humanitarian assistance, and since April last year, seven million people have been internally displaced. The RSF has also been accused of raping women and girls and committing ethnic cleansing on the Masalit people and other non-Arab groups (Amnesty International, 2024, p: 7; HRW, 2024, p: 15).

#### **3.4 The Libyan Experience**

Libya is a country in the Northern part of Africa on the Mediterranean coast. Egypt, Algeria, Chad, Sudan, Niger, and Tunisia border the country. Its population is just over 7 million (Worldometer, 2024). The kingdom of Libya gained independence from Italy in 1951 (Aghayev, 2013: 193). The country was under Ottoman rule before this time (Aghayev, 2013: 193).

Scholars have pointed out several factors that caused the Arab Spring in general. Some have mentioned economic, political, and social factors. Moreover, decades of marginalization of certain social groups (social injustice) and the absence of geographic diversity (Darwisheh, 2014: 1) have contributed to the phenomenon.

Moreover, it is also important to note that before the Arab Spring, Libya was one of the success stories when it came to economic stability in Africa; the literacy rate was 80 percent, and a majority, if not all, of its population, enjoyed free healthcare (Aghayev, 2013: 194). Many agree that Gaddafi was not the puppet of Western neo-colonialism (QadirMushtaq et al., 2017: 7). This begs the question of what may have caused the uprising in Libya if most of its population enjoyed the opportunities mentioned earlier. This chapter will only examine the main factors that caused the Libyan conflict and how these factors are linked to the 'greed and grievance' theory.

In 1969, at the age of 27, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi launched a coup d'état and overthrew King Idris in what became known as the Al Fateh Revolution (Al Jazeera English, 2011: 8:53; Aghayev, 2013: 193; BBC, 2011: para. 7). Gaddafi and his movement became very popular among ordinary people and mostly among university students because of its anti-colonialism, nationalism, egalitarianism, and modernization of Libyan society (Al Jazeera English, 2018: 9:50; BBC, 2011). Moreover, they nationalized big businesses like the banks and the oil industry (Al Jazeera English, 2018: 10:50; BBC, 2011: 10).

In the 1990s, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, formed by Mujahideen returning from Afghanistan, attempted to overthrow Gaddafi and establish an Islamic State, but their coup failed (Al Jazeera English: 34:44, 2018). Many members were imprisoned without trial under harsh conditions in Abu Salim prison in Tripoli (Al Jazeera English: 35:07, 2018). In 1996, after being denied access to their families and lawyers, some prisoners protested and managed to escape. In response, prison guards, acting on orders from Gaddafi's intelligence chief, killed around 1,200 prisoners (Al Jazeera English, 2018: 35:20). In an interview with Al Jazeera English in 2018, Professor Ali Abdullatif Ahmida described the incident as “one of the ugliest and most brutal massacres under the regime, and in the long term, it hunted the regime (35:46).” Many of the families of those killed in Abu Salim Prison wanted answers that they never got, and this was one of those discontents that started sowing the seeds of hatred towards the regime in Libya among civilians in Benghazi because many of these families were from that city (Al Jazeera English: 36:00, 2018).

In the wake of the Arab Spring (which many believe to be pro-democracy uprisings) that engulfed North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 had its strongest effect on Libya (Zaheer, 2023: 56; Pedde, 2017: 99). In fact, many refer to it as the “third wave of democratization” (Plakoudas 2017: 2). The revolution was inspired by the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, former Tunisian dictator, in December 2010 (McQuinn, 2013: 716). It then spread through Egypt, which saw the end of Hosni Mubarak's thirty-year rule (Mahmood et al., 2020), it later spread to Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Protesters were motivated by issues such as corruption, social justice, human dignity, authoritarianism; and lack of political freedom, as well as calls for democratic and anti-corruption reforms (Barakat et al., 2021: 8).

However, during Gaddafi's rule, although the basic economic needs of the Libyan people were fulfilled, the political situation was highly unstable (Aghayev, 2013: 194). Many believed that strict repression stifled any form of political diversity or civil society, with political dissent being outlawed under Law 75 of 1973, and the regime's failure to address the



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ongoing demands of citizens had fueled their frustrations (Aghayev, 2013: 194; Barakat et al. 2021). Colonel Gaddafi was known to be brutal against political dissents, not only inside of Libya but also with those who criticized him outside of the country as the target of assassination (BBC, 2011: para. 35). For instance, the East had a distinct identity, and a narrative centered on the belief that it was intentionally punished and sidelined by the Gaddafi regime (Al Jazeera English, 2018: 48:30). These repressions motivated exiled political leaders soon after the violent protests had started in Tunisia and Egypt. (McQuinn, 2013: 716). The National Conference for the Libyan Opposition, a group of exiled dissidents based in London, mobilized emerging opposition to Muammar Gaddafi by organizing domestic and international protests against his regime on February 17 (McQuinn, 2013: 716). The planned protest was called the “Day of Rage” and was organized by the lawyer (Fathi Terbil) representing the families of the prisoners killed in Abu Salim prison in 1996 (Al Jazeera English, 2018: 40:00).

The majority of people who participated in the revolutions were youths, and Libya was not an exception to this (Plakoudas, 2017: 6). For instance, in Libya, these disgruntled youth took to the streets in main opposition areas, especially in Benghazi, in violent protests against Gaddafi’s regime (McQuinn, 2013: 716). That is why when these violent protests started, Benghazi quickly fell to the opposition (Al Jazeera English: 49:00, 2018). For instance, in Benghazi, demands for political liberalization extended past free and fair elections (Qadir Mushtaq et al., 2017: 7). They included dismantling oppressive security apparatuses, stopping human rights violations, removing the military from civic politics, guaranteeing political freedoms, ending corruption and nepotism, and upholding minority rights (Qadir Mushtaq et al., 2017: 7). This also, at times, included the rights of more marginalized LGBTQ+ people (Plakoudas, 2017: 4).

The political mechanisms of the Gaddafi regime reached into every Gaddafi-era military establishment (McQuinn, 2013: 716). Gaddafi's sons or loyalists were placed in command of crucial parts of the National Army, while the ordinary military was too little funded, suggesting that they may have only been loyal to him (McQuinn, 2013: 717). Until Gaddafi's regime began experiencing problems in 2011 and rapidly started losing its political grip, defections occurred mass from lower ranks of the military. These defections were particularly high in the east but also in Kufra, Misratah, and the western mountainous areas, and at times, local conflicts have erupted, fueled by deep-rooted communal grievances. (Al Jazeera English, 2011; McQuinn, 2013: 717).



## Conclusion

The study examined how the "greed versus grievance" theory plays a role in contemporary civil wars. Throughout the paper, we argued that this theory remains relevant in explaining the primary causes of civil wars post-Cold War. In the introduction, we highlighted that immediately after the Cold War ended, the issue of greed versus grievance was a critical factor in many civil wars and armed conflicts, particularly in countries from the Global South. Key examples are drawn from the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Secondly, we delved into the "Greed" and "Grievance" theory, contextualizing it within conflict situations of the immediate post-Cold War era. Thirdly, we also looked at what the literature has been saying about the said theory.

Furthermore, we focused on four case studies (CAR, South Sudan, Sudan and Libya) and argued that the conflicts in these countries can be attributed to the issue of greed and grievance. First, in the case of the CAR, we introduced the country's civil war and accounted for the greed and grievance aspect of the war. Moving forward to the case of South Sudan, we showed how the greed for power clouded the mind of President Salva Kiir, and how his failure to allow the NLC to organize the National Convention angered Machar and his camp. Moreover, the sacking of members of his cabinet including Vice President Machar, based on an attempted coup, was not well-received by an already aggrieved Machar and his camp members. Additionally, the study showed how ethnicity played a crucial role during the conflict, and how both camps used ethnic sympathy to appeal to fighters. The control of natural resources was also another key factor during the conflict.

In the case of Sudan, the research also showed how since the fall of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the leaders of the country have been struggling for control of the country. First, the overthrow of the civilian-led government in 2021, and the cracking down on pro-democracy supporters, left many people aggrieved. Moreover, how the greed for power of two former military allies has led the country into a civil conflict. The failure to agree on a timeline for the integration of more than 100,000 RSF fighters into the military, was also seen as the main cause of the conflict (Al-Jazeera, 2023). The paper highlights the prolonged nature of the conflict, emphasizing the involvement of international actors such as Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. It also explains how this international support for various warring factions complicates efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Finally, we focused on the impact of greed and grievance during Gaddafi's forty years of rule, which ultimately led to the Arab Spring.

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## Soğuk Savaş Sürecinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde Afrika Çalışmaları: ABD Üniversiteleri Özelinde Kurumsallaşma Süreci

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### Atıf

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### Özet

Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sürecinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde (ABD) Afrika Çalışmalarının ABD üniversiteleri özelinde nasıl geliştiğini ve kurumsallaştığını incelemektedir. ABD'de bölge çalışmalarının kurumsallaşması, Soğuk Savaş bağlamında şekillenmiş; bu dönemde hem ABD hem de Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (SSCB), Afrika gibi stratejik bölgelerde nüfuz elde edebilmek için akademik bilgiye yatırım yapmıştır. Bu durum, kıtanın iki süper güç arasında bir rekabet alanına dönüşmesine neden olmuştur. Afrika Çalışmalarının gelişimi, Soğuk Savaş sürecindeki Amerikan dış politikasından, Afrika'daki dekolonizasyon sürecinden ve küresel jeopolitik dinamiklerden etkilenmiştir. ABD, Afrika çalışmalarına ağırlık vererek kıtadaki çıkarlarını korumayı, yeni bağımsız devletlerle ilişkilerini güçlendirmeyi ve Soğuk Savaş rekabetinde avantaj sağlamayı hedeflemiştir. Akademide üretilen bilgi, bu doğrultuda politika yapımcılar için kritik bir kaynak haline gelmiştir. Makale, ABD'deki çeşitli üniversitelerde kurulan Afrika Çalışmaları programlarını ve merkezlerini detaylı bir şekilde incelemektedir. Bu programlar, Afrika dillerinin öğretilmesi, kıta tarihine dair akademik çalışmalar yürütülmesi ve Afrika'nın politik, sosyal ve ekonomik meselelerine yönelik analizler yapılması gibi amaçlara sahiptir. Ayrıca, saha araştırmaları ve Afrika'ya yönelik akademik geziler de bu sürecin bir parçası olmuştur. Üniversiteler, vakıflar ve dernekler tarafından sağlanan finansman sayesinde Afrika Çalışmaları alanında hızlı bir gelişim kaydetmiştir. Çalışma, Soğuk Savaş döneminde üniversitelerin hangi alanlara odaklandığını, Afrika Çalışmaları kapsamında yazılan tezlerin içeriklerini ve akademisyenlerin araştırma konularını analiz ederek, ABD'de bu alanın kurumsallaşma sürecini kapsamlı bir şekilde değerlendirmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** ABD'de Afrika Çalışmaları, Kurumsallaşma, Bölge Çalışmaları, ABD Üniversiteleri, Dış Politika.

# African Studies in the United States During the Cold War: The Institutionalization Process in American Universities

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## Abstract

This study examines how African Studies developed and institutionalized in American universities during the Cold War. The institutionalization of area studies in the United States was shaped within the context of the Cold War; during this period, both the United States and the Soviet Union invested in academic knowledge to gain influence in strategic regions like Africa. This dynamic turned the continent into a competitive arena between the two superpowers. The development of African Studies was influenced by U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, the decolonization process in Africa, and global geopolitical dynamics. By prioritizing African Studies, the U.S. aimed to safeguard its interests on the continent, strengthen its relations with newly independent states, and gain an advantage in the Cold War rivalry. The knowledge produced in academia became a critical resource for policymakers in this regard. This article provides a detailed examination of African Studies programs and centers established at various universities in the U.S. These programs aimed to teach African languages, conduct academic research on the continent's history, and analyze Africa's political, social, and economic issues. Additionally, field research and academic trips to Africa became integral to this process. The field of African Studies rapidly expanded, supported by funding from universities, foundations, and associations. The study comprehensively evaluates the institutionalization of African Studies in the U.S. by analyzing the focal areas of universities during the Cold War, the content of theses written within this field, and the research topics pursued by academics.

**Keywords:** African Studies in the U.S., Institutionalization, Area Studies, American Universities, Foreign Policy.



## Giriş

Devletler, varlıklarını sürdürebilmek ve uluslararası sistemdeki konumlarını güçlendirebilmek için diğer bölgeler veya ülkeler üzerinde etkili olmayı, ilişkilerini şekillendirmeyi ve zaman zaman hegemonya kurmayı hedefler. Bu durum, devletlerin sürekliliği açısından stratejik bir zorunluluk haline gelmiştir. Devletlerin bu hedefleri doğrultusunda yalnız hareket etmeleri çoğu zaman mümkün olmamış, aksine tarihsel olarak birbirleriyle çok boyutlu ilişkiler ve etkileşimler kurmak zorunda kalmışlardır. Bu karşılıklı bağımlılık ilişkisi ise çoğu zaman bir rekabet ve mücadele ortamı yaratmıştır. Bu durum yalnızca 21. yüzyıla sınırlı olmayıp geçmiş yüzyıllarda da devletlerin birbiriyle mücadeleleri, esasen bölgesel güç mücadelesi şeklinde tezahür etmiştir. İşte bu mücadele ortamı, devletlerin belirli bölgeler üzerinde daha fazla bilgi ve analiz üretme ihtiyacını doğurmuş; bu da bölge çalışmalarının akademide kurumsallaşmasına zemin hazırlamıştır. Bu çalışmada esasen Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde (ABD) akademik bir alan olarak Afrika Çalışmalarının nasıl geliştiğini ve kurumsallaştığını irdelemektedir. Özellikle ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının hangi amaçla kurumsallaştığı ve yıllar içerisinde ABD üniversitelerinde Afrika Çalışmalarının nasıl kurulup geliştiği üzerinde durulmuştur.

Çalışma zaman dilimi açısından Soğuk Savaş sürecini esas almaktadır. Bu hususun temel sebebi, ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının kurumsallaşma sürecinin Soğuk Savaş ile başlamasıdır. Soğuk Savaş dönemi, yalnızca askeri ve siyasi rekabetin değil, aynı zamanda bilgi üretimi üzerinden şekillenen bir küresel mücadele alanı olmuştur. Bu bağlamda ABD, dış politikasının yönünü belirlerken akademik üretimi stratejik bir araç olarak kullanmıştır. Soğuk Savaş’ın etkisiyle gelişen bölge çalışmaları, devletlerin uluslararası sistemde nüfuz kurma çabalarının bir uzantısı olarak akademide kurumsallaşmıştır. Makale, bu kurumsallaşma sürecini tarihsel bir perspektifle ele alarak, üniversiteler bünyesinde kurulan Afrika Çalışmaları programlarını, bu programların içeriklerini, fon kaynaklarını ve dış politika ile ilişkisini yalnızca entelektüel değil aynı zamanda araçsal bir işlev gördüğünü de ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bağlamda, çalışmanın temel sorusu şudur: Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD’de Afrika Çalışmaları neden, hangi amaçla, hangi kurumsal yapılar içerisinde, nasıl bir motivasyonla ve hangi aktörlerin katkısıyla gelişmiştir? Bu doğrultuda makale, disiplinler arası bir yaklaşımla tarih, siyaset bilimi, antropoloji ve ekonomi gibi alanlarda faaliyet gösteren Afrika Çalışmaları programlarını örneklem yoluyla analiz etmekte; söz konusu süreçte vakıflar, kamu kurumları ve üniversitelerin rolünü ortaya koymaktadır. Temel argüman ise, Soğuk Savaş döneminde



ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının, sadece akademik ihtiyaçlardan değil, aynı zamanda dış politika gereksinimlerinden kaynaklanan stratejik bir yönelim olarak geliştiğidir.

### 1. ABD Dış Politikasında Soğuk Savaş’ın Etkisi ve Afrika’ya Yansıması

Soğuk Savaş dönemi, ABD’nin dış politika önceliklerini yeniden şekillendirdiği ve bilgi üretimini stratejik bir araç haline getirdiği bir kırılma noktası olmuştur. Bu süreçte yalnızca askeri veya diplomatik değil, akademik alandaki yönelimler de küresel rekabetin bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Özellikle Afrika gibi birçok açıdan stratejik bölgeler, ABD için sadece jeopolitik veya ekonomik çıkarların değil aynı zamanda ideolojik mücadelelerin de merkezi hâline gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Afrika Çalışmalarının ABD’de bir akademik alan olarak gelişimi, Soğuk Savaş’ın gerekleri doğrultusunda biçimlenmiştir. Dolayısıyla, ilk olarak Soğuk Savaş’ın ABD dış politikasını nasıl şekillendirdiğini, Afrika’nın bu dönemde ABD açısından ne anlam ifade ettiğini ve bu çerçevede akademide nasıl bir yönelim oluştuğunu değerlendirmek bu çalışmanın ilerleyen bölümleri için tarihsel bir arka plan sunacaktır.

Soğuk Savaş’ın kökeni, nasıl geliştiği veya kavramsal anlamda tanımı üzerine literatürde birçok görüş ve tartışma yer almaktadır. Bu noktada tek bir olay veya durum üzerinden gitmek ve genelleme yapmak doğru bir yaklaşım değildir (Besi, Hanhimâki, Maiolo, & Schulze, 2012, s. 257). Bununla birlikte, kavramın tarihsel bağlamda nasıl tanımlandığını ortaya koymak açısından bazı tanımlar açıklayıcı bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Örnek olarak Sander’in aktardığı üzere Soğuk Savaş:

*“İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra galip çıkmış iki büyük devlet ve bu devletlerin çerçevesinde kümelenmiş, küçük devletler arasındaki anlaşmazlık ve çatışmanın, doğrudan birbirlerine karşı silah kullanmadan sürdürdüğü belirli bir tarihsel döneme verilen addır”* (Sander, 2013, s. 224). Bu bağlamda, uzun yıllar boyunca farklı alanlarda karşı karşıya gelen ABD ve SSCB arasında kesintisiz bir güç mücadelesi sürmüştür. Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD, dış politikasını yalnızca açık çatışmayı önlemeye değil, aynı zamanda küresel ölçekte ideolojik ve politik rekabeti yönetmeye odaklanmıştır. Komünizmi, serbest ticaret, serbest seçimler ve bireysel özgürlükler için bir tehdit olarak değerlendiren ABD diplomasisi, bu ideolojinin yayılmasını engellemeyi ve var olduğu bölgelerde etkisini sınırlamayı temel hedef haline getirmiştir (National Museum of American Diplomacy, 2024).

ABD’nin tanımlamasına göre, özgür dünya ile sosyalist blok arasındaki varoluşsal rekabet, caydırıcılık ve yumuşama yoluyla yönetilmesi gereken, kesintisiz bir hayat gerçeği olarak görülmüştür. ABD, müttefiklerini güçlendirmek ve bağlantısız ülkeleri kendi safına çekmek amacıyla, ABD silahlarına, pazarlarına, eğitim sistemine ve teknolojisine ayrıcalıklı

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erişim imkânı sunan bir strateji benimsemiştir (Fingar, 2018, s. 3). Bu stratejiyi uygularken bazı bölgelere özel bir önem atfedilmiş, Afrika kıtası da bu bölgeler arasında öne çıkmıştır. Afrika’ya verilen önemin arkasında Sovyet tehdidin yanı sıra kıtanın farklı alt bölgelerinde zengin doğal kaynaklarının bulunması, bazı ülkelerin deniz ticaret rotalarında stratejik konumlara sahip olması, kıtanın genç ve dinamik bir nüfusun olması gibi faktörler de yer almıştır. Ancak en temel etken, Soğuk Savaş döneminde Afrika ülkelerinin büyük bölümünün bağımsızlıklarını yeni kazanması ve bu yeni devletlerin uluslararası sistemdeki yönelimlerinin henüz belirsiz olmasıdır. Bahsi geçen hususlar detaylandırıldığında, ilk olarak Afrika, Avrupa’nın sömürge yönetimi altında bulunurken güçlü bir anti-sömürgeci milliyetçilik dalgası yaşamıştır. Bu durum, Amerikan siyasi liderleri tarafından, Avrupa dışındaki ve Sovyet ideolojik etkisine açık, hassas bir bölge olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Sömürgeciliğin sona erip Afrika ülkelerinin bağımsızlıklarını kazanmasından sonra bile, kıtanın kırılgan ve istikrarsız bir coğrafya olduğu yönündeki algı varlığını sürdürmüştür. Bu nedenle, Afrika’nın komünist ideoloji ve siyasi etkiden korunması, ABD’nin sömürge sonrası döneme yönelik temel politika hedeflerinden biri haline gelmiştir. Nitekim bu yaklaşım, Eisenhower döneminde şekillenmiş ve Ronald Reagan ile George Bush yönetimlerine kadar büyük ölçüde değişmeden devam etmiştir. Yine kıtaya jeostratejik açıdan bakıldığında: Süveyş Kanalı, Babülmendep Boğazı ve Ümit Burnu gibi ticaret yolları, Amerika’nın kendi ve Avrupa’daki müttefikleri için hayati önem taşımıştır. Özellikle Ümit Burnu rotası, Batı için stratejik açıdan kritik bir öneme haiz olmuştur. Bu nedenle örnek olarak Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca ABD, Güney Afrika’da Sovyet destekli bir radikal rejimin iktidara gelmesinin önüne geçmek için ayrıca bir çaba sarf etmiştir.

Özetle ABD dış politikasında Afrika’nın ne derece yer aldığı, çoğunlukla kıtadaki Sovyet girişimlerinin varlığına veya ABD yetkililerinin algıladığı gerçek ya da olası Sovyet tehdidine bağlı olarak dalgalanmıştır (Ohaegbulam, 1992, s. 19-24). Bu kapsamda ABD, Afrika’yı Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca Sovyet ideolojik etkisine karşı korumaya yönelik stratejik bir öncelik olarak değerlendirmiştir. Bu yaklaşım, kıtanın bağımsızlık sonrası istikrarsızlık ve Sovyet tehdidi gibi faktörlerle şekillenen bir dış politika hedefi olarak devam etmiştir.

**2. ABD’de Bölge Çalışmaları ve Afrika Çalışmalarının Soğuk Savaş Dönemindeki Gelişimi**

Soğuk Savaş dönemi, sadece uluslararası ilişkilerde değil, aynı zamanda akademik alanlarda da önemli dönüşümlere yol açmıştır. Bu dönemde, akademik dünyada üretilen bilginin sadece teorik bir amaç taşımadığını, aynı zamanda ABD’nin dış politikasına şekil

verme ve küresel hegemonya stratejilerini destekleme noktasında önemli bir araç haline geldiği görülmektedir. Akademi içerisinde özellikle bölge çalışmalarına yönelik artan ilgi de Soğuk Savaş'ın rekabetçi ortamında bilgi üretiminin stratejik bir değer kazanmasının bir yansıması olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, farklı coğrafyalar üzerine derinlemesine bilgi edinmek, ABD'nin dış politika hedeflerini belirlemede ve sahadaki etkisini artırmada kritik bir rol oynamıştır. Bu noktada ABD'nin bölge çalışmalarına ilgisinin temelinde Soğuk Savaş'ın getirdiği rekabet yatmakta ve bölge çalışmalarının kurumsallaşmasının aynı dönem içerisinde geliştiği görülmektedir (Katzenstein, 2001, s. 789). Soğuk Savaş esas olarak bölgeler arasındaki bir mücadeleye sahne olduğundan, ABD bu rekabette üstünlük sağlamak amacıyla bölge çalışmalarına büyük önem atfetmiştir. Bölge çalışmalarında üretilen bilgilerin siyasa yapıcılarının karar alma süreçlerinde kritik bir rol oynaması, bu önemin temel nedenini oluşturmuştur. Hem ABD hem de SSCB, çeşitli bölgeler üzerinde nüfuz kurabilmek için akademik bilgiye dayalı stratejilere ihtiyaç duymuştur. Bu çerçevede, ABD'de bölge çalışmalarının temelinde jeo-stratejik dinamiklerin belirleyici olduğu görülmektedir (Huat ve diğerleri, 2019, s. 34). Bu genel çerçeve içinde, Soğuk Savaş'ın jeo-stratejik dinamikleri doğrultusunda Afrika da önemli bir rekabet alanı haline gelmiş ve bu durum, ABD'de Afrika Çalışmalarının ayrı bir akademik disiplin olarak yükselmesine zemin hazırlamıştır.

Literatüre bakıldığında ABD'de Afrika Çalışmalarının gelişimi, transatlantik köle ticareti sebebiyle Afrika ile kurulan tarihi ilişkilere atfedilmektedir (Tepeciklioğlu, 2019, s. 126). Bu bağlamda John Henrik Clarke *"ABD'nin Afrika'ya olan ilgisinin ulusun kendisi kadar eski olduğunu"* belirtmektedir (Clarke, 1969, s. 10). ABD'nin Afrika Çalışmaları ve Afro-Amerikan Çalışmaları alanlarında ürettiği araştırmalar, diğer akademik disiplinler gibi, tarihin dinamikleri tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Bu disiplinlerdeki bilgi üretimi ve dolaşımı, tarih boyunca değişen kurumsal, entelektüel ve ideolojik süreçlerden etkilenmiştir (Zezeza, 2011, s. 9-10). Bu durum ABD'nin tarihsel olarak dış politika yönelimlerinin bölge çalışmaları ile olan bağlantısını açıklamaktadır. Genel olarak, bir ülkedeki bölge çalışmalarının gelişimi o ülkenin dış politikasıyla doğrudan bağlantılı olduğu için ABD'de de değişen dış politika süreçleri ve bölgesel yönelimler, Afrika Çalışmalarını doğrudan etkilemiştir.

1996 yılında Ford Vakfı ve Afrika Çalışmaları Derneğinde ekonomik antropolog ve Northwestern Üniversitesi'nde program direktörü olan Jane Guyer tarafından yayımlanan (1996) *African Studies in the United States: A Perspective* başlıklı çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sürecinde ABD'deki Afrika Çalışmalarının gelişimini detaylı bir şekilde incelemiştir. Guyer, çalışmasında ABD'deki Afrika Çalışmalarını üç döneme ayırmıştır. İlk dönemin 1960'larda başladığını ifade eden Guyer, bu dönemin temel dinamiğini Afrika'daki devletlerin bağımsızlık süreçleriyle

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bağdaştırmaktadır. Bu döneme dair ek bir not olarak, Clarke’ın ise 1969’da yayımladığı çalışmaya bakıldığında, gelişmekte olan Afrika Çalışmaları programlarının çoğunun tarihten ziyade antropoloji ve siyaset alanlarına odaklandığı görülmektedir (Clarke, 1969, s. 10). İkinci dönemin ekonomik temelli olduğunu vurgulayan Guyer, bu dönemi 1973 Yom Kippur Savaşı, petrol krizi, 1971’de Bretton Woods Anlaşması’nın çökmesi ve Afrika’daki kıtlık ile ekonomik krizle ilişkilendirmektedir. Guyer, bahsi geçen bu durumları 1996 perspektifinden değerlendirdiğinde, üniversitelerin Afrika Çalışmaları alanında yeniden konumlandırıldığını ifade etmiştir (McCann, 2002, s. 30). Guyer’in ve Clarke’ın değerlendirmeleri, Afrika Çalışmalarının ABD’deki gelişiminin yalnızca akademik ilgiyle değil, küresel siyasi ve ekonomik dinamiklerle doğrudan şekillendiğini göstermektedir. Bu çalışmalar, disiplinler arası yönelimin ve dönemsel krizlerin, Afrika Çalışmaları alanının kurumsal yapısını ve önceliklerini belirlemede belirleyici olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının yalnızca Soğuk Savaş sürecine özgü olmadığı da açıktır; ancak bu dönemde kurumsallaşmış ve sistemli bir yapıya kavuşmuştur. Guyer ve Clarke’ın analizlerinin yanı sıra Atlantik köle ticareti ve Afrika tarihi üzerine çalışmalarıyla ünlü Philip D. Curtin’e göre ise ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının kurumsallaşma süreci iki aşamada gerçekleşmiştir. İlk aşama, 1948’de Northwestern Üniversitesi’nde ve 1954’te Boston Üniversitesi’nde Afrika Çalışmaları programlarının oluşturulmasıyla başlamıştır. Bu ilk aşama 1958’e kadar sürmüştür, bu süreçte farklı üniversitelerde 10 yeni Afrika Çalışmaları programı açılmıştır. Bu iki üniversitenin ardından, diğer Afrika Çalışmaları programları da bölge çalışmaları modeline uygun biçimde disiplinler arası bir yapıya kavuşmuş ve farklı alanlardaki uzmanları bünyesine katarak kurumsallaşma sürecine girmiştir. Bu kurumsallaşma sürecinde, Ford ve Carnegie Corporation of New York Vakfı, Afrika Çalışmaları alanında uzmanlaşacak akademisyenler ve araştırmalar için maddi destek sağlamıştır. Kurumsallaşma sürecinin ikinci aşaması 1960’ta başlamış ve belirli üniversitelerde lisansüstü programların açılmasıyla ilerlemiştir (Ferreira, 2010, s. 72-73).

ABD’de Afrika Çalışmaları, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında kurumsallaşmış olsa da savaş öncesi dönemde Afro-Amerikan Çalışmalarıyla yakından ilişkili bir gelişim süreci izlemiştir (Zezeza, 2011, s. 12). Başta Afro-Amerikalılar olmak üzere, diğer azınlık gruplarının araştırmalarıyla bağlantılı olarak şekillenen Afrika Çalışmaları; aynı dönemde kölelik, köle ticareti ve özgürlük gibi konuların da akademik çalışmaların merkezinde yer almasıyla birlikte gelişim göstermiştir. Bu süreçte, neo-sömürgeci egemenlik bağlamında *Öteki’yi* bilmenin önemli hale gelmesi, ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının büyük ölçüde bu kavramsal zeminde inşa edilmesine neden olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda, başta vakıflar olmak üzere ABD hükümeti

tarafından ABD üniversitelerinde açılan Afrika Çalışmaları merkezlerine önemli miktarda ekonomik destek sağlanmış ve bu alanın kurumsal gelişimi teşvik edilmiştir. Ayrılan fonlar, özellikle Afrika hakkında bilgi üretimini artırmaya yönelik olarak kullanılmıştır (Msindo, 2020, s. 7). Ayrıca, ABD üniversitelerinde bölgesel araştırma merkezlerinin kurulmasını teşvik eden 1958 tarihli Ulusal Savunma Eğitim Yasası (National Defense Education Act) da bu sürece kurumsal bir ivme kazandırmıştır. NDEA, özellikle siyaset bilimi başta olmak üzere disiplinler arası araştırmaları finanse etmiş ve Afrika Çalışmalarının gelişimine önemli katkılarda bulunmuştur (McCann, 2002, s. 31).

Bahsi geçen bu destek ve kurumsallaşma süreci, Afrika Çalışmalarına yönelik ilginin yalnızca akademik değil, aynı zamanda stratejik saiklerle de şekillendiğini göstermektedir. Nitekim ABD, Soğuk Savaş ortamında, ABD üniversitelerinin dünyanın çeşitli toplumları ve kültürleri hakkında bilgi üretiminde yetersiz kaldığını değerlendirmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, bölge çalışmalarına haliyle Afrika Çalışmalarına da olan ilgisini artırmıştır ve küresel ölçekte teşvik etmek amacıyla belirli vakıflara fon sağlamıştır. Bunun yanı sıra hem özel sektör hem de kamu tarafından savunma sektörü ve istihbarat servisleri aracılığıyla bölge çalışmalarına finansman ayrılmıştır (Jewsiewicki, 2007, s. 128). Amerikan akademisinde bölge çalışmaları kapsamında üretilen bilgi ABD'nin bölgesel hegemonya inşasına hizmet edecek şekilde şekillenmiştir.

Yazarların incelediği dönemler, kurumsallaşma süreçleri ve dönemin konjonktürel dinamikleri dikkate alındığında, ABD'de Afrika Çalışmalarının nasıl şekillendiğini ve bu süreçlerin hangi iç ve dış politika etkenlerinden etkilendiğini daha iyi anlayabilmek için, o dönemdeki üniversite literatürüne, çalışmalara ve araştırma merkezlerine odaklanmak faydalı olacaktır. Bu bağlamda, Cambridge Üniversitesi tarafından 1958-1969 yılları arasında yayımlanan *Afrika Araştırmaları Bülteni*, ABD üniversitelerindeki Afrika Çalışmalarının gelişimine ışık tutmuştur.

### **3. Soğuk Savaş Sürecinde ABD Üniversitelerinde Kurulan Afrika Araştırma Merkezleri ve Programları**

Amerikan yükseköğretim kurumlarında Afrika Çalışmalarına yönelik ilgi, kökenlerini mezhep kolejlerinde misyoner yetiştirme amacıyla başlatılan çalışmalara kadar götürmektedir. Bu erken dönem girişimlerinin temel motivasyonu, Batı dışı olarak tanımlanan Latin Amerika, Rusya, Doğu Avrupa, Orta Doğu, Sahra Altı Afrika ve Uzak Doğu gibi bölgelere Batılı değerleri aktarmak olmuştur. Tarihsel süreç içinde, dünya genelindeki bilgi ihtiyacının artmasıyla birlikte bu çalışmalar daha sistematik bir boyut kazanmıştır. Bu çerçevede, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında ABD'de Afrika'ya ilişkin uluslararası bir konferans düzenlenmek

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istenmişse de, bu girişim sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Savaş sonrası dönemde ise, Carnegie Corporation of New York bölge çalışmalarına ayırdığı kaynakları Afrika Çalışmalarına yönlendirerek küçük akademisyen gruplarının Afrika’da saha araştırmaları yapmasına destek olmuştur (Dressel, 1966, s. 66). Bu gelişmelerin ardından, birçok ABD üniversitesi, vakıf ve derneklerin sağladığı finansmanla Afrika Çalışmaları programları kurmaya başlamıştır. Kuruluş yıllarından bağımsız olarak, izleyen bölümlerde bu üniversitelerdeki Afrika Çalışmaları programlarının kuruluş amaçları, işleyişleri ve içerikleri ayrıntılı biçimde ele alınacaktır.

**3.1 Boston Üniversitesi**

Boston Üniversitesi’nde yer alan Afrika Çalışmaları Programı, 1953 yılında Afrika dilleri ve bölge çalışmalarını desteklemek amacıyla kurulmuştur. Bu program, ABD Eğitim Bakanlığı’nın Başlık VI Ulusal Kaynak Merkezi tarafından federal fonlarla desteklenerek hayata geçirilmiştir (Boston University African Studies Center, 2022). Cambridge Üniversitesi’nin 1961 yılında yayımladığı ABD’de Afrika Çalışmaları başlıklı bültende, programın akademik kadrosuna ilişkin bilgilere de yer verilmiştir. 1961 yılı itibarıyla program, on iki yarı zamanlı akademisyen ve iki araştırma görevlisinden oluşan bir kadroya sahipken, öğretim ve araştırma kadrosu yedi tam zamanlı akademisyen ve iki yarı zamanlı araştırma görevlisinden oluşmaktadır. Programın akademik kadrosunun araştırma alanları incelendiğinde, dönemin direktörü William O. Brown’ın sosyoloji alanında araştırmalar yaptığı görülmektedir. Diğer akademik üyeler ise tarih, siyaset bilimi, antropoloji, sosyoloji, ekonomi ve coğrafya alanlarında çalışmalar yürütmüştür. Program, sosyal bilimler alanında akredite edilmiş bölümlerde geniş bir yelpazede kurslar, seminerler ve yönlendirilmiş çalışmalar sunmaktadır.

1961-62 yıllarında programda; antropoloji ve sosyoloji, Afrika halkları ve kültürleri, çağdaş Afrika’nın sorunları, Afrika toplumlarının sosyal organizasyonu, Afrika tarihi, Afrika’da geleneksel toplum ve sosyal değişim, Afrika’da kabile toplumu, Afrika’da yerel siyasi sistemler, az gelişmiş bölgelerin ekonomisi ve ekonomik kalkınma, Afrika coğrafyası, çağdaş Afrika siyaseti, Afrika’da hükümet ve siyaset sorunları gibi konularda eğitimler verilmiştir. Ayrıca, az gelişmiş bölgelerin siyasi sorunları, Afrika’da milliyetçilik, Afrika tarihine giriş, Afrika tarihinin sorunları ve modern Avrupa emperyalizmi gibi birçok disiplini içeren seminer, kurs ve eğitimler de düzenlenmiştir (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 9-10). 1961-62 yıllarında programın finansmanı Boston Üniversitesi bütçesi ve Ford Vakfı tarafından karşılanmıştır. Programın öncelikli hedeflerinden bir diğeri de Dışişleri Bakanlığı memurlarının eğitimi olmuştur. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, 1959 yılında Uluslararası İş Birliği İdaresi (USAID’in öncüsü) ile üç yıllık bir anlaşma yapılarak dört grup memur için 6-7 aylık eğitim programları



düzenlenmiştir. Ayrıca, Ford Vakfı lisansüstü bursları kapsamında 2.250 dolarlık mali destek ve öğrenim ücreti sağlamış, üniversitenin sunduğu ek katkılarla bu hibe desteklenmiştir (Boston University, 2025).

Kurulduğu ilk yıllarda olduğu gibi, Boston Üniversitesi Afrika Çalışmaları programı lisans ve yüksek lisans düzeyinde eğitim vermekte; ayrıca dil ve çeşitli alanlarda kurslar sunmaktadır. Programın öne çıkan yönlerinden biri, Amharca, Arapça, Hausa, Igbo, Swahili, Twi, Wolof, Xhosa ve Zulu gibi Afrika dilleri üzerine kapsamlı eğitim sunmasıdır (Boston University, 2025).

### 3.2 California Üniversitesi

Boston Üniversitesi'nden sonra açılan bir diğer Afrika Araştırma Merkezi, 1 Temmuz 1959'da Los Angeles'ta, California Üniversitesi bünyesinde Afrika Çalışmaları Merkezi olarak kurulmuştur. Merkez, öğrenci, akademisyen, eğitimci, politika yapıcı, girişimci, sanatçı ve aktivistleri bir araya getirmek amacıyla kurulmuş ve üç temel misyon üstlenmiştir: a) Afrikalı araştırmacıları teşvik etmek amacıyla burs programları düzenlemek b) kamu diplomasisi kapsamında girişimleri desteklemek, uluslararası konferanslar ve öğretmen yetiştirme atölyeleri organize etmek, görsel sanatlarla birlikte hizmet programları geliştirmek ve son olarak c) California Üniversitesinin öğrencileri ile Afrika'daki öğrencilerin akademik ve mesleki alanda zenginleşmesi için fırsatlar yaratmak (UCLA African Studies Center , 2022). Araştırma Merkezi, ilk açıldığı yıllarda antropoloji, coğrafya, ekonomi, tarih, siyaset bilimi, eğitim ve dilbilim olmak üzere yedi disiplinde doğrudan Afrika'ya odaklanan toplam yirmi üç ders (14 lisans ve 9 yüksek lisans) programını hayata geçirmiştir. Ek olarak, Afrika toplumlarının incelenmesi ve anlaşılmasıyla yakından ilişkili on altı dersi (9 lisans ve 7 yüksek lisans) müfredatına dahil etmiştir. Araştırma merkezinde Afrika'da yaygın olarak konuşulan üç Avrupa dili (Fransızca, İspanyolca, Portekizce) ve sekiz Afrika dili (Arapça, Bambara, Berber, Luganda, Svahili, Twi ve Zulu veya Xhosa) üzerine eğitim verilmiştir. Merkez, sosyal bilimler alanındaki akademisyenler arasında da iletişim ve iş birliğinin geliştirilebileceği bir alan sunmuştur (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 10-11). Üniversite Doğu, Batı ve Kuzey Afrika bölgelerine odaklanmakla birlikte, siyaset bilimi, antropoloji, tarih ve ekonomi alanlarında çalışmalar yürütmüştür (Brokensha, 1965, s. 4). Araştırma merkezinin kuruluş amacı göz önüne alındığında, merkezin faaliyetlerinde kamu diplomasisi ön planda tutulurken, Afrika'da sömürge sonrası dönemde eğitim reformlarıyla da doğrudan ilgilenmiştir.



### 3.3 Chicago Üniversitesi

Boston ve California Üniversiteleri gibi resmi bir araştırma merkezi olmasa da 1960 yılında Chicago Üniversitesi'nde sosyal bilimler alanında üç Afrikalı öğretim üyesi görev almıştır. Aynı dönemde, Afrika’daki devletlerin siyasi, sosyal, ekonomik ve idari gelişimini incelemek amacıyla “Yeni Ulusların Karşılaştırmalı Çalışmaları Komitesi” (Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations) kurulmuştur. Bu komite, yüksek lisans ve doktora öğrencilerine ders vermenin yanı sıra, doktora öğrencilerine saha çalışmaları için burs desteği sağlamıştır (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 11). Günümüzde Afrika Çalışmaları Komitesi (The Committee On African Studies) adıyla çalışmalarını sürdüren Chicago Üniversitesi hem lisans hem de lisansüstü düzeyde eğitim vermektedir. Bölüm Başkanı Jennifer Cole, Madagaskar, sosyal ve kültürel antropoloji, toplumsal cinsiyet, Hristiyanlık, Afrika’dan Avrupa’ya Göç vb. akademik alanlarda uzmanlıkları olmakla birlikte komitede 15 öğretim üyesi görev almaktadır. Bu öğretim üyeleri, Afrika tarihi, Afrika dilleri (Svahili), sömürge öncesi devletler, kölelik, arkeoloji, göç ve din sosyolojisi gibi alanlarda çalışmalar yürütmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, sömürge sonrası Afrika, Afrika’da insan hakları, arkeolojik alan çalışmaları, Arapça ve çeşitli Afrika dillerinde dersler vermektedir (African Studies at the University of Chicago, 2023).

### 3.4 Columbia Üniversitesi

Columbia Üniversitesi Afrika Araştırma Programı da Afrika halkları ve sorunları hakkında devletin bilgi sahibi olması için belirli sayıda yüksek nitelikli öğrenci yetiştirme amacıyla açılmıştır. Program doğrudan Sahra-altı Afrika’ya odaklanmıştır. Programın temel olarak amacı, öğrencileri Afrika’nın politik, sosyal ve ekonomik sorunlarıyla ilgili kariyer odaklı hazırlamaktır. Genel çerçevede program, ABD’nin dekolonizasyon süreci sonrasında yeni Afrika devletleriyle ilişkilerinde yaşanan diplomatik ve yönetsel sorunları çözmek için nitelikli insan kaynağı yetiştirmek amacıyla kurgulanmıştır. Afrika Araştırma Programı, ekonomi, tarih, siyaset bilimi, sanat tarihi ve arkeoloji, ekonomik coğrafya, müzik, hukuk ve sosyoloji bilim dallarında eğitim vermiştir. Bu bilim dallarında hangi konularda derslerin verildiğini irdelemek, Soğuk Savaş sürecinde ABD’nin hangi amaçla Afrika çalışmalarına ağırlık verdiğini de ortaya koyacaktır. 1961-62 öğretim yılında *Antropoloji’de*: Afrika’nın Dilleri, Dil Sorunları ve Sahra-Altı Afrika’nın Etnolojisi, *Sanat Tarihi’nde*: İlkel Halkların Sanatı, Sahra-Altı Afrika Sanatı ve Kongo Sanatı, *Ekonomi’de*: Afrika Ekonomik Sorunlarında Kolokyum, *Coğrafya’da*: Afrika’nın Bölgesel Ekonomisi, *Siyaset Bilimin’de*: Afrika’da Çağdaş Siyasi ve İdari Gelişme, *Tarih’te*: Modern Afrika’nın Tarihsel Arka Planı, *Hukuk’ta*: Afrika Hukukundaki Sorunlar, *Dilbilim’de*:

Karşılaştırmalı Afro-Asyatik Diller ve Svahili; *Müzik'te*: Etnik Müzik, *Sosyoloji'de* ise: Yeni Uluslarda Değişen Kurumlar derslerin yanı sıra; Fransızca, Portekizce ve Arapça dillerinde yazma ve konuşma dersleri de verilmiştir (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 11-12).

Columbia Üniversitesi'nde ilk olarak Afrika Araştırma Programı olarak kurulan merkez, daha sonra Afrika Çalışmaları Enstitüsü (Institute African Studies) adını almış ve günümüzde de Afrika'ya dair akademik çalışmalarını sürdürmektedir. Diğer üniversitelerde olduğu gibi Afrika Çalışmaları Enstitüsü de lisans ve lisansüstü düzeyde eğitim vermektedir. Program kapsamında; kalkınma, diplomasi, işletme, yönetim, sosyal hizmet, gazetecilik, hukuk, insan hakları alanlarında dersler sunulmakta, ayrıca Wolof, Arapça, Pulaar, Swahili, Zulu ve Yoruba dillerinde dil eğitimi verilmektedir. 2025 Bahar döneminde lisans ve lisansüstü dersler incelendiğinde: Swahili, Yoruba, Wolof ve Zulu gibi Afrika dillerinde başlangıçtan ileri seviyeye kadar dersler sunulmaktadır. Tarih ve kültür alanında: Afrika'nın sömürgecilik öncesi dönemi, dekolonizasyon süreci, Afrikalı kadınların tarih içindeki rolü ve diaspora çalışmaları üzerine dersler bulunmaktadır. Siyaset ve kalkınma alanında Soğuk Savaş bağlamında Afrika, Pan-Afrikanizm, küresel siyaset ve Afrika'da sosyal hareketler gibi konular ele alınmaktadır. Ekonomi ve iş dünyasında Afrika'nın kalkınma stratejileri, sürdürülebilir ekonomi modelleri ve küresel iş dünyasındaki konumu üzerine dersler sunulmaktadır. Sanat ve Performans alanında ise Afrika dansı, Afro-Küba dansı ve Afrika müziği gibi disiplinlerde kültürel üretimler ve performans sanatları incelenmektedir (Columbia University Institute of African Studies, 2025).

Program, Afrika'nın tarihsel ve çağdaş dinamiklerini kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alarak, bölgeyi akademik ve profesyonel bağlamda anlamak isteyen öğrencilere güçlü bir altyapı sunmaktadır. Özellikle dil eğitimi, siyasi analiz, kalkınma politikaları ve kültürel çalışmalar alanlarında derinlemesine bir bakış açısı geliştirmeye imkân tanımaktadır.

### 3.5 Duquesne Üniversitesi

Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD'de Afrika kıtasının tamamına odaklanan üniversite ve araştırma merkezleri bulunurken sadece bir bölge üzerine çalışmalarını yoğunlaştıran merkezlerde kurulmuştur. Örneğin Duquesne Üniversitesi'nde bulunan Afrika Çalışmaları Enstitüsü; coğrafya, antropoloji, siyaset bilimi, tarih ve ekonomi dallarında sadece Doğu Afrika'ya odaklanmıştır (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 12-13). Bunun yanı sıra, kıtasal veya bölgesel bir odaktan ziyade Afrika'daki belirli konular üzerine yoğunlaşan programlar da aynı dönemde oluşturulmuştur. Kennedy Misyon Okulu ve Hartford Semineri Vakfı Afrika Çalışmaları Programı'nda; Kırsal Kesimdeki Hristiyan Misyonu, Yabancı Topluluklarda Din Eğitimi, Kur'an ve İslam, Afrika'daki Müslüman bölgelerde Hristiyan Misyonu, Müslüman

bölgeler ve Modern Dünyada İslam alanlarında dersler verilmiş ve araştırmalar yürütülmüştür (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 13). 2025 yılı itibarıyla Duquesne Üniversitesi Afrika Araştırmaları Merkezi çalışmalarını aynı alanlarda sürdürmektedir.

### 3.6 Howard Üniversitesi

1959 yılında, Howard Üniversitesi'nin Afrika Çalışmaları Programı bünyesinde Afrika Dilleri ve Bölgesel Çalışmalar Merkezi kurulmuştur. Merkezde, Svahili ve Yoruba dillerinin yanı sıra Afrika tarihi üzerine kapsamlı bir akademik program geliştirilmiştir. Merkezde, Sahra Altı Afrika'ya odaklanan Erken Medeniyet Araştırmaları, 1500-1875 yılları arasındaki Afrika Tarihi, Afrika'da Kolonizasyon Tarihi ve 1919 sonrası Afrika Tarihi üzerine akademik çalışmalar gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu merkez de Ford Vakfı'nın desteğiyle faaliyet göstermiştir (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 13-14). Geçmişte Ford Vakfı tarafından desteklenen Afrika Çalışmaları Programı, günümüzde Afrika Araştırmaları Merkezi adıyla faaliyet göstermektedir. Merkez, Başlık IV Ulusal Kaynak Merkezi'nin desteğiyle çalışmalarını sürdürmekte, özellikle Doğu Afrika'da rotasyon programları, Svahili grup projeleri ve su yönetimi gibi alanlarda akademik çalışmalar ve projeler yürütmektedir. Diğer üniversitelerdeki benzer merkezlerde olduğu gibi, bu merkez de lisans ve lisansüstü düzeyde eğitim vermektedir. Ayrıca, Afrika dilleri üzerine derslerin yanı sıra tarih, siyaset bilimi, antropoloji, ekonomi, İngilizce, felsefe ve sanat tarihi alanlarında akademik programlar sunmaktadır (Howard University Center For African Studies, 2025).

1958 tarihli Ulusal Savunma Eğitimi Yasası, bölgesel çalışmalar kapsamında Afrika dillerinin öğretilmesine öncelik tanımıştır. Bu doğrultuda, Columbia, California, Duquesne ve Howard üniversiteleri, Amerikan hükümeti tarafından 1964-1965 yılları arasında Afrika Çalışmaları merkezi olarak belirlenmiştir (Ferreira, 2010, s. 76).

### 3.7 Massachusetts Teknoloji Enstitüsü

1951 yılında kurulan Massachusetts Teknoloji Enstitüsü Uluslararası Çalışmalar Merkezi'nde, Afrika'nın ekonomik ve politik kalkınması üzerine çeşitli araştırmalar yapılmıştır. Bu merkezin diğer merkezlerden ayrılan yönü, bölge araştırmaları kapsamında beş araştırmacıdan oluşan bir saha ekibinin 1959 yılında Kongo ve Nijerya'da araştırmalar yürütmesidir. Araştırmacıların başlıca çalışma konuları, Kongo'nun ekonomik büyümesi, Kongolu siyasi partiler, Nijerya'daki yabancı yatırımlar ve Nijerya siyasetinin ekonomik kalkınmayla ilişkisi olmuştur (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 15). Massachusetts Teknoloji Enstitüsü ve Northwestern Üniversitesi'nde olduğu gibi, yukarıda belirtilen

Columbia Üniversitesi'nde de Kongo üzerine kapsamlı bir ders içeriği bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca, programda yer alan öğretim üyeleri ve yüksek lisans öğrencileri, 1961-62 yıllarında saha araştırması yapmak üzere Nijerya ve Madagaskar'a gitmiştir (African Studies Association, 1961, s. 18). Massachusetts Teknoloji Enstitüsü ve Northwestern Üniversitesi'nde olduğu gibi, yukarıda belirtilen Columbia Üniversitesi'nde de Kongo üzerine kapsamlı bir ders içeriği bulunmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, Nijerya'ya da iki farklı üniversiteden saha araştırması yapmak üzere heyetler gönderilmiştir. Nijerya'nın, dünyada petrol üreten ülkeler arasında üst sıralarda yer alması, nüfusunun görece yüksek olması ve Sahra Altı Afrika'daki stratejik konumu, ABD için bu ülkeyle ilişkilerin geliştirilmesini önemli hale getirmiştir. Bu nedenle, akademik düzeyde bilgi üretilmesi amacıyla Nijerya araştırmaları için seçilmiştir. Nitekim ABD, Nijerya'nın 1960 yılında Birleşik Krallık'tan bağımsızlığını kazanmasıyla birlikte bu ülkeyle diplomatik ilişkiler kurmuştur (U.S. Department Of State, 2025). Bu durum bir kez daha göstermektedir ki, Soğuk Savaş sürecinde ABD üniversitelerindeki akademik çalışmalar, politik karar alıcılar için kritik bir husus olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

### 3.8 Stanford Üniversitesi

Soğuk Savaş dönemi sırasında başka bir spesifik çalışma yürüten kurum da Stanford Üniversitesi Gıda Araştırma Enstitüsü Afrika Programı'dır. Program, Sahra-altı Afrika'daki gıda, tarım ve ekonomik kalkınmanın farklı yönleriyle ilgilenmektedir. Bu araştırma enstitüsünün önemli özelliklerinden biri, kütüphanesinde ekonomi, tarım ve beslenme alanlarında Sahra-altı Afrika'ya dair geniş bir materyal koleksiyonu bulundurmasıdır. Kütüphanede, 46 Afrika bölgesine ait genel istatistik yıllıkları ve bültenler, 36 ülkenin dış ticaret raporları ile 17 bölgenin tarım raporları ve istatistikleri bulunmaktadır. Enstitü, diğer üniversitelerde olduğu gibi, 1953-1958 yılları arasında New York Carnegie Corporation'dan, 1959-1960 yıllarında ise Ford Vakfı'ndan aldığı hibelerle Sahra-altı Afrika'da gıda, tarım ve ekonomik kalkınma sorunlarına ilişkin araştırmaların devamlılığını sağlamıştır (Duignan, 1960, s. 11-12).

Eskiden Stanford Üniversitesi'nde Gıda Araştırma Enstitüsü bünyesinde yürütülen Afrika Programı, bugün daha kapsamlı bir şekilde Afrika Çalışmaları Küresel Araştırmalar Merkezi adıyla faaliyetlerini sürdürmektedir. Merkezin direktörü Joel Cabrita, Eswatini ve Güney Afrika odaklı çalışmalar yürütmekte olup, tarih bölümünde yardımcı doçent olarak görev yapmaktadır. Merkez müdür yardımcısı Laura Hubbard ise Zambiya, Zimbabve ve Güney Afrika üzerinde çalışmalar yürütmektedir. Merkez, Güney Afrika'da öğrencilere dil

eğitimi ve Afrika çalışmaları kursları sunmaktadır (Stanford University Center For African Studies, 2025).

#### 4. Genel Değerlendirme ve Analiz

İncelenen sekiz üniversitede görüldüğü üzere üniversitelerde birçok disiplin kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Bu disiplinler arasında, özellikle tarih çalışmalarının Afrika Çalışmaları içerisinde nasıl gelişip kurumsallaştığının incelenmesi önemlidir. Tarih disiplini, diğer disiplinlerin bir üst çatısı niteliğinde olup, diğer disiplinlerin gelişimi tarih disiplinine doğrudan bağlı olduğu için ABD’de Afrika Çalışmaları içerisinde tarih çalışmalarının dönemsel durumunu tespit etmek önemlidir. 1950’lerin ortalarına kadar Afrika tarihi, ABD üniversitelerinin hiçbirisi tarafından çalışılmamış ve dönemin profesörlerinin hiçbirisi, üniversitelere Sahra-altı Afrika tarihçisi olarak atanamamıştır. Amerikalı yayıncılar ise Afrika tarihi ile ilgili çok az sayıda makale veya kitap yayımlamıştır. Bu duruma bağlı olarak, aynı dönemde Afrika tarihi kapsamında birkaç girişim de olmuştur. Howard Üniversitesi’nde Sahra-altı Afrika tarihi üzerine köklü kurslar açılmış, ancak Amerikan tarihi çalışmalarında Afrika tarihi çalışmalarına çok az önem verilmiştir. Örneğin, William L. Hansberry sömürge dönemi öncesi Afrika tarihi üzerine ders verirken görev süresi uzatılmamış ve fakülteden çıkarılmıştır. Bahsedilen durumlar, esasen ABD’de Afrika tarihini bir öğretim veya araştırma alanı olarak açmaya yetkin akademisyenlerin eksikliğinden kaynaklanmıştır. Bu eksiklik, başlangıçta Avrupa veya Güney Afrika’daki üniversitelerden ya da araştırma enstitülerinden görevli öğretim üyelerinin ABD’ye getirilmesiyle karşılanmıştır. Daha sonra, çalışmada bahsedildiği üzere Amerikalı öğrenciler, vakıflardan ve federal hükümetten aldıkları desteklerle Afrika tarihini incelemeye teşvik edilmiştir.

Bu noktada Ford Vakfı, diğer vakıflar arasında kaynak ayırma noktasında öne çıkmıştır. Vakıf, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında itibaren Amerikan yükseköğretiminde bölge çalışmalarının gelişmesine ve desteklenmesine önemli katkılar sağlamış ve ABD’de bölge uzmanlığının önemini kabul eden ilk büyük kurumlar arasında yer almıştır. Ek olarak, dünya çapında eğitim, araştırma ve savunuculuk alanlarında destek sağlamak amacıyla çeşitli ülkelerde Ford ofisleri açmıştır (University of Michigan, 1996). Ford Vakfı, Asya ve Yakın Doğu Çalışmalarına 1952 yılında kaynak ayırmaya başlarken, Afrika Çalışmalarına 1954 yılında fon desteği sağlamıştır. Ford Vakfı’nın Afrika çalışmalarına yönelik ilgisinin ardında ise dönemin siyasi ve ekonomik koşulları belirleyici olmuştur. Ford Vakfı’nın dönem başkanı Rowan Gaither, 1954 yılında Vakfın Yıllık Raporu’nda Afrika çalışmalarına yönelmelerinin nedenlerini açıkça ortaya koymaktadır. Başkan Rowan Gaither’in:

*"Tarihin bu döneminde (1954) insan refahına yönelik herhangi bir program, ülkemizin dünya işlerine artan katılımı ve yeni uluslararası liderlik sorumluluklarımız, savaşların ve komünizmin yarattığı insani ilerleme umuduna yönelik ölümcül tehditle ilgilenmelidir. Demokrasinin, savaştan kaçınma ve barışı teşvik etme sorunlarına başarılı bir şekilde yanıt vermesi için, daha fazla insanın erişebileceği ve paylaşabileceği yabancı alanlar (bölgeler) hakkında daha fazla bilgi gereklidir"* (Sutton & Smock, 1976, s. 68) ön sözü, ABD'nin genel olarak bölge çalışmalarına, özel olarak ise Afrika Çalışmalarına hangi amaçla yöneldiğini açıkça ortaya koymaktadır.

ABD'de bulunan vakıf, enstitü veya üniversiteler ilk olarak Sahra-altı Afrika'yı incelemek üzere bir hibe programı geliştirilmiş ve Altın Sahili (Gold Coast) olarak bilinen bugünkü Gana topraklarının bulunduğu bölgeyi 1954 yıllarında incelemiştir. 1966 yılına gelindiğinde, 41 Amerikalı ve Kanadalı uzmana (öğretim üyesi, araştırmacı vb.) Sahra-altı Afrika tarihi çalışması için burs verilmiştir (Thompson, 1967, s. 51-53). 1950'lere kadar Afrika tarihi üzerine çalışan veya uzmanlaşan bir kurum veya kişi bulunmazken, verilen hibeler sonrası Afrika tarihine yönelik çalışmalarda artış gözlemlenmiştir. 1959 yılında Amerikan Tarih Derneği tarafından yapılan araştırmaya göre, ABD'deki seçkin üniversitelerde (Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Columbia vb.) tarih alanında yüksek lisans ve doktora düzeyinde 1735 öğrencinin Afrika tarihi veya Afrika üzerine çalışmalar yürüttüğü belirtilmiştir. 1959'dan önceki yıllar da göz önüne alındığında, toplamda 31 Amerikan kurumunun Afrika üzerine çeşitli akademik çalışmalar yaptığı tespit edilmiştir. 1996 yılına gelindiğinde, sadece tarih değil; antropoloji, sosyoloji ve siyaset bilimi gibi alanlar da dahil olmak üzere yaklaşık bin doktora öğrencisi ABD'de Afrika üzerine akademik çalışmalar yürütmeye başlamıştır. 1951-1960 yılları arasında yalnızca 49 doktora tezi Afrika üzerine yazılmışken, 2000-2001 yıllarında bu sayı 529'a yükselmiştir. Ayrıca, Afrika Çalışmaları merkezlerinin sayısı 2002 yılında yetmişin üzerine çıkmıştır (Ferreira, 2010, s. 72).

Ford Vakfı ve Carnegie Corporation of New York'un yanı sıra, 1960'ların ortalarından 1990'lara kadar ABD'li akademisyenlerin birçoğu, Afrika Çalışmaları kapsamında eğitimlerini Ulusal Savunma Eğitim Yasası VI (Title VI) fonlarıyla desteklenen ABD kurumlarında almıştır. Tablo 1'de görüldüğü üzere Başlık VI Merkezleri tarafında fonlanan tezlerde en çok çalışılan disiplinler %50 ile Güzel Sanatlar ve Dil programı olmuş, bu disiplinleri; iletişim, tarih ve edebiyat takip etmiştir. Aynı dönem içerisinde ise Afrika yazarların en çok çalıştığı disiplin %76 ile iletişim olmuştur. Nitekim, farklı alanlarda ise Afrikalı araştırmacıların katkı oranı dikkat çekici biçimde düşüktür. Örneğin, Güzel Sanatlar alanında Title VI merkezlerinin katkısı %50 iken, Afrikalı yazar oranı yalnızca %23'tür. Benzer biçimde, Antropoloji (%24), Coğrafya (%16) ve Tarih (%27) gibi disiplinlerde de temsil düzeyi oldukça sınırlıdır. Bu durum, Afrika'yı



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konu alan bilgi üretiminin önemli ölçüde kıta dışından, genellikle Batılı araştırmacılar tarafından gerçekleştirildiğini göstermektedir.

Öte yandan, bazı disiplinlerde daha farklı bir tablo dikkat çekmektedir. İletişim alanında %49’luk Title VI katkısına karşılık Afrikalı yazar oranı %76 gibi yüksek bir düzeydedir. Bu durum, belirli disiplinlerde kurumsal yapılar ile Afrikalı araştırmacılar arasında daha eşitlikçi ve kapsayıcı bir üretim ilişkisinin kurulabildiğini göstermektedir. Benzer şekilde, Tarım (%62), Ekonomi (%57), Dil (%52) gibi daha uygulamalı ve yerel bilgiyle iç içe geçmiş alanlarda Afrikalı akademisyenlerin üretimdeki rolü daha baskındır. Bu bulgu, Afrika’nın içsel bilgi kaynaklarının özellikle toplumsal ihtiyaçlara yönelik disiplinlerde daha görünür hale gelebildiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Disiplin	Başlık VI Merkezleri (%)	Afrikalı Yazarların (%)
Tarım	26	62
Antropoloji	28	24
İletişim	49	76
Ekonomi	26	57
Güzel Sanatlar	50	23
Coğrafya	19	16
Tarih	47	27
Dil	50	52
Edebiyat	38	49
Felsefe-Din	9	33
Planlama	23	64
Siyaset Bilimi	26	40
Mühendislik – Çevre Çalışmaları	26	40
Sosyoloji	18	44

**Tablo 1:** 1995 Yılına Kadar Title VI Merkezlerinde Afrika Alanında Üretilen Tezlerin Disiplinlere Göre Yüzdesi ve Bu Disiplinlerin Afrikalı Yazarlar Tarafından Yazılanlarının Yüzdesi, (McCann, 2002, s. 33).



Yıl	Yıllık Ortalama Tez Üretimi
1951 – 1960	49
1961 – 1965	105
1966 – 1971	208
1972 – 1978	245
1979 – 1983	370
1984 – 1986	440
1987 – 1993	449
1994 – 1996	602
1997 – 1999	829
2000 – 2001	529

**Tablo 2:** Afrika Çalışmalarında Yıllık Ortalama Tez Üretimi, 1951-2001,  
(McCann, 2002, s. 33).

Tablo 2’de görüldüğü üzere, 1999 yılına kadar Afrika alanında yazılan tez sayısında düzenli bir artış gözlemlenmektedir. Bu durum, Afrika Çalışmalarının akademisyenler tarafından desteklendiğini ve lisansüstü öğrencilerin bu alana duyduğu ilginin arttığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca, Afrika Çalışmalarının ABD’de yıllar içinde giderek daha fazla akademik ilgi gördüğünü de ortaya koymaktadır. Tablodaki veriler doğrultusunda, öğrencilerin Afrika alanında hangi konulara odaklandığını da incelemek, ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının zaman içindeki gelişimini anlamak açısından önem arz etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, örnek olarak Howard Üniversitesi’nde 1968’e kadar ve California Üniversitesi’nde 1969 yılına kadar kabul edilen Afrika ile ilgili tezler detaylı olarak incelenmiştir.

Howard Üniversitesi, Afrika kıtasına yönelik akademik üretimiyle dikkat çeken köklü kurumlardan biridir. Üniversitede yapılan çalışmalar, Afrika’nın siyasal, tarihsel, ekonomik ve kültürel boyutlarını disiplinler arası bir yaklaşımla ele almaktadır. Siyaset bilimi alanında “Pan-Afrikalıların Evrimi”, “Afrika için Amerikan Dış Politikasının Evrimi, Özü ve Sorunları, 1945-1961”, “Afrika Hükümetinde Tek Parti Sistemi” ve “Afrika Birliği” gibi çalışmalar, kıtanın modern siyasal yapılarla ilişkisini ve dış politika dinamiklerini incelemektedir. Tarih disiplini kapsamında ise “Afrika Monogenezi Üzerine Son Bilimsel Düşüncenin Tarihi”, “Modern Pan-Afrikacılık, 1945-1962” ve “Hapis ve Siyasi Liderler: Afrika Deneyimi – Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Banda” başlıklı tezler, Afrika’nın entelektüel ve liderlik tarihine ışık tutmaktadır. Sanat alanında “Afrika Sanatı Müzesi’ne Programlanmış Maruz Kalma Yoluyla Afrika’daki Tutum Değişikliğinin Ölçülmesi” başlıklı çalışma kültürel temsil ve algı konularını merkezine alırken, sosyolojide “Howard Üniversitesi’ndeki Eve Dönmek İsteyen veya Dönmek İstemeyen

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Afrikalı ve Jamaikalı Öğrencilerin Özellikleri” başlıklı araştırma diaspora deneyimini ve aidiyet meselelerini tartışmaktadır. Ekonomi disiplini de “Avrupa Ortak Pazarı ve Afrika’nın Az Gelişmiş Bölgeleriyle Bağlantılı Sorunlar” ile “Afrika ve Kapitalizmin Yükselişi” gibi çalışmalarla Afrika’nın küresel ekonomiyle ilişkilerini sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışmalar, Howard Üniversitesi’nin Afrika çalışmalarında hem kurucu bir rol oynadığını hem de farklı disiplinlerde kıtaya yönelik çok yönlü ve derinlikli analizler geliştirdiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Howard Üniversitesi’nde yukarıda bahsi geçen ana konular çalışılırken; Mısır, Kongo Demokratik Cumhuriyeti, Etiyopya, Gabon, Gana, Gine, Kenya, Liberya, Libya, Malavi, Fas, Nijerya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali, Güney Afrika, Sudan, Tanzanya ve Uganda gibi ülkeler üzerine de ayrıca yoğunlaşmıştır. Bu ülkeler arasında özellikle Gana, Kenya ve Nijerya üzerine, belirtilen tarihler arasında çok sayıda tez çalışması yapılmıştır. Sadece Nijerya özelinde, 1969 yılına kadar Howard Üniversitesi’nde 32 tez çalışması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, ülkeler yerine Doğu Afrika, Afrika Boynuzu ve Batı Afrika gibi bölgelere odaklanan tez çalışmaları da yürütülmüştür (Garlick, 1968, s. 259-268). Howard Üniversitesi örneğinden şu yorumlar çıkarılabilmektedir; a) ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının kurumsallaşmaya başladığı 1950’lerin başlarından 1968’e kadar geçen kısa sürede, yüksek lisans ve doktora düzeyinde çeşitli disiplinlerde tezler üretildiği, b) Çalışmaların özellikle bazı alanlara (örneğin, siyaset bilimi), bölgelere (Batı Afrika, Doğu Afrika ve Afrika Boynuzu) ve ülkelere (Gana, Kenya ve Nijerya) yoğunlaştığı görülmektedir. Bu durum, 18 yıllık süre içinde Afrika Çalışmaları alanında derinlemesine uzmanlık çalışmalarının yürütüldüğünü göstermektedir. Kısa süre içinde bir üniversitede kapsamlı lisansüstü tez çalışmalarının gerçekleştirilmesi, ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının hızla geliştiğine işaret etmektedir. Ancak, bu çalışmaların bazı vakıflar, dernekler veya hükümet fonları tarafından desteklendiği gerçeği de göz ardı edilmemelidir.

Berkeley’deki California Üniversitesi ise Afrika çalışmalarında özellikle Sahra-altı Afrika’ya odaklanan tezlerle öne çıkmaktadır. Üniversitede yürütülen yüksek lisans ve doktora araştırmaları, kıtanın siyasal, ekonomik, tarihsel ve toplumsal yönlerini derinlemesine incelemektedir. Siyaset bilimi alanında “Pan-Afrika Hareketi: Yirminci Yüzyılda Örgüt ve Toplum Arayışı”, “Afrikalı Liderlerin Siyasi Kavramları” ve “Fransız-Afrika Topluluğu” başlıklı tezler, Afrika’nın siyasal örgütlenme biçimlerini ve Fransa ile olan sömürge sonrası ilişkilerini ele almaktadır. Ekonomi disiplini de “Sahra-altı Afrika’ya Atıfta Bulunarak Kalkınma ve Ekonomik Kalkınma” çalışması, bölgenin kalkınma süreçlerini değerlendirmektedir. Sosyoloji alanında yapılan “Doğu ve Batı Afrika’da Etnik İşgücü Ayrımı” tezi, etnisite ve ekonomik yapılar arasındaki ilişkileri irdelemektedir. Tarih disiplini kapsamında

“Portekizliler ve Doğuya Giden Ticaret Yolları” adlı tez, Afrika’nın erken dönem dış ticaret bağlantılarını analiz etmektedir. Antropoloji alanındaki “Batı Afrika Kabileleri: Senegal’den Angola’ya” başlıklı araştırma, bölgesel kültürel çeşitliliğe ışık tutarken, uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini ise “Afrika’nın Dünya Siyasetindeki Yeni Rolü” adlı çalışmayla kıtanın küresel siyasal düzende artan önemini değerlendirmektedir. Bu tezler, California Üniversitesi’nin Afrika çalışmalarına disiplinler arası ve bölgesel odaklı bir katkı sunduğunu göstermektedir.

Her iki üniversite, Afrika Çalışmaları alanında kurumsallaşma açısından gelişim göstermiş ve her biri belirli ülkelere odaklanmıştır. Odaklanılan ülkeler göz önüne alındığında, neden bu ülkelerin seçildiğine dair birkaç güçlü ihtimal öne çıkmaktadır. İlk olarak, Soğuk Savaş sürecinde ABD ile SSCB arasında bu ülkeler veya bölgeler üzerinde bir rekabet söz konusu olmuştur. İkinci olarak, çalışılan ülkelerin bazıları -örneğin Nijerya- petrol açısından oldukça zengin olduğundan, ABD bu ülkeler üzerinde daha etkili bir politika geliştirmek amacıyla akademik düzeyde bilgi ihtiyacını karşılamayı hedeflemiştir. Bahsi geçen tüm bu hususlar üzerine, Güney Afrikalı antropolog Prof. David W. Brokensha’da aynı dönemde kurulan Afrika Çalışmaları programları için bazı tespitlerde bulunmuş ve mevcut durumu özetlemiştir. Brokensha, ilk olarak Afrika Çalışmaları programlarının bir merkez veya komite biçiminde kurulduğunu belirtmiş ve bu durumun, farklı disiplinlerdeki kişileri bir araya getirmek için idari bir araç olarak kullanıldığını ifade etmiştir. Kurulan fakültelerin temel olarak siyaset bilimi, tarih, antropoloji, ekonomi, coğrafya ve sosyoloji disiplinlerinden oluştuğunu vurgulamıştır. Brokensha aşağıda yer alan tespitlerde de bulunmuştur:

a) Çoğu üniversitede, Sahra-altı Afrika’nın Hükümeti ve Siyaseti, Ekonomik Antropolojideki Sorunlar, Doğu Afrika Halkları ve Batı Afrika Tarihi gibi dersler verilmiştir. b) Belirli bir disiplinde ve bölgede uzmanlaşmış birçok program kurulmuş, çoğu program ise sosyal bilimler alanında lisansüstü seviyede yer almıştır. c) Bazı üniversitelerde ise Afrika Çalışmalarına yönelik özel bir derece veya sertifika programları geliştirilmiştir. d) Çoğunlukla yeterli olmak üzere az sayıda belirli konularda uzmanlaşmış kütüphaneler kurulmuştur. e) Programlarda öğretim üyeleri ve öğrenciler için disiplinler arası seminerler düzenlenmiştir. f) Başarılı öğrencilere burslar verilmiş, Afrikalı öğrencilerin sayısı ise artmıştır. Bazı üniversitelerde ise Afrika’nın yerel düzeyinde eğitimler verilmiştir (Dressel, 1966, s. 70-71).

Bahsi geçen değerlendirmelere katkı olarak, ekte yer alan Tablo 3’te görüldüğü üzere 1968-1969 akademik yılına gelindiğinde birçok üniversite Afrika Çalışmaları alanında kısa sürede önemli bir mesafe kat etmiştir. Yaklaşık 20 yıl içinde, üniversiteler sistemli bir şekilde çalışmış ve bazıları belirli bölgelerde uzmanlaşırken, diğerleri Afrika kıtasının tamamına yönelik

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çalışmalar yürütmüştür. Bu tabloda dikkat çeken bir diğer nokta ise üniversitelerin, dil eğitimi konusunda Afrika’nın yerel dillerine ağırlık vermiş olmalarıdır. Bölgelere odaklanan üniversiteler, programlarına yerel dillerin yanı sıra sömürgeci devletlerin resmi dillerini de dahil etmişlerdir. ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının kurumsallaşma süreci, Afrika kıtasındaki ülkelerin dekolonizasyon süreçleriyle paralel olarak ilerlediğinden, sömürgeci devletlerin dilleri de öğretilmiştir. Benzer şekilde Tablo 3’te, üniversitelerin odaklandığı bölgeler, verdikleri dil eğitimleri, uzmanlaşmış öğrenci sayısı ve hangi disiplinlerde eğitim verdikleri önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, Derya Göçer “21. Yüzyıl Bölge Çalışmaları: Üç Yaklaşım” başlıklı makalesinde çalışılan disiplinleri bölge çalışmaları ekseninde şu şekilde yorumlamaktadır:

*“Bölge çalışmaları her zaman bir “yer” bilgisinin peşindedir. Örneğin, otoriter rejimleri, siyaset bilimi yerine bölge çalışmaları alanında çalışmanın nedeni, bölge çalışmalarının bir bölgede otoriterliği, coğrafi, tarihsel ve kültürel bağlamı içinde bütüncül bir şekilde anlamaya çalışmasıdır, ...amaç öncelikle Ortadoğu’daki otoriterliği anlamaktır”* (Göçer, 2022, s. 362).

Tablo 3’te yer alan disiplinler de öncelikle Afrika kıtası içerisinde değerlendirilmektedir. Örnek olarak, Göçer’in de belirttiği gibi, Boston Üniversitesi Kuzey Afrika Çalışmalarında Siyaset Bilimi disiplini kapsamında bir program yürütüyorsa, bu programın öncelikli amacı Kuzey Afrika devletlerinde siyaset biliminin incelenmesidir. Bu husus, Soğuk Savaş süreci, ABD’nin bölge çalışmalarına jeo-stratejik bakışı ve Burawoy’un bilgi üretim kategorileri açısından değerlendirildiğinde<sup>1</sup>, ABD üniversitelerinde Afrika Çalışmaları kapsamında üretilen bilgi, araçsal ve akademi dışı bir bilgi olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır (Burawoy, 2007, s. 140). Daha açık bir ifadeyle, Kuzey Afrika’daki hükümet sistemleri veya Kuzey Afrika devletlerinin dış politikaları çalışılırken, amaç, siyaset yapıcılara bilgi üretmektir. Bu yıllarda, Amerika’daki üniversitelerdeki akademisyenler, politikacıların uygulayacağı stratejilerin doğru hedefe ulaşması için politikaların uygulanabilirliğini ve verimliliğini artırma doğrultusunda bilgi üretmişlerdir. Ana akım bölge çalışmalarında üretilen bilgiler, çoğunlukla siyasi karar alma mekanizmalarının ihtiyaç duyduğu bilgiyi ürettiği için (Göçer, 2022, s. 367), -bu çalışmanın incelemiş olduğu yıllar baz alınır- ABD üniversitelerinde Afrika Çalışmaları, ana akım bölge çalışmaları kapsamına girmektedir.

Bahsi geçen değerlendirmelerin yanı sıra, ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının kurumsallaşma süreci içerisinde birçok üniversite, fon desteği aldığı için belirli temel sorunlarla da

<sup>1</sup> Burawoy bilgi üretim kategorilerini dörde ayırmıştır. Bu bilgiler; profesyonel, eleştirel, siyasa ve kamu/müşterektir. Profesyonel bilgi; diğer bilim insanları için üretilen bilgi, eleştirel bilgi; mevcut bilgileri dönüştürmek için üretilen bilgi, siyasa bilgi; siyasi yapıcılar için üretilen bilgi olmakla birlikte kamu/müşterek ise kamuyu bilgilendirmek için üretilen bilgidir (Burawoy, 2007, s. 140-141).

karşılaşmıştır. Öncelikle, ABD'nin Afrika Çalışmalarını yalnızca Soğuk Savaş stratejisi bağlamında desteklemesi, Amerikan akademisinde ciddi tartışmalara yol açmıştır (Ferreira, 2010, s. 76). Bu durumu destekler nitelikte, 1962 yılında ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın raporunda, Afrika'nın *"Çin-Sovyet bloğu ile komünist olmayan dünya arasındaki rekabette manevralara açık en büyük alan"* olduğu belirtilmiştir (Ferreira, 2010, s. 75). Raporda yer alan bu ifadeler, ABD'nin bölge çalışmalarını siyasi yapıcılara bilgi üretme amacıyla odaklandığını göstermektedir. Diğer yandan, ABD üniversitelerinde bölge çalışmaları kapsamında Afrika Çalışmalarının gelişimi için insan kaynağının hangi niteliklere sahip olması gerektiğine dair belirli kurallar oluşturulmamıştır. ABD'de bölge çalışmaları geliştirme programları da aynı dönemde belirli kuruluşlar tarafından desteklendiği için finansman rekabeti içinde kalmıştır. Bu sebeple üniversiteler, öğrencileri çekmek ve finansman rekabeti içinde öne çıkmak amacıyla dünya genelinde, özellikle Belçika ve İngiltere'den gelen çalışmalarıyla ünlü akademisyenleri işe almak istemiş, birçok merkez ve program kurulmuş ve çok sayıda doktora öğrencisine burs verilmiştir.

Bölge çalışmalarındaki bu politik hamleler, üniversitelerdeki fakültelerin değerini bir öğretim üyesinin yıllık maaşına düşürmüştür. Bu sebeple, politik hamleler için kurulan fakültelerde teori çalışmaları, bazı yerlerde çok az, bazı yerlerde ise hiç gelişmemiştir. Ancak, 1960'larda bazı doktora öğrencileri, siyasi düzeyde ideoloji içeren ve ABD'nin küresel çıkarları için üretilen bilgiden rahatsız olduklarını belirtmiş ve teori alanında çalışmalar yapmışlardır (Jewsiewicki, 2007, s. 132-133). Öte yandan, ABD'de Afrika Çalışmalarına yönelik en büyük ve en etkili kuruluş olan Afrika Çalışmaları Derneği'nin (African Studies Association) yönetim süreçlerinde çoğunluğu beyaz akademisyenlerden oluşan bir kadro görev alırken, 1960'larda derneğin karar alma mekanizmasında yalnızca bir siyah araştırmacı yer alabilmiştir. Ayrıca, yıl içinde düzenlenen konferansların süreçleri beyaz akademisyenler tarafından yönetilmiş ve Afrika ile ilgili çalışmalar, Afrika tarihi dışarıda tutularak, siyaset bilimi ve antropoloji alanlarında gelişmiştir. Aynı dönemde kıta genelindeki politik olaylara ise ortak bir tavır alınmaması, ABD'de Afrika Çalışmalarının kurumsallaşma süreçlerine yönelik ciddi eleştirilerin yükselmesine yol açmıştır (Tepeciklioğlu, 2019, s. 130).

ABD'de Afrika Çalışmalarının kurumsallaşma süreci Soğuk Savaş dönemine denk geldiği için, ABD'nin bölge çalışmalarını bahsi geçen bağlamda değerlendirmesi makul karşılanmaktadır. Ayrıca, genel olarak bölge çalışmaları ve özelde Afrika Çalışmaları, ABD'de belirli vakıf, dernek veya kuruluşlar tarafından bir amaç doğrultusunda desteklendiği için, üretilen bilgi çoğunlukla ABD'nin Afrika'daki çıkarlarıyla bağlantılı olmuştur. Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi, ABD üniversitelerindeki tartışmaların bir kısmı, üretilen bilgilerin yalnızca

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siyasi yapıcılar için kullanılması yönündedir. ABD üniversitesindeki bu eleştiriler, temelde akademinin siyasetten bağımsız olamayışına yöneliktir.

**Sonuç**

ABD’de Afrika Çalışmalarının gelişimi, 1960’lardaki Amerikan dış politikası, uluslararası jeopolitik ve siyasi koşullar, Afrika’nın dekolonizasyon sonrası sömürgeleşmesi ve Soğuk Savaş’tan etkilenmiştir. Bu çalışmaların iç dinamiği, güçlü disiplinlerarası içeriklerle ve uzun süreli saha çalışmaları sonucunda ivme kazanmıştır. ABD’de bölge çalışmaları modeli, Afrika Çalışmalarını belirli alanlarda başarıya ulaştırmış, ABD üniversitelerinin müfredatlarını küreselleştirmiş ve özellikle tarih bölümlerini uluslararasılaştırmıştır. Afrika Çalışmaları ilerleyen dönemlerde Amerikan akademisi için hayati bir konuma gelmiştir. Bu önemin kanıtı olarak, ilerleyen yıllarda ABD’de tarih alanında Afrika’da uzmanlaşmış en az iki öğretim üyesi olmayan bölüm kalmamıştır (Ferreira, 2010, s. 82). Çalışmada görüldüğü üzere, ABD, Soğuk Savaş sürecinde Afrika Çalışmalarına akademik düzeyde ağırlık vermiştir. Bu karar, Marksist ve Komünist yazıların etkisini aşma amacı gütmüş, Ford Vakfı gibi Amerikalı fon sağlayıcıları aracılığıyla, küresel komünizme karşı mücadele nedeniyle bu alanda finansal destek sağlanmıştır (Msindo, 2020, s. 8). ABD, küresel komünizmin etkisini kırmak amacıyla, akademinin ürettiği bilgiye büyük bir ihtiyaç duymuş ve Afrika Çalışmalarını yüksek miktarda fonla desteklemiştir. Bu duruma farklı bir açıdan bakıldığında, Afrika çalışmalarının kurumsallaşmasının büyük ölçüde dış kaynaklara dayanması, alanın sürdürülebilirliğini kırılgan hâle getirmiş; finansman kaynaklarında yaşanacak herhangi bir değişiklik ya da kesinti, kurumsal yapıların devamlılığını tehdit eder duruma getirmiştir.

Çalışmada yer alan ve incelenen üniversitelerdeki Afrika araştırma programları göz önüne alındığında, ABD, Batı Avrupa dışındaki bölgelere siyasal ve ekonomik alanlarda önemli miktarda kaynak ayırmış olsa da antropoloji, tarih, sosyoloji, edebiyat gibi alanlara yeterince kaynak ayırmamıştır (Anderson, 2019, s. 40). Bu durumun nedeni ise, ABD’nin bölgelere dış politika çıkarları doğrultusunda yaklaşması ve ihtiyaç duyduğu bilginin öncelikle siyasal ve ekonomik alanda gelişmesidir. Bu, Afrika Çalışmalarında antropoloji, tarih veya sosyoloji disiplinlerinin gelişmediği anlamına gelmemektedir. Birçok üniversite, özellikle Afrika tarihi ve edebiyatı üzerine çalışmalar gerçekleştirmiştir. Bahsi geçen çalışmaların yanı sıra Soğuk Savaş süreci içerisinde gelişen dinamikler ABD’nin bölge çalışmalarına doğrudan etki ettiği için ABD, güvenlik kaygıları nedeniyle Doğu Avrupa ve Ortadoğu gibi jeopolitik önemi bulunan bölgelere bir süre daha ağırlık vermiş ve Afrika Çalışmalarının bir dönem ikincil plana düştüğü de olmuştur (Schraeder, 1994, s. 5). Ek olarak disiplinlere göre Afrikalı yazarların temsil



oranlarına bakıldığında da antropoloji, tarih ve güzel sanatlar gibi Afrika'nın kültürel ve tarihi belleğiyle doğrudan ilişkili alanlarda Afrikalı akademisyenlerin oldukça düşük oranda yer aldığı görülmektedir. Bu durum, belirli disiplinlerde bilginin ne tür sorularla üretileceğinin ideolojik olarak yönlendirildiğini düşündürmektedir.

Genel olarak bakıldığında, ABD ana akım bölge çalışmaları kapsamında Afrika Çalışmalarına odaklanmış ve üniversiteler bu doğrultuda şekillenmiştir. Kısa sürede kapsamlı programlar geliştiren ABD üniversitelerinin, Afrika Çalışmaları kapsamında derinlemesine çalışmalara odaklandığı görülmektedir. Üniversiteler yalnızca teorik çalışmalarla sınırlı kalmayıp, fonlar sayesinde saha araştırmaları da yapmıştır. Bu fonların aynı dönem içerisinde tartışmalara yol açtığı görülmekle birlikte, eleştirel bölge çalışmalarının<sup>2</sup> akademi içerisinde geliştiği de belirginleşmiştir.

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<sup>2</sup> Eleştirel Bölge Çalışmaları, Ana Akım Bölge Çalışmalarının siyasaya bilgi ürettiği için bir karşılık olarak gelişmiştir.



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## Ekler

Üniversite İsmi	Odaklandığı Bölge	Çalışmış Olduğu Ana Disiplinler	Literatüründe Yer Alan Afrika Dili	Afrika Konusunda Uzmanlaşmış Öğrenci Sayısı
Boston Üniversitesi	Kuzey Afrika	Tarih, Sosyoloji, Antropoloji, Siyaset Bilimi, Ekonomi, Arkeoloji ve Coğrafya.	-	40-50
California Üniversitesi	Afrika'nın Tamamı	Siyaset Bilimi ve Antropoloji Temel Disiplin, Ekonomi ve Tarih'te ek olarak sunulmaktadır.	Arapça	175
Chicago Üniversitesi	Sahra-altı Afrika	Antropoloji, Afrika Dinleri, Eğitim, Etiyopya Çalışmaları, Coğrafya ve Siyaset Bilimi	Arapça	Yaklaşık 50
Columbia Üniversitesi	-	Antropoloji, Sanat Tarihi, Ekonomi, Eğitim, Coğrafya, Tarih, Hukuk, Müzik, Siyaset Bilimi ve Sosyoloji	Hausa ve Swahili	100 +
Duke Üniversitesi	Sahra-altı Afrika	Siyaset Bilimi, Tarih, Ekonomi ve Sosyoloji	Düzenli bir eğitim yoktur, ancak lisansüstü öğrencilerin Afrika dili programlarına başka yerlerde katılmalarını sağlamak için hibeler mevcuttur.	17
Duquesne Üniversitesi	Sahra-altı Afrika	Dil, Antropoloji, Sanat, Ekonomi, Eğitim, Coğrafya, Tarih ve Edebiyat	Hausa, Lingala, Svahili ve Arapça	84
Florida Üniversitesi	Sahra-altı Afrika'nın Güneyi	Siyaset Bilimi, Tarih, Antropoloji ve Coğrafya	Swahili, Arapça, Afrikaans, Portekizce ve Fransızca	13

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Houston, Rice, Texas Southern Üniversiteleri	-	Tarih, Siyaset Bilimi, Psikoloji, Antropoloji, Sosyoloji, Ekonomi, Sanat ve Dil	Arapça, Hausa, İbo, Svahili	120
Indiana Üniversitesi	Batı ve Fransızca konuşan Afrika Bölgeleri	Antropoloji, Afrika Sanatı, İşletme, Karşılaştırmalı Edebiyat, İletişim, Ekonomi, Eğitim, Etnomüzikoloji, Folklor, Coğrafya, Tarih, Dilbilim ve Siyaset Bilimi.	Arapça, Fon, Hausa, Svahili, Temne, Twi, Dyula, Susu, Koyun, İbo, Wolof	545
Lincoln Üniversitesi	Güney ve Doğu Afrika	Bağımsız Afrika Siyaseti, Bağımsız Olmayan Afrika Siyaseti, Kuzey Afrika Tarihi ve Siyaseti, Afrika Felsefesi, Tarih, Etnoloji, Afrika Uygarlığı, Ekonomi ve Dilbilim	Svahili, Portekizce, genel dilbilim	-

**Tablo 3:** 1968-1969 Akademik Yılı’nda ABD’deki Üniversitelerde Afrika Çalışmalarına Dair Bilgiler, (Bennett, 1968).

## Bölgesel Kalkınmada İklim Değişikliğinin Rolü

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### Atıf

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Bu makale, en az iki hakem tarafından incelenmiş ve intihal içermediği, araştırma ve yayın etiğine uyulduğu teyit edilmiştir.

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### Yayıncı

Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi

### Özet

Son dönemlerde doğa ve insan kaynaklı afetlerin sayısında ve sıklığında gözlenen artışlar dikkate alındığında, küresel iklim değişikliğinin yalnızca değişen fiziksel çevre koşullarıyla ilişkilendirilemeyeceği; aynı zamanda bölgesel kalkınma süreçleri bakımından ele alınması gerektiği açıktır. Bu gereklilik baz alınarak, iklim değişikliğinin meydana getirdiği bölgesel farklılıklar incelendiğinde, 1950'li yıllardan başlayan ve ekonomik eşitsizliklerin giderilmesini odağına alan geleneksel kalkınma yaklaşımının işlevselliği yeniden değerlendirilmelidir. Bilindiği üzere, küreselleşme ve ekonomik rekabetin artmasıyla meydana gelen sektörel değişim sürecinin ortaya çıkardığı baskı, risk ve tehditlerle baş edebilmek amacıyla ülkeler mevcut kalkınma politikalarında yapısal dönüşümü gerçekleştirmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, bölgesel dinamikleri esas alan, iklimsel değişiklikleri takip eden ve 'iklim ekonomisi' olarak adlandırılan yeni bir kalkınma yaklaşımına geçiş yapılmaktadır. Bu noktadan hareketle, çalışmanın amacı ekonomi temelli bakış açısından çevre temelli bakış açısına geçiş yoluyla yaşanan eksen değişikliğinin ortaya çıkardığı kazanımlar ve kayıplar üzerinden bölgesel kalkınma süreçlerinin tartışılması olarak belirlenmiştir. Nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanılarak yürütülen incelemeler sonucunda, iklim değişikliğinin ortaya çıkardığı dışsallıkların mevcut ekonomik yapıyı oluşturan parametrelerden ayrı düşünülmemesi, ekonomik dinamikler ile çevresel dinamiklerin birlikte değerlendirilmeye alınması ve küresel ölçekte iklim değişikliğinin etkilerini hesaba katan bir ekonomik büyüme modelinin uygulanması gerekliliği ortaya konulmuştur.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İklim Değişikliği, Bölgesel Kalkınma Süreci, Sektörel Değişim, İklim Ekonomisi.

# The Role of Climate Change in Regional Development

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## Abstract

Global climate change cannot only be associated with changing physical environmental conditions; it also needs to be addressed in terms of regional development processes while the increase of number and frequency of natural-caused and human-caused disasters have been considered. The functionality of traditional development approach must be reevaluated which has been started from the 1950s and focused on the elimination of economic inequalities. As it is known, countries are implementing structural transformation in their development policies in order to deal with pressures, risks and threats posed by sectoral change related with globalization and economic competition. In other words, a transition occurs to a new development approach based on regional dynamics, following climatic changes and called ‘climate economy’. The aim of the study is to discuss regional development processes based on gains and losses caused by an axis change from an economy-based perspective to an environment-based perspective. According to results obtained from the research made using the qualitative research method, the externalities caused by climate change must not be considered separately from economic structure’s parameters, economic dynamics and environmental dynamics must be evaluated together and also an economic growth model must be applied considering the effects of climate change on a global scale.

**Keywords:** Climate Change, Regional Development Process, Sectoral Change, Climate Economy.



## Giriş

Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından 2001 – 2005 yılları arasında hazırlanan Milenyum Ekosistem Değerlendirmesi raporuna göre (MEA, 2005); çevre kavramının, kalıplaşmış tanımlamalardan ziyade, gezegende yer alan canlı ve cansız tüm unsurların birlikte yaşadıkları ortam ve bu ortamda gözlenen süreçlerin sonuçları biçiminde ele alınması gerektiği vurgulanmıştır. Çevre kavramına bakış açısına yönelik bu tutum değişikliği, geleneksel iktisadi modeller yerine, iklimsel değişiklikleri girdi kabul eden yeni iktisadi modellere geçişin temel dayanaklarından biri olmuştur (Bilgen, 2019: 3).

Günümüzün güncel tartışma konuları arasında yer alan doğa ve insan kaynaklı faaliyetler sonucunda ortaya çıkan negatif dışsallıklara (afet türleri, iklimsel ve meteorolojik değişimler, koruma-kullanma dengesinin bozulması, vb.) dair belli başlı çevresel kaygıların ilk kez dile getirildiği 1970’li yıllarda sürdürülebilirlik kavramı ön plana çıkmıştır (Baş ve Partigöç, 2022: 128). Devamında, sıklıkla ifade edildiği haliyle ‘yeşil ekonomi’ kavramının temellerinin atıldığı dönem olarak da bilinen 1970’li yıllarda başlayan ve üretim - tüketim ilişkilerinin doğa ile uyumlu biçimde yürütülmesi gerektiğini savunan yaklaşım olarak sürdürülebilir kalkınma yaklaşımının gündeme gelmesi söz konusu olmuştur (United Nations, 2023: 2). Bu yaklaşımın, geleneksel kalkınma anlayışının değişime ve dönüşüme uğraması ile geliştirilen yeni ekonomik modellerin zeminini oluşturan öncül bir yaklaşımı ifade ettiğini de söylemek mümkündür. Yeni ekonomik modellerin savunduğu başlıca fikir, doğal kaynakların rasyonel kullanımının ekonomik büyümeyi engellemeyeceği; tersine, çevre odaklı kalkınma politikalarının geliştirilmesini teşvik edeceğidir (Pirali, 2021: 37).

Negatif dışsallıklardan biri olan iklim değişikliğini günümüzdeki iktisat politikalarının gündemi yapan en önemli nedenlerden birisi, iklim değişikliği nedeniyle meydana gelen çevresel sorunların küresel ölçekte izlenen bürokratik süreçlerden (protokoller, anlaşmalar, vb.) daha hızlı biçimde ilerlemesidir. Dolayısıyla, fiziksel çevreye ilişkin geliştirilen politik stratejilerin odağında kötümser senaryoların daha geniş yer tuttuğu izlenmektedir (Kaba, 2020: 5). Esasen, bu tür senaryoların gündemde daha fazla yer alması beklenen bir sonuçtur. Küresel ölçekte izlenen değişimler dikkatle incelendiğinde, genel olarak üç grupta toplanan ve yaygın biçimde görülen belli başlı fiziksel değişiklikler mevsim anomalilerinde artış (sıcaklık, yağış, vb.), tarımsal kuraklık ve temiz içme suyu kaynaklarının azalması ve deniz suyu seviyelerinde gözlenen artışlar biçiminde sıralanmaktadır (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - UNFCCC, 2015: 1-3). Dolayısıyla, üretim – tüketim ilişkilerini birinci dereceden etkilemesi öngörülen bu fiziksel değişikliklerin etkilerine ve çözüm önerilerine

yönelik olarak ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde geliştirilen politikalarda bu tür senaryoların sıklıkla gündeme getirilmesi doğaldır.

Ekonomik perspektiften bakıldığında, bahsi geçen senaryoların iklim değişikliğinin etkileri karşısında en kırılgan sosyo-ekonomik gruplar olan alt ve orta-alt gelir gruplarını görece daha fazla etkilediği ifade edilmektedir (Yılmaz ve Ersoy, 2019: 1450). Başka bir deyişle, küresel ölçekte etkilerinin izlendiği iklim değişikliği sorunu pek çok ülkede doğal kaynak varlığının bozulmasına neden olmuş ve artan aşırı hava olayları sebebiyle temel geçim kaynaklarını tehdit eder duruma gelmiştir (An vd., 2020: 1098). Özellikle temel ihtiyaçlara erişim (yeterli gıda, temiz içme suyu, temiz hava, vb.) ve iklim değişikliğine adaptasyon (iklimlendirme, yer değiştirme, vb.) konularında bu gelir gruplarının orta, orta-üst ve üst gelir grupları kadar şanslı olmadığı açıktır (Challinor vd., 2010: 3; Porter, 2014: 490). Öngörülen senaryo, kırılganlığın yüksek olduğu bölgelerden kırılganlığın düşük olduğu bölgelere doğru zorunlu bir göç hareketinin başlayacağı ve göç hareketi sonucunda nüfusun az olduğu ve yaşam kalitesinin yüksek olduğu ülkelerin bu göç sorunuyla baş etmek zorunda kalacağı şeklindedir (Türkeş, 2022: 37). Güncel araştırmalarda, kavramsal açıdan, bu durum kuzey yarım kürenin güneyinden batısına ve kuzeyine doğru zorunlu yer değiştirilen ‘iklim mülteciliği’ sorunu olarak yer almaktadır. Her yıl dünya genelinde yaklaşık 21,5 milyon insanın iklim değişikliğinin neden olduğu krizlerden direkt olarak etkilenmesi ve zorunlu olarak yer değiştirmesi (IDMC, 2016: 1), hem iklim değişikliği hem de iklim mülteciliğinin olası olumsuz sonuçları hakkında çarpıcı bir çerçeve çizmektedir. 1990’lı yıllarda yürütülen tartışmalarda, iklim değişikliğinin etkilerinin ulusal ve uluslararası bilimsel platformlarda hızla zirveye yükselecek konulardan biri olduğunu ifade eden iki düşünür Carl Sagan (Sagan, 1990) ve Dr. Robert White (White, 1990; Aktaran Glantz vd., 1990: 3) şu ifadeleri kullanmıştır:

*“Isınma gerçekten küreseldir. Kuraklık gezegen çapında etkiye sahiptir. Kaçacak yer yok, nakledilen tarım için ideal yeni yerler yok. Uzun vadede, küresel ısınmadan kazanan olmayacaktır, herkes kaybetmeye mahkumdur (The warming is truly global. The drought is planet-wide. There are no places to escape to, no ideal new locales for transplanted agriculture. In the long run, there are no winners from global warming. Everybody loses)”.*

*“Isınma dünya yüzeyinde tekdüze olarak gözlenmeyeceğinden, muhtemelen bölgeler ve uluslar arasında hem kazananlar hem de kaybedenler olacaktır (Because the warming would not be uniform over the surface of the earth, it would probably produce both winners and losers among regions and nations.).”*

**Bölgesel Kalkınmada İklim Değişikliğinin Rolü**

Öngörülen senaryolar ve sonuçları (Şekil 1 ve 2) göz önünde bulundurulduğunda ve son dönemlerde doğa ve insan kaynaklı afetlerin sayısında ve sıklığında küresel iklim değişikliğine bağlı olarak gözlenen artışlar dikkate alındığında, bu konunun yalnızca değişen fiziksel çevre koşullarıyla ilişkilendirilemeyeceği; aynı zamanda bölgesel kalkınma süreçleri bakımından ele alınması gerektiği açıktır. Bu kapsamda, iklim değişikliğinin tüm boyutlarıyla anlaşılması ve olumsuz sonuçlarıyla mücadele süreci, farklı ölçeklerde ve alt uzmanlık alanlarında istikrarlı biçimde sürdürülmektedir. Bu mücadele sürecinin etkin olabileceği alanlardan birisi de sektörel yapıdaki değişim ve dönüşümdür. Bu değişim ve dönüşüm sürecinin pek çok yeni ekonomik fırsatlara, yeni yatırımlara ve yeni istihdam kanallarına olanak sağlayabileceği öngörülmektedir (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı, 2013: 14). Başka bir deyişle, bölge planlama kavramının tanımında da yer verildiği üzere, bölgenin doğal, beşeri ve iktisadi kaynaklarını optimumu biçimde kullanılmasıyla yeni yatırımlar aracılığıyla bölgesel kalkınmanın sağlanması (Sakman ve Soral, 1966: 7) hedefine yönelik olarak sektörel değişim ve dönüşüm süreci önemli bir kırılma noktası potansiyeli taşımaktadır.

Son dönemlerde sıklıkla dile getirilen ve “*karbon salımlarını azaltmayı teşvik etmek için oluşturulan bu çağa mahsus bir ekonomik sistem*” (Tarhan, 2023: 1) olarak ifade edilen karbon ticareti sektörel yapıda gözlenen değişim sürecinin kolaylıkla izlenebildiği bir diğer alt uzmanlık alanıdır. Buna göre, karbon ticareti ile özel sektör yatırımlarının küresel ölçekte mobilize edilmesi, yeni çevre dostu teknolojik olanakların geliştirilmesi, yenilenebilir enerji yatırımlarının piyasa içerisinde rekabetçi hale gelmesi gibi çözüm önerilerinin ilişkilendirildiği görülmektedir. Bu çözüm önerileri ağırlıklı olarak özel sektör eliyle geliştirildiği ‘iklim ekonomisi’ yaklaşımından temellenmektedir (Karaosmanoğlu, 2022: 20; Yalçın, 2016: 760).

Bu çalışmanın amacı, ekonomi temelli bakış açısından çevre temelli bakış açısına geçiş yoluyla yaşanan eksen değişikliğinin ortaya çıkardığı kazanımlar ve kayıplar üzerinden bölgesel kalkınma süreçlerinin tartışılmasıdır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, iklim değişikliği ve farklı afet türleri kaynaklı olarak oluşan negatif dışsallıkların bölgesel kalkınma süreçlerini ne yönde ve ne ölçüde etkilediği tartışılmıştır. Nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanılarak yürütülen incelemeler sonucunda, iklim değişikliğinin ortaya çıkardığı dışsallıkların mevcut ekonomik yapıyı oluşturan parametrelerden ayrı düşünülmemesi, ekonomik dinamikler ile çevresel dinamiklerin birlikte değerlendirmeye alınması ve küresel ölçekte iklim değişikliğinin etkilerini hesaba katan bir ekonomik büyüme modelinin uygulanması gerekliliği ortaya konulmuştur. Ayrıca, iklimsel değişiklikler ve gözlenen etkileri için geliştirilen çözüm önerilerinin uluslararası boyutta ele

alınması ve bu çözüm önerilerinin enerji tedarigi, sanayi, tarım ve ormancılık, ulaşım ve ısınma faaliyetleri alanlarında yoğunlaşması gerektiği ortaya konulmuştur

### 1. Bölgesel Kalkınma Yaklaşımının Değişim ve Dönüşüm Süreci

Günümüzde iklim değişikliğinin meydana getirdiği bölgesel farklılıklar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, 1950'li yıllardan başlayan ve ekonomik eşitsizliklerin giderilmesini odağına alan bölgesel kalkınma yaklaşımının işlevselliğinin yeniden değerlendirilmesi gerektiği açıktır. Zamanla önemli değişimlerin gözlemlendiği alt başlıklar şöyle sıralanabilir (Eraydın, 2004: 140):

- a. Bölgesel üstünlüğün yerini sürdürülebilirliğin ve rekabet gücünün alması,
- b. Yenilik, yaratıcılık, inovasyon gibi yeni motivasyonların aktörlerin rollerini değiştirmesi,
- c. Kalkınma sürecinde devletin tek başına karar verici olma rolünü bırakması,
- d. Toplumun farklı paydaşlarının iş birliği içerisinde vizyon, politika ve strateji üretmesi.

1970'li yıllarda başlayan, zaman içerisinde hızla değişen ve bugünün bölgesel kalkınma dinamiklerini de etkileyen belli başlı kırılma noktaları dikkat çekmektedir. Bu kırılma noktaları arasında gelişmiş ülkelerin neden olduğu çevresel kirliliğin az gelişmiş ülkelere transfer edilmesi konusunda gösterilen çevresel duyarlılık ön plana çıkmaktadır. Ancak günümüzde izlenen bölgesel eşitsizlikler ve asimetrik güç dengelerinin; iklimsel koşullar, üretim – tüketim faaliyetleri, ekonomik gelişmişlik düzeyleri açısından makasın iyice açılması ve âdem-i merkeziyetçi anlayış doğrultusunda sürdürülebilirliğin tesis edilmesinin zorlaşması gibi faktörlere bağlı olarak kritik bir eşiğe geldiği ortadadır (Eraydın, 2004: 145).

Bölgesel kalkınmanın dengeli bir biçimde tesis edilebilmesinin şartı, üretim ve hizmet faaliyetlerini ve işlerliğini en iyi şekilde yansıtabilen bir yerleşim sisteminin kurulması olarak ifade edilebilir. Önerilen bu sistem içerisinde, nüfusun ve gelirin dengeli dağılımı kadar, doğal kaynak varlığının dengeli kullanılması da önemlidir. Doğal kaynak varlığının yoğun biçimde kullanıldığı endüstriyel faaliyetlerin belirli bölgelerde yığılması sonucunda bölgesel farklılıkların daha belirgin hale geldiği, dolayısıyla bölgesel kalkınmanın ekonomik boyutunun yanı sıra, yer seçim kriterlerine bağlı olarak şekillenen yerleşim sisteminin bu yığılmadan önemli ölçüde etkilendiği görülmektedir. Yalnızca endüstriyel faaliyetler değil, aynı zamanda bölgenin coğrafi konumu, altyapı ve üstyapı durumu, sermaye birikimi, girişimcilik ve rekabetçilik kabiliyeti, ekonomik destek gücü gibi çeşitli faktörlerin de bölgesel kalkınmada önemli rol oynadığı bilinmektedir (Tekin, 2011: 3).

**Bölgesel Kalkınmada İklim Değişikliğinin Rolü**

1980’li yıllardan itibaren iki temel yaklaşım ön plana çıkmaktadır: (1) Yenilikçi çevre yaklaşımı ve (2) teknolojik değişim/öğrenme yaklaşımı. Hem yerel ölçekte ekonomik yaşamın verimliliğini ve etkinliğini belirleme, hem de bölgesel ölçekte yenilikçi politikalar ve stratejiler üretmek gibi başlıca hedeflere ulaşmak bu yaklaşımların temel amacı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır (Çetin, 2004: 42). Ülkeler, küreselleşme ve ekonomik rekabetin artmasıyla meydana gelen değişimin ortaya çıkardığı baskı, risk ve tehditlerle baş edebilmek amacıyla, mevcut bölgesel gelişme politikalarında yapısal dönüşümü gerçekleştirmeye başlamışlardır. Başka bir deyişle, geleneksel kalkınma yaklaşımı yerine bölgesel dinamikleri esas alan ve iklimsel değişiklikleri yakından takip eden yeni bir kalkınma yaklaşımına geçiş ülkeler için gerekli hale gelmiştir. Kalkınma anlayışında yaşanan değişim ve dönüşüm süreci Tablo 1’de sunulmuş olup; tabloda yer alan bilgiler Eraydın (2004), Kargı (2009), Akiş (2011), Özarslan ve Ünlü (2015) ve Turhan (2020)’ın bölgesel kalkınma süreçlerine ilişkin yapmış olduğu detaylı incelemelerden derlenerek elde edilmiştir.

**Tablo 1:** Kalkınma Anlayışında Yaşanan Değişim ve Dönüşüm Süreci

1980 DÖNEMİ ÖNCESİ DURUM	1980 DÖNEMİ SONRASI DURUM
Merkezileşme	Çok uluslu bölgeler
Merkez – bölge ilişkisi	Ulusal alt bölgeler
Belli başlı dinamik sektörler	Sermaye ve emeğin hareketliliği
Üretim tüketim maksimizasyonu	Bölgeler arası ilişkiler
Büyük ölçekli yatırım – dağıtım mekanizmaları	Yönetimden yönetişime geçiş
	Farklı paydaşların söz sahibi olması

**Kaynak:** Yazar Tarafından Oluşturulmuştur

Bölgesel gelişme yaklaşımlarında meydana gelen bu eksen değişikliği, oluşumu ve birincil etkilerinin yerel ve bölgesel ölçekte gözlendiği iklim değişikliği ve farklı afet türleri karşısında yerleşim alanlarının ve doğal kaynak varlığının korunabilmesi ve daha dirençli hale getirilebilmesi bakımından önemli bir farkındalık oluşturmıştır. Bu farkındalığın işaret ettiği temel konu, koruma-kullanma dengesi gözetilerek sürdürülebilir kalkınmanın sağlanabilmesinin kriz yönetiminin başarılı şekilde gerçekleştirilmesine bağlı olduğu gerçeğidir. Krizlerin başarıyla yönetilebilmesi fikri ise, bölgesel gelişme yaklaşımlarını doğal kaynakların üretim süreçlerinde etkin şekilde kullanılması ve sosyal sorumluluk bilinci ile düşük karbon salınımını tercih eden ‘iklim ekonomisi’ alternatifine yönlendirmektedir (Geçgel ve Karaca, 2023: 37).

İklim ekonomisi kavramı, genel bir ifadeyle, çevresel sürdürülebilirliği hesaba katarak yönetilebilecek üretim ve tüketim ilişkilerine odaklanan, ekonomik kalkınma süreçlerinde enerji verimliliği, yenilenebilir enerji kaynakları ve yeni istihdam olanaklarının oluşmasını teşvik eden ve tüm bu unsurların insanların yaşam kalitesiyle doğrudan ilişkili olduğunu savunan bir anlayıştır (Yılmaz, 2018: 80). Dolayısıyla, iklim ekonomisinin temel amaçları arasında, ekonomik büyüme ve üretim faaliyetlerine bağlı yatırımların artışının sağlıklı çevre ve sosyal sorumluluk bilincinden ayrı düşünülmemesi ön plana çıkmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, iklim ekonomisinin önemli amaçlarından biri de kontrolsüz ekonomik büyümenin sonucunda oluşan ve negatif dışsallıklar olarak gelişen çevre sorunlarının düzeltilmesidir. Bu hedef doğrultusunda, ekonomik sürdürülebilirliğin sağlanabilmesi için ön koşul sağlam bir ekolojik temel kurulmasıdır (Yavuz, 2010: 83). Koruma-kullanma dengesi olarak bilinen bu temel, doğal çevrenin sağladığı olanaklar ile yapılı çevrenin ihtiyaçları arasında sürdürülebilir bir ilişkiye referans vermektedir.


İklim ekonomisinin diğer amaçları incelendiğinde, küresel ölçekte yoksulluğun azaltılması ve refahın artırılması dikkat çekmektedir. Bu amaçların sürdürülebilir olması ancak farklılıkların göz ardı edilmesi ve tüm insanlığın yaşam kalitesini koruyarak mümkündür. Tüm bu ekonomik sistemin ve üretim – tüketim ilişkilerinin sorgulanmasına neden olan durum ise iklim değişikliğidir. Çünkü insanlar, sınırsız istekleri karşısında doğal kaynak varlığının sınırlı olduğunu unutup; mevcut kaynakların onların ihtiyaçları için her zaman yeterli olacağını, doğanın insan kaynaklı faaliyetlerin sebep olduğu değişimlere her zaman ve sürekli olarak uyum sağlayabileceğini zannetmişlerdir. Bilinmektedir ki, küresel ölçekte ortalama sıcaklık her yıl artış göstermekte, tarım faaliyetlerinin yapıldığı topraklar verimsizleşmekte, temiz içme suyu kaynakları ve temiz hava zaman içerisinde giderek azalmaktadır (Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2017: 7; Gülersoy, 2022: 230). Ağırlıklı olarak insan kaynaklı faaliyetler sonucunda gözlenen bu çevresel bozulmalar, iklim değişikliği ile mücadele edilmesini gerekli hale getiren koşulları hazırlamaktadır.

Diğer ekonomik yapılardan farklı olarak, iklim ekonomisinin ön plana çıkan iki önemli özelliği şunlardır: (1) Sera gazı salınımının ortaya çıkışının yerel ölçekte, etkilerinin gözlenmesinin ise küresel ölçekte olması, (2) sera gazı emisyonlarının olası etkilerinin süresinin öngörülememesi (Nordhaus, 1992: 1080). Sanayi Devrimi'nden bu yana geçen yaklaşık 250 yıllık süreçte, küresel ölçekte üretilen sera gazı emisyonunun yaklaşık üçte ikisi Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) (%25 oranında ve 399 milyon ton miktarında CO<sub>2</sub>), Çin (%12,7 oranında ve 200 milyar ton miktarında CO<sub>2</sub>), Avrupa ülkeleri (%22 oranında ve 353 milyar ton

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
miktarında CO<sub>2</sub>) ve Rusya (%6 oranında ve 101 milyar ton miktarında CO<sub>2</sub>) tarafından üretilmiştir (Wigley ve Çağatay, 2019: 12). Başka bir deyişle, geç sanayileşen ve az gelişmiş ve/veya gelişmekte olan diğer dünya ülkelerine kıyasla, erken sanayileşen ve gelişmiş ülkelerin iklim değişikliğinin meydana gelmesindeki payı oldukça fazladır. Gelişmekte olan ve hatta yeni sanayileşen ülkelerin sera gazı emisyonlarının %0,1 ila 1 arasında değiştiği görülmektedir (Wigley ve Çağatay, 2019: 13) (Şekil 1). Başka bir deyişle, gelişmekte olan ülkelerin iklim değişikliğinin meydana gelmesinde payı oldukça azdır.

Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict tarafından hazırlanan, küresel sera gazı emisyonlarının %90'ından fazlasından sorumlu olan 60 ülke ve AB'yi sera gazı emisyonları, yenilenebilir enerji, enerji kullanımı ve iklim politikası performanslarına göre dört kategori altında değerlendiren ve 2023 yılında yayınlanan 'İklim Değişikliği Kırılganlık Endeksi (*Climate Change Vulnerability Index*)' (Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft, 2023: 6) incelendiğinde, gelişmiş ülkelerin tersine, özellikle güney ve güneydoğu Asya ülkelerinin (Hindistan, Bangladeş, Filipinler, vb.) ve Afrika ülkelerinin iklim değişikliğinin olası sonuçlarından en fazla etkilenecek ülkeler arasında yer aldığı görülmektedir. Aynı zamanda bu ülkeler, iklim değişikliği karşısında en çok risk altında olan ülkeler olarak da ifade edilmektedir (Kim ve Chung, 2017: 550) (Şekil 2).



**Şekil 1:** Sera Gazı Emisyonlarının Üretiminde Ülkelerin Payı (Kaynak: URL-1, 2024)





**Şekil 2:** İklim Değişikliği Kırılganlık Endeksi (Kaynak: Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft, 2023)

İklim değişikliğiyle mücadelede, bölgesel kalkınma yaklaşımlarında yaşanan eksen değişikliğinin bir sonucu olarak önerilen düşük karbonlu ekonomiye geçişin, insanların yaşam biçimleri ile üretim-tüketim alışkanlıklarını köklü biçimde değiştireceği öngörülmektedir (Geçgel ve Karaca, 2023: 43). Bu nedenle, iklim değişimi ile mücadele süreci yalnızca çevresel boyutuyla algılanmamalıdır. Düşük karbonlu ekonomiye geçiş sürecinde bölgesel kalkınma stratejilerinin, sektörlere (enerji, tarım, sanayi, vb.) ilişkin politikaların, su kaynaklarının kullanımının ve gıda güvenliğinin sürdürülebilir kalkınma hedeflerini direkt olarak etkileyebilecek bir rolü olacağı öngörülmektedir.

## 2. Bölgesel Kalkınmada Yeni Yaklaşımlar

1970’li yıllardan itibaren iktisadi büyüme odaklı politikaları sürdürülebilir kalkınma yaklaşımını kritik biçimde etkilemiş ve doğal ve yapılı çevre dinamikleri üzerinden bu etkiler izlenebilmiştir. Koruma-kullanma dengesini birinci plana almayan büyüme odaklı bu yaklaşımın ortaya çıkan negatif dışsallıkları arasında özellikle sınırlı doğal kaynakların sınırsız kullanımı, çevresel kirlilik ve sera gazı emisyonları ön plana çıkmaktadır. Şekil 1’de belirtildiği üzere, erken sanayileşen ve gelişmiş ülkelerin iklim değişikliğinin meydana gelmesindeki payı oldukça fazla olduğu için, yalnızca büyümeye odaklanan ekonomi temelli bakış açısından yeşil ekonomi düşüncesine temel teşkil eden çevre temelli bakış açısına geçiş yoluyla yaşanan eksen değişikliğinin ortaya çıkardığı kazanımlar ve kayıplar üzerinden yeniden değerlendirilmesi gerektiği açıktır. Bu kapsamda, çalışmada Entegre Değerlendirme Modeli (*Integrated Assessment Model-LAM*), Dinamik Entegre İklim Ekonomisi Modeli (*Dynamic Integrated Climate – Economy Model-DICE*) ve Kirlilik Sığınağı Hipotezi detaylı biçimde ele alınmıştır.

### 2.1. Entegre Değerlendirme Modeli (*Integrated Assessment Model-IAM*)

Entegre Değerlendirme Modeli, ekonomik dinamikler ile çevresel dinamiklerin birlikte değerlendirilmeye alındığı ve küresel ölçekte iklim değişikliğinin etkilerini hesaba katan bir ekonomik büyüme modeli olarak ifade edilmektedir (Nordhaus, 1992: 1073; Ruhl, 2012: 338; Pirali, 2021: 38). Modelin ortaya koyduğu hipotez ise, iklim değişikliğinin beklenen kritik sonuçlarından birinin, mutlaka bölgesel ve/veya ulusal ölçekte kazananların ve kaybedenlerin olacağı yönündedir. Öyle ki, iklim değişikliğinin sağlayabileceği kazanımların veya neden olabileceği kayıpların bölge bazında farklılık gösterebileceği, gelişmiş ülkeler ‘kazanan’ tarafta yer alırken, bazı gelişmekte olan ülkelerin düşük adaptasyon kapasitesi sebebiyle ‘kaybeden’ tarafta yer alacağı öngörülmektedir. Ayrıca, modelde ülkelerin teknolojik yeniliklere uyumlanması ve iklim değişikliğinin etkilerine stratejik olarak cevap verebilmesi becerilerinin sürecin kazananını ve kaybedenini belirleyeceği görüşü yer almaktadır (Malta, 1990: 5). Modele göre, iklim değişikliği sürecinde oluşabilecek kazanımlar ve kayıplar Tablo 2, 3, 4 ve 5’te sunulmuş olup; tablolarda yer alan bilgiler Malta (1990), Stern (2006), Stern (2015), Pollock (2017), The Hamilton Project ve The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2019), Kaba (2020), Uluslararası Enerji Ajansı (2021), Pirali (2021), Şen (2022), Baş ve Partigöç (2022), Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft (2023), NASA (2024), Avrupa Çevre Ajansı (2024) ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (1963 – 2023)’nın iklim değişikliği kaynaklı öngörülen çevresel, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kentsel kazanımlar ve kayıplara ilişkin yapmış olduğu detaylı incelemelerden derlenerek elde edilmiştir.

Tablo 2: İklim Değişikliği Kaynaklı Öngörülen Çevresel Kazanımlar ve Kayıplar

	KAZANIMLAR	KAYIPLAR
ÇEVRESEL	Evsel ısınma kaynaklı yakıt tüketiminin önemli ölçüde azalması	Dünyanın önemli biyolojik noktalarında yer alan kentlerin doğal alanlarının daralması
	Karayolu ve havayolu ulaşımının etkinliğinin azaldığı bölgelerde denizyolu ulaşımının ivme kazanması	Mevsimsel anomalilerinin (aşırı yağışlar, aşırı sıcaklar, buharlaşma, vb.) artması
	Ekolojik rejimlerin değişmesi nedeniyle sıcak iklimlere göç eden türlerin kendi habitatlarında kalabilmesi	Aşırı hava olaylarına bağlı olarak doğal afetlerin sayısının ve sıklığının artması
	Ekonomik kalkınmaya olumlu etkisinden ötürü tarımsal sürdürülebilirliğin sağlanması adına doğal nitelikli alanların (tarım alanları, meralar, otlaklar, çayırlar, vb.) korunması ve yapılaşmaya açılmaması	Biyçeşitlilik ve doğal kaynak varlığının zamanla azalması
	Endüstriyel üretim yapan tesislerin sürdürülebilirliğini sağlamak için çevre dostu stratejiler geliştirilmesi	Artan sıcaklıklar nedeniyle kuraklığın küresel ölçekte yaygın görülen bir afet türü haline gelmesi
	Sıcaklık artışlarının erken ekim ve hasat dönemleri oluşturmasıyla sıcak bölgelerde yetişen ürünlerin ılıman bölgelerde de yetiştirilebilmesi	Dünya genelinde ülkelerin yarısından fazlasının su stresi yaşama olasılığının olması
	---	Büyük ölçekli orman yangınlarının ve tropikal siklonların aşırı sıcaklar nedeniyle artması
	---	Küresel ortalama sıcaklığın 2100 yılına kadar ortalama 1 – 3,5°C artması
	---	Ekosistemlerin yapısal özelliklerinin, üretkenliğinin ve coğrafi dağılımının bozulması
	---	Flora ve fauna yapısındaki değişimler nedeniyle yeni türlerin biyolojik çeşitliliğinin yerel ölçekte azalması
	---	Habitatların bölünmesi
	---	Kurak ve yarı kurak bölgelerde su kaynaklarına olan ihtiyacın artması
	---	Sıcaklık artışına bağlı olarak artan çölleşme sorununun tarımsal üretimi azaltması
	---	Artan ozon seviyesi ve UV ışınlarının bitkilerin büyüme sürecini olumsuz etkilemesi

Kaynak: Yazar Tarafından Oluşturulmuştur

Tablo 2’de aktarılan ve çevresel perspektiften ele alınan içerik dikkatle incelendiğinde, iklim değişikliği probleminin ortaya çıkışında kritik rolü olan sera gazı emisyonlarının azaltılması amacıyla, özellikle enerji, sanayi, tarım, ormancılık ve ulaşım sektörlerinde çevresel kazanımlar bakımından önemli gelişmeler olduğu izlenmektedir. Doğa dostu ve sürdürülebilir

**Bölgesel Kalkınmada İklim Değişikliğinin Rolü**

enerji kaynaklarına yönelim, hava kirliliğine neden olan sabit kaynak etkisinin azaltımı, iklimsel koşullarda gözlenen değişimlere göre tarımsal üretim yöntemlerinin değişimi bu gelişmelere örnek verilebilir. Buna karşın, mevsimsel anomalilerin artışına paralel olarak doğal kaynak varlığında azalma ile afetlerin sayısında ve sıklığında artış konularında çevresel kayıplar olarak değerlendirilebilecek yeni durumlar gözlemlenmektedir. Özetle, Entegre Değerlendirme Modeli'ne göre, kalkınma süreçlerinde ekonomik dinamikler ile çevresel dinamikler arasında koruma-kullanma dengesinin sağlanabilmesine yönelik yapıcı bir ilişkinin tamamıyla kurulabildiği söylenemez.

**Tablo 3: İklim Değişikliği Kaynaklı Öngörülen Ekonomik Kazanımlar ve Kayıplar**

	KAZANIMLAR	KAYIPLAR
<b>EKONOMİK</b>	Sıcak gün sayısının artmasıyla bazı bölgelerde tarımsal üretim sürecinin uzaması	Doğal kaynak varlığına bağlı ekonomik faaliyetlerin azalması ve kayıpların artması
	Turizm sektöründe tatil sezonunun daha uzun sürmesi	İklimsel değişimlere bağlı olarak özellikle Avrupa'nın güneydoğusu ve Orta Asya'da gıda üretiminin önemli ölçüde azalması
	Soğuk iklimin olduğu bölgelere hizmet götürme etkinliğinin ve maliyetinin azalması	Tarımsal ürün verimliliğinin önemli ölçüde azalması
	Coğrafi özelliklerin iklimsel değişim avantajına dönüştüğü bölgelerde tarıma dayalı üretimin ekonomik girdi sağlaması	Yaşanacak su kıtlığı nedeniyle tarımsal ürün deseninin değişmesi
	Tarım sektörünün ekonomik girdisinin artmasıyla yerel ölçekte yatırımların ve girişimlerin artması (KOBİ, e-ticaret, vb.)	Otlak verimliliğinin azalmasına bağlı olarak hayvancılık faaliyetlerinde ekonomik kayıplar oluşması
	Büyük ölçekli ekonomik değişimlerin önünün açılması	Turizm faaliyetlerinin ve turistik bölgelerin hareketliliğinin iklimsel değişiklikler nedeniyle olumsuz etkilenmesi ve ekonomik kayıplar verilmesi
	---	Turizm sektörünün hammaddesi olan doğal ve kültürel kaynak varlığının zarar görmesi sonucunda sektörde verimliliğinin düşmesi
	---	2050 yılında iklim değişikliğinin maliyetinin küresel GSMH'nın yaklaşık %5 – 20'sine denk gelmesi

**Kaynak:** Yazar Tarafından Oluşturulmuştur

Tablo 3'te aktarılan ve ekonomik perspektiften ele alınan içerik dikkatle incelendiğinde, iklimsel değişimlerin özellikle tarım ve hayvancılık sektörlerini direkt olarak etkilediğini ve dolayısıyla yerel veya bölgesel ölçekte geliştirilebilecek üretim politikalarının ve stratejilerinin gözlenen olumsuz etkilerin bertaraf edilebilmesi için yeterli olmayacağını söylemek mümkündür. Benzer biçimde, iklim değişikliğinin etkisiyle azalan doğal kaynak varlığı dikkate

alındığında, turizm sektöründe yürütülmekte olan faaliyetlerin sektörel verimliliği olumsuz yönde etkileyeceği açıktır. Özetle, her ne kadar yerel ve bölgesel ölçekte yatırımlar bakımından atılan adımların sayısı zamanla artıyor olsa da, ulusal ve küresel ölçekte iklim değişikliğinin ekonomik kayıpları daha belirgin biçimde göstermektedir.

**Tablo 4:** İklim Değişikliği Kaynaklı Öngörülen Toplumsal Kazanımlar ve Kayıplar

	KAZANIMLAR	KAYIPLAR
TOPLUMSAL	Değişen iklimsel koşulların artırdığı su varlığının pek çok ihtiyacı (gıda üretimi, sulama imkânları, HES kurulumu, vb.) karşılaması	Artan afet olaylarına bağlı olarak yaşanan can, mal ve kentsel doku kayıplarının artması
	Tarımsal üretim sürecinin yıl geneline uzaması sonucunda çiftçilerin varsıllık düzeyinin artması	Su ve vektör kaynaklı halk sağlığı sorunlarının artması ve kentlerin salgın hastalıklar bakımından yüksek risk altında olması
	Doğal nitelikli alanlarında korunması için yeni yasal ve denetimi sıklaştırılan düzenlemelerin yapılması	Çevresel ve ekonomik değişimler sebebiyle iklim değişikliğine bağlı göçlerin ve iklim mülteciliğinin önemli ölçüde artması
	Toplumsal farklı sosyo-ekonomik kesimlerinin ekonomik kazançlarında artış görülmesi (emekçi, işçi, çiftçi, vb.)	Sıcaklık artışı ve düzensiz yağış dağılımının insanlarda hastalıklara (veba, kuş gribi, sıtma, kolera, ebola, vb.) karşı hassasiyeti artırması
	Adaptasyon stratejilerine uyumlu yeni teknolojik çözümler geliştirilmesi	Farklı sektörlerde azalan veya tükenen doğal kaynak varlığı nedeniyle ekonomik büyüme ve ulusal kalkınmanın gecikmesi
	---	Güvenli gıda ve temiz suya erişim maliyetinin artması
	---	Tarımsal üretimin maliyetlerinin artması sebebiyle tüm toplumsal paydaşların bu süreçten olumsuz etkilenmesi

**Kaynak:** Yazar Tarafından Oluşturulmuştur

Tablo 4'te aktarılan ve toplumsal perspektiften ele alınan içerik dikkatle incelendiğinde, yasal düzenlemeler ve iklim değişikliğine adaptasyon amacıyla başvurulmuş teknoloji tabanlı çözümler özellikle tarımsal üretim türlerinde (seracılık, kuru tarım, topraksız tarım, vb.) faaliyet gösteren kişi ve grupların sosyo-ekonomik düzeylerinin artmasını sağladığı izlenmektedir. Toplumsal açıdan önemli bir kazanım olarak değerlendirilebilecek gelişmenin aksine, dikkat çeken toplumsal kayıplar olarak afet olaylarının sayı ve sıklığının artmasının toplumsal yapıyı kısa sürede ve geri dönülmez biçimde etkilemesi, su ve vektör kaynaklı halk sağlığı sorunlarının giderek yaygınlaşması, iklimsel değişikliklere bağlı zorunlu yer değiştirmelerin gözlenmesi örnek verilebilir. Özetle, çok katmanlı yapıya sahip olan toplumda iklim değişikliğine bağlı

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yaşanan gelişmelerin bütüncül biçimde kazanım veya kayıp olarak ele alınmasının oldukça zor olduğu, konu bazında değerlendirme yapılmasının ise daha sağlıklı olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

**Tablo 5: İklim Değişikliği Kaynaklı Öngörülen Kentsel Kazanımlar ve Kayıplar**

	<b>KAZANIMLAR</b>	<b>KAYIPLAR</b>
<b>KENTSEL</b>	Aşırı soğuk havanın neden olduğu altyapı ve ulaşım sorunlarının ciddi oranda azalması	Yükselen deniz seviyesinin kıyı kentleri için riskli olması
	İklimsel koşullar kaynaklı sekteye uğrayan veya durma noktasına gelen kentsel hizmetlerin sürdürülebilirliğinin sağlanması	İklim ve afet dirençliliği bağlamında kentlerin daha kırılgan hale gelmesi
	Kıyı kentlerinde denizyolu taşımacılığı ve ekonomik getirisi yüksek arazi kullanım türlerinin ön plana çıkması	Kentsel ısı adası etkisinin oluşması ve mikro-klimatik özelliklerin değişmesi
	Özellikle kıyı kentlerinde olası afetlerin etkilerinden korunmak için geliştirilebilecek veya yenilenebilecek altyapıların ekonomik yatırım ve istihdam olanağı yaratması	Olası afet durumunda kentsel altyapı ve ulaşım olanaklarının zarar görmesi
	---	Kentsel ve kırsal alanda mevcut arazi kullanım deseninin değişmesi

**Kaynak:** Yazar Tarafından Oluşturulmuştur


Tablo 5'te aktarılan ve kentsel perspektiften ele alınan içerik dikkatle incelendiğinde, kentsel alanlarda mevcut altyapı ve üstyapı olanaklarının artan nüfus yoğunluğunun ihtiyaçlarını yeterli düzeyde karşılamadığı düşünülürse, iklim değişikliğinin neden olabileceği mevsimsel anomalilere bağlı yaşanacak afet olaylarının (sel, taşkın, kuraklık, heyelan, vb.) sonucunda can ve mal kayıplarının öngörülenden fazla olması kaçınılmazdır. Bu durumda, yapı çevre olarak tanımlanan kentlerin kırılganlığının azaltılması ve olası bir afet durumunda kentsel hizmetlerde meydana gelebilecek aksaklıkların minimum düzeye indirilebilmesi öncelikli konulardan biri haline gelmiştir. Özetle, afet yönetimi alanında hazırlıklı olmayan kentsel alanların iklim değişikliğine bağlı olarak önemli kayıplar vereceği, yerel ölçekte karar mekanizmalarının başarılı risk yönetimi uygulamaları ile önemli kazanımlar elde edebileceğini söylemek mümkündür.

**2.2. Dinamik Entegre İklim Ekonomisi Modeli (*Dynamic Integrated Climate – Economy Model - DICE*)**

1970'li yıllarda klasik neoliberal büyüme modelinin savunduğu “*Tüm fiziksel ve sosyal değerler sermaye için girdi niteliği taşır*” tezine tepki olarak ortaya çıkan Dinamik Entegre İklim Ekonomisi Modeli, 1994 yılında William Nordhaus tarafından geliştirilmiştir. Temel olarak, iklim değişikliği ve ekonomiyle ilişkilenen farklı parametreleri dikkate alan ve optimum strateji ulaşmayı hedefleyen bu model, tüketme tatmini ve kâr miktarı gibi belli başlı değişkenlerin

sabit tutulduğu koşullar altında tüketim miktarı ve sera gazı emisyonlarının önemli ölçüde azalacağı görüşünü savunmaktadır (Nordhaus, 1992: 1131; Pirali, 2021:42).


Bilindiği üzere, geleneksel ekonomik yaklaşıma göre, mevcut ekonomik yapının temel bileşenleri sermaye, işgücü ve teknolojik imkânlar olarak sıralanmaktadır. Ülkelerin nüfusu ve teknolojik inovasyonlar artıp çeşitlendikçe, mal ve hizmetlerin tüketim düzeyi ve sermaye dolaşımının arttığı görüşü bu yaklaşımın odağında yer almaktadır (Şekil 3). Buna karşın, geleneksel olmayan ekonomik yaklaşımın kapsamı incelendiğinde ise, iklim değişikliğinin gözlenebilen etkilerinin belirleyici unsurlar olduğu görüşü ön plana çıkmaktadır. Emisyon miktarı, emisyon türü, emisyon konsantrasyonu ve verdiği zararlar bu tür yaklaşımların matematiksel olarak modellenmesi sürecinde girdi olarak yer almaktadır (Klein vd., 2007: 770; Türkeş, 2022: 40).



**Şekil 3:** Geleneksel Ekonomik Büyüme Yaklaşımı (Kaynak: Yazar Tarafından Oluşturulmuştur)

Küresel ölçekte ortalama sıcaklığın artması ve yaratabileceği olumsuz etkiler de modelleme sürecine dâhil edilmektedir. Bu tür modellerde ülkelerden beklenen genel tutum, yapılan hesaplamalarda karar alma süreçlerinin ekonomik kalkınmaya yönelik faaliyetlerin yol açabileceği çevreye dair sonuçların küresel ölçekte etkilerinin dikkate alınarak şekillendirilmesidir (Şekil 4). Dinamik Entegre İklim Ekonomisi Modeli ile başarılmak istenilen temel hedeflerden biri, yoğun doğal kaynak kullanımının söz konusu olduğu, yalnızca ekonomik büyümeye odaklanan ve olası çevresel zararları modellemeye ve fiyatlandırmaya dâhil etmeyen piyasa mekanizmalarına kamu eliyle müdahale edilmesi ve mevcut koşulların iyileşmesinin sağlanmasıdır (Dixon ve Jorgenson, 2013: 990; Pirali, 2021: 41).



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**Şekil 4:** Dinamik Entegre İklim Ekonomisi Modelinde Önerilen Ekonomik Büyüme Yaklaşımı  
(Kaynak: Yazar Tarafından Oluşturulmuştur)

**2.3. Kirlilik Sığınağı Hipotezi**


Gelişmiş ve erken sanayileşmiş ülkelerin zaman içerisinde çevresel kirlilik yaratan ve yoğun sermaye gerektiren endüstrilere kaydıkları gözlemlenmiştir. Bu değişim sürecinde, çevresel politikalarını hayata geçirebilmeleri adına gelişmiş ülkeler katlanmaları gereken maliyetleri, üretim faaliyetlerini çevre duyarlılığı düşük, geç sanayileşmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelere gerçekleştirerek minimize etmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, gelişmiş ülkeler az gelişmiş ve/veya gelişmekte olan ülkeleri kirlilik düzeyi (emisyon) yüksek endüstriyel faaliyetler için bir tür ‘sığınak’ olarak kullanmaktadır (Akbostancı vd.: 12, 2004; Temurshoev, 2006: 37).

Bu hipotezin temelinde, kirlilik düzeyi yüksek ‘kirli sektörlerin’ katı çevre politikaları uygulayan ülkelere kaçıp, esnek çevre politikaları uygulayan ve dışa açık ekonomilerde kirlilik sığınakları oluşturduğu fikri yatmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımın üç temel boyutu ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bu boyutlar şu şekilde sıralanabilir (Aliyu, 2005: 20):

- Çevreye ilişkin yasal mevzuatın, gelişmiş ülkelere kıyasla, gelişmekte olan ülkelere daha esnek biçimde denetlenmesi ve uygulanması,
- Üretim ve tüketim faaliyetleri sonucunda oluşan atığın gelişmekte olan ülkelere gönderilmesi ve bu ülkelerin ‘gelişmiş ülkelerin arka bahçesi’ olarak görülmesi,
- Gelişmiş ülkeler emek yoğun ve kirlilik düzeyi düşük ‘temiz sektörleri’ (tekstil, makine, turizm, teknoloji, vb.) tercih ederken, az gelişmiş ve/veya gelişmekte


olan ülkelerin sermaye yoğun, enerji kullanımı yoğun ve kirlilik düzeyi yüksek 'kirli sektörleri' tercih etmeleri.

Kirliliği Sığınağı Hipotezi'ni destekleyen belli başlı niteliksel ve niceliksel bulgulara ilgili akademik literatürde yer verildiği görülmektedir. Şekil 5 ve 6'dan izlenebileceği üzere, bu yaklaşımı destekleyen temel bulgular sera gazı salınımına neden olan ürünlerin üretiminde ve ihracatında gözlenen kritik artış (Low ve Yeats, 1992: 100; Lucas vd., 1992: 5; Birdsall ve Wheeler, 1993: 140), gelişmiş ülkelerde çevresel eşiklere ve uygulamalara yönelik ortaya konulan standartlara zaman içerisinde daha az uyum gösterilmesi (Birdsall ve Wheeler, 1993: 145; Kolstad ve Xing, 1998: 70; List ve Co, 2000: 15; Javorcık Smarzynska ve Wei, 2004: 8) ve gelir düzeyi azalan ülkelerin karbon salınımına daha fazla neden olması (CO<sub>2</sub> tüketiminin %60'ının OECD ülkeleri tarafından yapılması) şeklinde sıralanabilir (Yılmaz ve Ersoy, 2009: 1450).



**Şekil 5:** 1990-2022 Döneminde Toplam ve Kişine Başına Sera Gazı Emisyonu (Kaynak: TÜİK, 2022)

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Şekil 6: CO<sub>2</sub> Salınımında En Yüksek Paya Sahip Ülkeler (Kaynak: World Bank, 2021)

Buna ek olarak, Kirlilik Sığınağı Hipotezi, yabancı yatırımların daha esnek çevresel standartlara duyarlı olabildiğini savunmaktadır. Yabancı yatırımlar ve çevre standartları arasında gözlenen asimetrik ilişki incelendiğinde, firmaların çevresel kirliliğe neden olan üretim süreçlerinde üstünlük elde etmek için çevresel düzenlemelerden kaçındıkları ve esnek çevre politikası uygulayarak kolaylıkla rekabet edebilir duruma geldikleri görülmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, bu hipoteze göre, gelişmiş ülkelerde yer alan yabancı firmaların kirlletici emisyonların yoğun biçimde açığa çıkmasına neden olan endüstriyel üretimleri için, az gelişmiş ve/veya gelişmekte olan ülkelerin denetimi daha az sıkı olan yasal düzenlemelerinden faydalanmaları doğrultusunda hareket etmektedir ve bu nedenle doğal çevrenin zarar görmesine neden olmaktadır (Aliyu, 2005: 10; Zhang, 2013: 5; Bilgen, 2019: 45).

### Değerlendirme ve Tartışma

Doğa ve insan kaynaklı faaliyetler sonucunda oluşan iklim değişikliği ve farklı afet türlerinin sayısında ve sıklığında gözlenen artış, küresel ölçekte güvenilir gıda, temiz içme suyu ve mevcut doğal kaynak varlığının sürdürülebilirliği açısından önemli bir tehdit oluşturmaktadır. Dünya genelinde doğa ve insan kaynaklı faaliyetler sonucunda ortaya çıkan negatif dışsallıklardan en çok etkilenen insanların az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde yaşadığı gerçeği göz önünde bulundurularak denilebilir ki, bu ülkelere bazılarının kısmen artan göç ve yoksullukla bağlantılı olan gıda güvenliğinde ve temiz içme suyu temininde önemli sorunlarla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu yüzden, uyum ve adaptasyon konularında kısa zamanda

etkili olabilecek bölge ve alt bölge düzeyinde politikalara ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bu tür politikalar hem bölgelerarası farklılıkların giderilmesi, hem yerel kaynak varlığının belirli ihtiyaç programları dahilinde optimum biçimde kullanılması, hem de bölgesel kalkınmaya yön verecek yatırımlarla ilgili öngörülen zaman ve bütçe kısıtlılıkları gibi öncelikli sorunlarla baş edilebilmesi bakımından kritik öneme sahiptir.

Küresel ölçekte mevcut ekonomik kalkınma biçiminin ve bireysel ölçekte yaşam kalitesi ve refah düzeyinin sorgulanmasına neden olan temel sebeplerden biri, iklim değişikliğidir. Çünkü Antik Yunan felsefesinin önemli tezlerinden biri olan “*her şeyin ölçüsü insandır*” mantığını dayanak alan insan için, sınırsız istekleri karşısında doğal kaynak varlığının sınırlı olduğu gerçeğiyle yüzleşmek oldukça zordur. Bu sebeple, ağırlıklı olarak doğal afetler biçiminde kendisini gösteren negatif dışsallıkların etkileriyle etkin biçimde mücadele etmek konusunda çeşitli sorunlar yaşanmaktadır. İnsan faaliyetlerinin ve zamanla artan taleplerinin neden olduğu çevresel bozulma, iklim değişikliği ve beklenen tüm olumsuz sonuçları ile mücadele edilmesini gerekli kılmaktadır.

Genel olarak, küresel ölçekte izlenen değişim ve dönüşüm sürecinin sürdürülebilirliğin üç temel boyutunu (sosyal, çevresel, ekonomik) direkt olarak etkileyen kritik bir geçiş evresinde olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Farklı adaptasyon kapasitelerine sahip olan gelişmiş ülkeler için bu geçiş evresi daha az sancılı olurken, iklim değişikliği ve doğal afetlerin etkileri karşısında hazırlıklı ve dirençli olmayan birçok az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülke bu geçiş evresini daha sancılı geçirmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, iklim değişikliğinin etkileri karşısında en kırılgan gruplar az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerdir.

Benzer bir bakış açısıyla, mevcut sosyal ve fiziksel coğrafya koşullarının önemli bir geçiş sürecinde olduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Bu süreçte ekonomik yapının değişime uğraması, sosyal dinamiklerin görünür hale gelmesi, bölgeler özelinde alternatif enerji kaynaklarının arayışı, meteorolojik ve iklimsel koşullarda gözlenen küresel ve bölgesel değişimler, bu değişimlere bağlı zorunlu yer değiştirmelerin gözlenmesi, doğal çevre – yapılı çevre ilişkisinde kalkınma önceliklerinin sürece yön vermesi, vb. gibi pek çok farklılaşma dikkat çekmektedir. Bölge planlama ve kalkınma süreçlerini birincil dereceden etkileyecek bu farklılaşmalar, iklim değişikliğinin baskın ve tehditkâr rolü bağlamında değerlendirildiğinde, mevcut durumda bölgelerarası eşitsizliklerin artmasına ve zamanla kırılgan grupların çevresel, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kentsel açılardan geri dönülmez kayıplar vermesine neden olacağı açıktır.

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Çalışma kapsamında Entegre Değerlendirme Modeli'ne göre bölgesel kalkınma süreçleri ile çevresel, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kentsel dinamikler arasındaki ilişki detaylı biçimde incelenmiştir. Buna göre; çevresel dinamikler açısından bölgesel kalkınma süreçlerinde ekonomik dinamikler ile çevresel dinamikler arasında koruma-kullanma dengesinin sağlanabilmesine yönelik yapıcı bir ilişkinin tamamıyla kurulabildiği söylenemez iken; ekonomik dinamikler açısından yerel ve bölgesel ölçekte sayısı artan yatırımlara rağmen ulusal ve küresel ölçekte iklim değişikliğinin ekonomik kayıpları daha belirgin biçimde gösterdiği tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, toplumsal dinamikler açısından toplumda iklim değişikliğine bağlı yaşanan gelişmelerin bütüncül biçimde kazanım veya kayıp olarak ele alınmasının oldukça zor olduğu ve konu bazında değerlendirme yapılmasının daha doğru bir yaklaşım olacağı ortaya konulmuş olup; kentsel dinamikler açısından ise olası afetler karşısında oldukça kırılgan bir yapıya sahip olan kentsel alanların iklim değişikliğine bağlı olarak önemli kayıplar vereceği, yerel ölçekte karar mekanizmalarının başarılı risk yönetimi uygulamaları ile önemli kazanımlar elde edebileceği sonucuna varılmıştır.

İklimsel değişiklikler ve gözlenen etkilerinin küresel ölçekte olması, geliştirilen çözüm önerilerinin ve politikaların da uluslararası boyutta ele alınmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Birleşmiş Milletler İklim Değişikliği Çerçeve Sözleşmesi (BMİDÇS) kapsamında 2015 yılında imzalanan ve 2016 yılında yürürlüğe giren Paris Anlaşması, iklim değişikliğinin ve farklı afet türlerinin olumsuz etkilerinin azaltılması, küresel, bölgesel ve yerel düzeyde uyum ve adaptasyon çalışmalarının yürütülmesi ve bölgesel kalkınmanın tesis edilebilmesi için gerekli finansmanın sağlanması gibi çözüm önerilerini içeren önemli bir belge niteliği taşımaktadır. Bu anlaşmayla, toplam 197 ülke karbon emisyonunu düşürebilmek konusunda daha stratejik yöntemler izleyecekleri konusunda kritik bir rol üstlenmişlerdir. Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından hazırlanan raporda 'yeni iklim ekonomisi' biçiminde adlandırılan ve “*daha iyi büyüme, daha iyi iklim*” sloganıyla ifade edilen yaklaşım, iklimsel değişiklikler göz önünde bulundurularak bölgesel kalkınma hedeflerine ulaşılmasını amaçlayan bir içeriğe sahiptir.

TÜİK tarafından 2020 yılında yayınlanan istatistiklere göre, Türkiye’de en fazla karbon salınımına neden olan sektörlerin sırasıyla enerji tedariki (%34), sanayi (%24), tarım ve ormancılık (%22), ulaşım (%15) ve ısınma faaliyetlerinin (%6) olduğu belirlenmiştir. Farklı sektörlerle ilişkin verilen oranlar dikkate alınarak, hem sektörel yapıya yönelik öngörülen değişim ve dönüşüm sürecine, hem de karbon salınımının minimize edilmesine dair bilimsel çalışmalar ve uygulama örneklerinin ortak paydada buluştuğu belli başlı çözüm önerileri ve

bölgesel düzeyde etkili olabilecek politikalar dikkat çekmektedir. Bu öneriler ve politikalar şu şekilde listelenebilir:

- (a) Elektrik ve ısınma ihtiyacının fosil yakıtlar aracılığıyla temini yerine yenilenebilir enerji yatırımlarına ağırlık verilmesi,
- (b) Endüstriyel üretimde fosil yakıtlara alternatif olarak yeni ve doğa dostu enerji kaynaklarının bulunması,
- (c) Tarım, hayvancılık ve ormancılık faaliyetlerinde teknolojik yeniliklerden yararlanılarak verimin artırılması ve doğal kaynak tahribatının önüne geçilmesi,
- (d) Ulaşımda yenilenemeyen kaynak türleri (fosil yakıtlar) yerine karbon salınımı düşük ve yenilenebilir kaynak türlerini önceliğe alan yeni yöntemlerin tercih edilmesi.

Ekonomik büyüme ile doğal kaynak varlığının sürdürülebilirliği arasında dikkate değer bir ilişki kuran iklim ekonomisi kavramı, ekonomik gelişme süreçlerine toplum-birey ilişkisi yerine toplum-doğa ilişkisi açısından bakılması ile üretim-tüketim dengesi ve koruma- kullanma dengesinin yeniden yorumlanmasına olanak sağlayacaktır. Toplum için üretilen mal ve hizmetlerin hammaddesinin doğa kaynaklı olduğu gerçeği, bu yorumlamanın koruma yönünün ağır basması gerektiğini hatırlatmaktadır. Küresel ölçekte ve çok paydaşlı bir eyleme geçme motivasyonu, iklim değişikliğinin mevcut ve olası etkilerini minimize etmek için oldukça önemlidir. Çalışmanın temel amacı ve ilgili literatüre yapması beklenen bilimsel katkısı, üretim-tüketim dengesi ve koruma- kullanma dengesinin yeniden yorumlanmasına yönelik argümanların farklı perspektiflerden (ekonomik, sosyal, toplumsal ve kentsel) değerlendirilmesine olanak sağlayan bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır. Böylece, bölgesel kalkınma süreçlerinde iklim değişikliğinin rolünün yalnızca değişen fiziksel çevre koşullarının istatistiki değerler üzerinden yorumlanması ile sınırlandırılmayacağı; aynı zamanda bölge düzeyinde süregelen değişim ve dönüşüm süreçlerinde öngörülen kazanımların ve kayıpların bütüncül bir ele alışla değerlendirilmesi gerekliliği vurgulanmış olacaktır.

Bu noktadan hareketle denilebilir ki, iklim değişikliğinin tüm boyutlarıyla anlaşılması ve olumsuz sonuçlarıyla mücadele süreci, farklı ölçeklerde yürütülebilecek disiplinler arası çalışmalar ve iklim değişikliğine uyumlu biçimde gerçekleştirilecek sektörel yapıdaki değişim ve dönüşümle başarıya ulaşabilir. Özellikle, sürdürülebilirlik temelinde ele alınması gereken bölgesel kalkınma yaklaşımları düşünüldüğünde, iklim ekonomisinin tesis edilebilmesi ve hem yapısal çevre dinamikleri hem de kalkınma süreçleri bakımından yeşil büyümenin sağlanması oldukça önemli adımlar olacaktır. İklim ekonomisinin doğal ve yapısal çevredeki yaşam alanlarını koruyan, koruma-kullanma dengesini gözetten ve ekonomi ile ekoloji arasındaki

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hassas dengeyi sağlayabilecek bir yapıda olması sürdürülebilir üretim-tüketim ilişkisinin kurulmasına ve iklimsel değişiklikler göz önünde bulundurularak kalkınma hedeflerine ulaşılmasına vesile olacaktır.

İklim değişikliği ve farklı afet türlerine ilişkin geliştirilen kötümser senaryolar ve öngörülen negatif dışsallıklar, sürdürülebilir kalkınma süreçlerinde ‘kazanan’ ve ‘kaybeden’ ülkeler arasından mevcut dengelerin değişmesine neden olmuş ve özellikle bölgesel ölçekte ekonomik yapıya ilişkin yeni formül arayışları ön plana çıkmıştır. Bölgesel kalkınma süreçlerinde gözlenen bu değişim ve dönüşüm ihtiyacının doğal bir sonucu olarak, iklim değişikliğinin ortaya çıkardığı dışsallıkların mevcut ekonomik yapıyı oluşturan parametrelerden ayrı düşülmesi, ekonomik dinamikler ile çevresel dinamiklerin birlikte değerlendirmeye alınması ve küresel ölçekte iklim değişikliğinin etkilerini hesaba katan bir ekonomik büyüme modelinin uygulanması artık gerekli hale gelmiştir. Bu değişim ve dönüşüm sürecinin başarıyla uygulanması, izlenmesi ve denetlenmesi sonucunda iklim ekonomisi sürdürülebilir bir yaşamın ve kalkınma süreçlerinin ekonomik, sosyal ve çevresel anlamda tamamlayıcısı konumunda yer alabilecektir.

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## Kitap İncelemesi

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### Makale Türü

Kitap İncelemesi

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### Yayıncı

Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi

Sanayi devriminin ortaya çıkmasıyla üretimini artıran Avrupa, hammadde ve yeni pazarlar arayışına girmiştir. Ayrıca sanayileşmenin tetiklediği ulaşım ve silah endüstrisindeki gelişmeler Avrupalıları, kıta dışı yeni nüfus alanları aramaya itmiştir. Bu genişleme arayışı, “Afrika'nın Paylaşımı” olarak ifade edilen Avrupalıların, Afrika kıtasında toprak ve nüfus edinme yarışına yol açmıştır. Pakenham'ın Afrika Paylaşımı (*The Scramble for Africa*) başlıklı eseri, 19. yüzyılda gücünün zirvesinde olan ve siyasi olarak bütünlüğünü sağlamış Avrupalı güçlerin, siyasi olarak zayıf durumdaki Afrika'yı sömürgeleştirme yarışını ele alan Afrika çalışmalarında kullanılan temel eserlerden biridir. Yazar, kariyerinin çoğunu Afrika'yı anlamaya ve yazmaya çalışan önemli bir tarihçi ve yazardır. Kitabın yazım aşamasını yaklaşık 10 yılda birçok Avrupa ülkesinin yanı sıra 22 Afrika ülkesini ziyaret ederek tamamlayan İngiliz yazar, bu eseriyle birçok ödüle layık görülmüştür.

Yazar eserinde ele aldığı en temel sorun, Avrupa'nın Afrika'yı binlerce yıldır bilmesine rağmen Afrika'nın neden bu kadar uzun süre görmezden gelindiği ve neden 35 yıl gibi kısa bir süre de Avrupalı güçler tarafından paylaşıldığını ve neden Avrupa devletler Afrika kolonilerini paylaşım için aniden birbirleri ile rekabet ettiğini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Yazar, bu sorulara kitap içerisinde yer yer cevap verse de doğrudan

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yanıtlamamaktadır. Tarihsel bir anlatı ile nedenlerin okur tarafından anlaşılmasını beklemektedir. Kitabın vurguladığı en temel iddia, sömürgeciliğin Afrika üzerindeki derin ve kalıcı etkisinin nasıl gerçekleştiğidir. Afrika'nın kaynaklarının sömürülmesi, sömürge yönetimlerinin oluşturulması ve bunların Afrika halkları için yıkıcı sonuçlarının olduğu ortaya konulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Yazar çalışması ile Avrupa güçler, Afrika'daki sömürgeci motivasyonları ve gerekçelerini ortaya koymaktadır. Avrupalıların Afrika kıtasına doğru yayılmasına neden olan ekonomik, politik ve stratejik çıkarlarını araştırmaktadır. Ayrıca Avrupa'nın kültürel, dinsel ve ideolojik tutumları da tartışılmaktadır. Kitap, Afrika perspektifine odaklanarak güçlü bir yaklaşım ortaya koymakta ve Afrika halklarının Avrupalı işgalcilere karşı direnişi hakkında bilgiler sunmaktadır. Bir başka deyişle, Afrikalı liderlerin ve halkların sömürgecilere karşı direnerek topraklarını, kültürlerini korumak için benimsedikleri stratejileri de tartışmaktadır.

Kitap dört bölüm ve otuz yedi kısımdan oluşmaktadır. Ünlü tarihçi yazar Pakenham, Afrika'nın sömürgeleşmesindeki önemli olayları ve kişileri tasvir etmek için kapsamlı ve uzun dönemli araştırmalara ve ilgili ülkelerden elde edilen arşiv çalışmalarına ve zengin birincil kaynaklara başvurmuştur. Ayrıca ayrıntılarla dolu kapsamlı bir anlatım ile eserde, bu çalkantılı dönemin karmaşıklıklarını ve insani boyutlarına da yer vermektedir. Afrika Paylaşımı tarihini Dr. Livingstone'un 1873'teki ölümünü anlatan kısa bir önsöz ile başlatmaktadır. Daha sonra Belçika Kralı Leopold'un 1876'da Kongo'da kendi özel derebeyliğini kurma girişimleriyle devam etmektedir. Avrupalı önderlerden Bismarck, Stanley, Rhodes, Glastone, Kraliçe Viktoria ve Kaiser Wilhelm gibi ana karakterleri tanıtmalarının yanı sıra Afrika'daki önemli yerel isimler olan Dr. Emin Paşa, Menelik, Lebengula ve Tıppu Tıp gibi önemli yerel aktörlerin de yer vermekte ve rollerini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Yazar, Güney Afrika'dan Tunus'a, Hartum'dan Stanley Şelalerine, Kahire'den Kongo'ya, Zanzibar'dan Nijer'e neredeyse tüm kıta geçişini ele almaktadır.

Kitabın bölüm içeriklerinden bahsedecek olursak yazar, özsöz kısmında Dr. David Livingstone'ın mücadelesini ve köle ticaretini ifşa etmesinin yanı sıra Afrika'nın Ticaret-Hristiyanlık-Medeniyetin (*Commerce, Christianity, Civilisation*) baş harflerini temsil eden 'üç C' ile kurtarılması çağrısı ile başlamaktadır. Sömürge ateşinin Avrupa'yı sarması üzerine deniz aşırı arayışlara giren Avrupalılar, dördüncü 'C' olan fetih (*Conquer*) arayışı ile Afrika'ya yönelmişlerdir. Ticaret, Hristiyanlık ve medeniyet kavramları unutulmuş dönemin sembolü Maxim topu ile Afrika kolonilerinde vahşetler yaşanmaya başlandığı anlatılmaktadır.



Sekiz bölümden oluşan birinci kısımda ise, Avrupalı kâşiflerin kıtanın iç bölgelerine doğru yolculuklarına yer verilmektedir. Afrika'nın iç bölgelerindeki dağlara, nehirleri ismini veren kaşiflerin gözlemlerine yer verirken aynı zamanda Avrupa'daki politikacıların Afrika'ya dair karmaşık stratejilerini de vurgu yapmaktadır. Altı bölümden oluşan ikinci kısımda ise Avrupalı güçlerin Afrika'daki rekabetlerini ele almaktadır. Orta ve Batı Afrika'da Fransız ve İngiliz mücadelesine odaklanırken, aynı zamanda Alman Bismarck'taki fikir değişikliğinin nedenlerini açıklamaktadır.

On yedi bölümden oluşan üçüncü kısımda ise Avrupalılar tarafından Afrika'nın nasıl fethedilerek paylaşıldığına odaklanmaktadır. Bu bölümde yazar, Avrupalı güçlerin Afrika kıtası üzerindeki iddialarını, askeri faaliyetlerini, anlaşmalarını ve diplomatik hamlelerine dikkat çekmektedir. Ayrıca, Batı Afrika'da Fransızlara, Güney Afrika'da Zulu'ların İngilizlere karşı ortaya koyduğu mücadele gibi birçok direniş örnekleri ile Afrikalı liderlerin ve halkların mücadelesine vurgu yapmaktadır. Bu bölümdeki fetihler süresince ortaya konulan zorla çalıştırma, yüksek vergilerin yanı sıra yerel kültürlerin ve geleneklerin yok edilmesi gibi Avrupalı sömürgecilerin vahşetini ve duyarsızlığını ortaya koymaktadır. Avrupalılar tarafından Afrika'ya getirilen çiçek hastalığı gibi benzer rahatsızlıkların yıkıcı etkileri de yer verilmektedir. Ayrıca bu bölümde, Sudan'da görevli olan İngiliz komutan Gordon'un akıbeti, bir Osmanlı Paşası olan Dr. Emin'in durumu, Salisbury'in pazarlığı, Rodezya'daki mücadele, Fildişi savaşı, Milner savaşı ve Sudan'daki Mehdi hareketinin sonu ile ilgili olaylar da açıklanmaktadır.

Dördüncü kısım ise altı bölümden oluşan direniş ve reform kısmıdır. Bu kısımda, Belçika'nın Kongo'da yapmış olduğu insanlık dışı uygulamalar, Alman Kralı Kayser'in Alman Güneybatı Afrika'sındaki mücadelesi, Alman Doğu Afrika'sındaki Maji-Maji isyanı, Fransız Kongo'sunun kurtarılması, Britanya'nın mücadelesi ve Leopold'un sonu anlatılmaktadır. Son bölümlerde yazar, Afrika paylaşımının uzun vadeli sonuçlarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu kısımda, sömürgeci Avrupalı güçler tarafından çizilen sınırların dilsel, kültürel ve etnik bölünmeleri görmezden geldiğini ve gelecekteki çatışmaların tohumlarının nasıl ekildiği tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca sömürgeciliğin Afrika siyaseti, ekonomisi ve sosyal yapısı üzerinde nasıl kalıcı etki oluşturduğu belirtilmektedir.

Kitap, 1876-1912 yılları arası Afrika tarihi olarak okunabilecek ender bir çalışmalardan biridir. Yazar tarafından Afrika'nın Avrupalılar tarafından nasıl paylaşıldığına dair kapsamlı ve ikna edici bir üslup benimsenirken eser de akıcı bir tarihsel bir anlatım ile yazılmıştır. Kıtada Avrupalı güçler arasındaki rekabeti ve çatışmayı ortaya koymasının yanı sıra Avrupalıların neden olduğu insanlık dramları da yer verilmiştir. Eser içerisinde birçok önemli karakterlere yer

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verilerek karakterler tanıtılmış ve olay örgüsü tanıtılan karakterler üzerinden açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Yazar, önemli karakterlerin iyi ya da kötü tanımlamalarından ziyade neyin önemli insanları harekete geçirmeye neden olduğunu açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Çalışmanın eleştirilecek hususların başında çok fazla karakterin (Bismarck, Stanley, Rhodes, Glastone, Kraliçe Viktoria ve Kaiser Wilhelm, Dr. Emin Paşa, Menelik, Lebengula ve Tippu Tip) eserde yer almasıdır. Afrika tarihini bu karakterler üzerinden okuması eleştiriye açık bir durum oluşturmaktadır. Ayrıca Avrupa merkezli yazılmış olması bir diğer eleştirilebilecek husustur. Bu durum çalışmanın Afrikalı sömürgeleştirilenlerden ziyade Avrupalı sömürgecilerle ilgili olduğu değerlendirmeleri yapılabilir. Avrupalı beş ülkenin (Fransa, Birleşik Krallık, Almanya, Belçika ve İtalya) Afrika'daki sömürge faaliyetlerinden bahsederken, Portekiz gibi Afrika'da kolonileri olan ülkelerden yeteri kadar bahsedilmemektedir. Son olarak kitabın Türkçe'ye çevrilmesinde sehven olduğu değerlendirilen ve bir sonraki baskıda düzetilebilecek birçok yazım hatasının olduğu görülmüştür.

Sonuç olarak yazar bu çalışması ile 1876-1912 arası Afrika tarihindeki önemli olayların kapsamlı bir anlatımını yapmakta ve Avrupalı güçlerin kıtaya yönelik eylemlerini ve motivasyonlarına ışık tutmaktadır. Ayrıca yazar, bu dönemin Afrika toplulukları üzerindeki etkisini incelemiş ve sömürgeciliğin kıta üzerindeki kalıcı etkilerini ortaya koymuştur. Böylece yazar, Afrika tarihi ve sömürgecilik gibi konuların yanı sıra Avrupalı güçlerin Afrika kıtası üzerindeki etkisini inceleyen okuyucuları, öğrencileri ve akademisyenleri, bu çalışma ile Avrupalıların Afrika'ya yönelik politikaları üzerinde düşünmeye davet etmektedir. Yazar, Avrupalı devlet yöneticilerinin bencil çıkarları ile misyoner ve kâşiflerin iyi niyetleri arasında ayırım yapmaya çalışmakta, Dr. Livingstone gibi kâşifler ve misyonerlerin Afrika ve halkı ile ilgili daha fazla keşfe odaklandığını, ancak Kral Leopold gibi Avrupalı diğer yöneticilerin Afrika'dan sömürecekleri ekonomik ve siyasi faydalarla ilgilendiğini savunmaktadır. Afrika'nın birçok ülkesinde temel eser olarak okutulan Pakenham'ın kitabı, Avrupalı güçlerin Afrika'daki sömürgecilik yaklaşımlarını ve rekabetlerinin yanı sıra günümüz Afrika'sını anlamak için okunmaya değer bir çalışmadır.

